Bhopinder Singh
COVID realities have compelled the armed forces to make adaptive changes. For this, the leadership has to be politically literate, sophisticated but still daringly apolitical in its conduct
Like all domains, the armed forces will be forced into making adaptive changes necessitated by the COVID reality. As a lean-mean fighting machine, the onus of recalibrating the Army’s professional essentialities and sensibilities will not fall on “generalist” bureaucrats or the temporary politicos who hold the reins of the Defence Ministry but will rely on the senior leadership of the armed forces, euphemistically the “Generalship” of all fighting services. Over the years, the strategic thinking and calculus of the armed forces have evolved to incorporate the fluid reality and inevitability of diverse security realms. For example, nuclear threats, slow-bleed insurgencies, integrated commands and cyber warfare, among others. Now, to meet the COVID imperatives, the tradition-bound armed forces will require the most intellectual, innovative and convention-challenging strategic callisthenics that would be called upon such “Generalship.”
The most reassuring starting point is the unmistakable calibre, ethos and conduct of the ranks and the junior-to-middle leadership, which require fundamental soldiering attributes ie, physical, psychological and moral discipline of the “core” mass. The recent martyrdom of Col Ashutosh Sharma, Major Anuj Sood, Naik Rajesh and Lance Naik Dinesh (and Jammu & Kashmir police’s sub-inspector Sageer Pathan) in Handwara was reflective of the Indian Army’s “unlimited liability” where the officer-cadres lead from the front, unlike any other military in the world. The already twice gallantry-decorated commanding officer, Col Sharma, is a personification of the long list of bravehearts like Colonel MN Rai, Major Mukund Varadarajan and countless others who have given the Indian armed forces the highest “officer-to-soldier” fatality ratio in combat operations compared to any counter-insurgency operation in the world.
The Kargil war was yet another display of the supreme valour, raw grit and unparalleled josh of the “core” junior-to-middle leadership that defied conventional logic, firepower ratios and assumptions that typified the ground situation and prevailed before retaking those unforgiving heights. Yet, it is the peripheral tasks and expectations beyond this “core” of the Indian security framework that has not lived up to the parallel performance of the “core.” Take the example of the much-talked-about “Made in India.” The defence industry has repeatedly ensured that the country retains the dubious distinction and vulnerability as the world’s largest importer of weaponry.
The winning USP of the tactical and operational competence of this “core” junior-to-middle military leadership must be force-multiplied with the matching mental vigour, erudition and strategic thought of the “Generalship” that subsumes the increasingly complex world of symmetric, asymmetric and mutative threats and institutional perceptions.
In today’s context, the “Generalship” must demonstrate leadership beyond the tactical and operational realm that is managed exceptionally well by the “core” and envisage the higher orders of geo-strategic, geopolitical, cultural, social, psychological and even political impact of every institutional action and commitment. Routinely invoking and positing the strength of the “core” is certainly justifiable and expected but not enough.
The “Generalship” has to go beyond and contribute its own towards the readiness for tomorrow. All military commitments have a political nudge as the armed forces are the “sword arm” of the nation. But it is incumbent on the “Generalship” to manage, nuance and advise the civilian leadership of the long-term consequences. There are always personal, institutional and cultural concerns at play. Managing the competing expectations and outlook will always determine the steel of the “Generalship.”
Late Field Marshal FM Manekshaw goes down in the annals of history as the complete “General” who did not succumb to political pressures. Instead, he pushed back the establishment for timing, wares and control levers that were in consonance with the basic military requirements. What made Manekshaw so inspirational was his ability to speak truth to power and often contradict the unfounded political assumptions, albeit in a manner that betrayed no political allegiance or preference, personally. The “Generalship” has to be politically literate, sophisticated but still, daringly apolitical in its conduct. Any creeping compromise or perception of political preference could be devastating.
The COVID experience is a classic case of the “unknown” for all arms of governance. It will require specialists, experts and subject immersions that will test the openness, culture and quest for knowledge within the institution. An enlightening culture of fact-based reading and military history was, perhaps, never more relevant than today.
Beyond the Oorah of Marines-bravado of “Mad Dog”, former US Secretary of Defence, Gen James Mattis, also has a lesser known moniker as “warrior monk” as he is said to have a personal collection of over 6,000 books. This “last adult in the Trump administration” was reported to have said, “As commanders and staff officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: How can we coach anything if we don’t know a hell of a lot more than just the [tactics, techniques and procedures]?”
He added presciently, “Darwin has a pretty good theory about the outcome for those who cannot adapt to changing circumstance — in the information age, things can change rather abruptly and at warp speed, especially the moral high ground which our regimented thinkers cede far too quickly in our recent fights.” This was akin to the mercurial and controversial “thinking General,” K Sundarji, who, too, insisted in his famous letter to the officers that “I want that we read more and seriously, think more and seriously, discuss more and seriously and write more and seriously about professional matters!”
COVID is the latest security mutation in the ever-evolving physical, social and political environment that requires constant adaptation in clinical military style. The scope of “security” has just got magnified manifold and this disallows more of the same. The lateral thinking required in such times will still necessitate a robust mix of history, tradition, regimentation, scientific upskilling, equipping and even portents of symbolism. But if the preponderance of only one of these vectors is bought to public imagination, then the institution risks atrophying within. The raw materials and base for ensuring the military of tomorrow are clearly available. We just need the inspiration of a Manekshaw, Sundarji or even the “core” brilliance of the finest combat commander, General Sagat Singh, who forsook limelight for soldiering genius, dignity and restraint.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands)
DISCLAIMER:
The views expressed in the Article above are Bhopinder Singh’s personal views and kashmiribhatta.in is not responsible for the opinions expressed in the above article.
Courtesy: Pioneer: 13th May, 2020