M K Bhadrakumar
Sanctions as coercive diplomacy are as old as the hills, traceable at least from the time of the ancient Greeks, when in 432 BC, the Athenian Empire imposed a trade embargo on neighbouring Megara. The ostensible reason was the Megarians’ trespass on land sacred to Demeter, the goddess of fertility, and the killing of the Athenian herald who was despatched to their city to reproach them. It was an act of revenge. However, rather than bludgeon the Megarians to submission, the sanctions prompted them to seek help from Sparta, which in turn became one of the factors that triggered the calamitous Peloponnesian War that ended Athenian hegemony in classical history. Sanctions can have unintended
consequences.
The lessons of those times live on in the present day. Sanctions are ineffective unless they are universal. Cut off one supply and the adversary will find another. The failure of the severe US sanctions on Cuba to bring Fidel Castro to heel is the best example. That’s why sanctions were rarely used as tool of statecraft – that is, until the Americans made them
fashionable.
The Indian establishment ought to figure out the matrix of sanctions, as the government is likely considering trade curbs on Turkey and Malaysia in retaliation to their leaders’ critical comments on the J&K situation. The Ministry of External Affairs has reportedly sensitised concerned quarters to ‘go slow on all diplomatic and business relationship with Turkey and Malaysia as part of retaliatory measures.’
India has taken umbrage at Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad’s remarks at the UN General Assembly session in New York in September that ‘despite UN resolution on J&K, the country has been invaded and occupied’. Mahathir called on India to ‘work with Pakistan to resolve this problem’.
Mahathir has since insisted with characteristic stubbornness, ‘We will speak our minds. We will not retract or change what we’ve said. We felt that the people of Kashmir had benefited from the UN resolution, and all countries should abide by it, not just India or Pakistan but even the US. Otherwise, what’s the use of having the UN?’
In similar vein, Turkish President Recep Erdogan said in his speech at the UNGA, ‘One of the problems to which the international community still does not devote enough attention is the Kashmir conflict, which awaits a solution for 72 years.’ He added that in order for the ‘Kashmiri people to look at a safe future together with their Pakistani and Indian neighbours, it is imperative to solve the problem through dialogue and on the basis of justice and equity, and not through collision.’
Frankly, there’s nothing so very explosive in what Erdogan or Mahathir said, except perhaps the latter’s interpretation of J&K’s accession. But Mahathir is known to be an original thinker. Erdogan has been rather modest despite the fact that like Mahathir, he too is under the spell of the charming Pakistan PM Imran Khan.
When the Modi government espouses the message of ‘universal brotherhood’ and seeks to ‘turn this world into a garden of peace’ – to borrow from Modi – why such petulance? Modi should go ahead with the planned visit to Turkey. If we are unable to communicate with experienced statesmen like Mahathir and Erdogan, it reflects poorly on our diplomacy. Both are known to be pragmatic leaders, their ideological convictions notwithstanding. And Malaysia and Turkey are resilient nations living in a tough neighbourhood.
So, where lies the problem? In the case of Turkey at least, I can recall the parting advice by then Foreign Secretary K Raghunath when I was assigned to Ankara as ambassador in 1998. He made two profound observations: one, that Turkey has a glorious history spanning centuries as practitioner of international diplomacy and it should be possible to get through to them to moderate their unfriendly stance on Kashmir and their irrational backing of Pakistan; and, two, the key lies in intensifying the bilateral relationship and deepening strategic communication.
During the next three years, we could transform the relationship beyond recognition, thanks largely to the high-level exchanges between intelligence agencies, in particular the four-day visit to Turkey by then Deputy PM and Home Minister LK Advani, accompanied by AK Doval representing the Intelligence Bureau, and the three-day visit separately by the head of R&AW, AS Dulat. Ankara, which kept contacts with Kabul and Kandahar, significantly enhanced our understanding of the Taliban regime. The Turkish pragmatism surged as then parliamentary leader of Turkey’s present ruling party, Abdullah Gul – Erdogan was in prison at that time – turned up with a dozen ‘Islamist’ opposition MPs (some wearing head scarves) to Hilton Ankara for the launch of our friendship group. The meridian was reached when at PM Vajpayee’s invitation, Bulent Ecevit visited India in 2000 – overflying Pakistan.
The Turkish stance on Kashmir had entirely changed by then. My sense is that something of that goodwill and understanding is still traceable in Erdogan’s remarks, if we assimilate them properly. The world is not tailor-made for us and has own perceptions of the J&K situation, no matter our self-righteous narrative. Winning over dissenters isn’t easy but is doable. Sanctions are not the way forward. What we need is an intensification of diplomacy, as Raghunath thoughtfully observed 20 years ago. Ankara and Kuala Lumpur are key regional capitals that India shouldn’t alienate. Mahathir and Erdogan are headstrong leaders who can’t be browbeaten, but also are erudite minds amenable to reasoning. The bottomline, of course, is that the appalling J&K situation normalises during the next four-month period, as PM Modi has promised.

DISCLAIMER:

The views expressed in the Article above are M K Bhadrakumar’s personal views and kashmiribhatta.in is not responsible for the opinions expressed in the above article.

Courtesy: The State Times: 11th November, 2019