Inder Malhotra

Two of this country’s neighbours, both of the greatest strategic importance to it, Afghanistan and Burma (now called Myanmar), are in deep trouble. They are also undergoing enormous agony. But sadly New Delhi is paying them scant attention. For many months they have hardly figured either in official thinking or in the media.

One reason for this unhappy state of affairs is our preoccupation with our own multiplying and mounting woes at home. For instance, on top of all the communal, caste and sectarian divisions has come the explosive fallout of the Srikrishna report on Mumbai’s horrendous riots and of the Maharashtra government’s brusque rejection of the judicial commission’s findings.

The demand for strict action against the Shiv Sena supremo, Mr Bal Thackeray, on the strength of the commission’s indictment of him (and his own admission that at the height of the conflict his writings might have been “inflammatory”) is bound to grow. The two Yadav chieftains, Mr Mulayam Singh and Mr Laloo Prasad, heartened by their Lucknow rally, have escalated their “crusade” to unseat the BJP governments in both Delhi and Lucknow. The unabated tension over Kashmir built up by Pakistan, combined with the continuing nuclear dialogue with the USA is also weighing on the Vajpayee government’s mind.

However, there is another, rather regrettable, reason why neighbours like Burma and Afghanistan are not on the “Indian radar screen”, notwithstanding India’s high stakes in them. Because of sheer mental inertia, most Indians, including those charged with the responsibility of ruling the country, have begun to believe that India’s only neighbours are the six other members of SAARC. Only in times of stress, such as in 1962 or during the recent polemics with Beijing over the nuclear tests, does it dawn on most people that India’s largest, most powerful and most important neighbour is China. That Indonesia is a neighbour of this country, not merely in maritime sense but also because its island of Sumatra is barely 90 miles from the Andamans is not recognised even now.

In the case of Burma and Afghanistan, however, things used to be different. Through large parts of the Nehru era, Delhi and Rangoon (now Yangon) used to be in close touch at least thrice a week at the level of Prime Ministers. Later, partly because Burma, under military rule that has somehow gone on in different guises since 1962, things changed. But South Block was never so unmindful of Burma as it appears to be now.

Unlike Burma, which has a long and mutually agreed border with India, Afghanistan does not abut on Indian frontier because of the subcontinent’s partition in 1947. But, quite apart from historical ties, in purely strategic terms, the land of Afghans has been a close friend and neighbour of this country. Until the late Soviet Union’s tanks and troops rolled into Kabul in December, 1979, relations between India and Afghanistan were the friendliest and most cooperative.

Since then the story has been dismal and tragic. It now looks like turning catastrophic. The standoff between the Pakistan-backed Taliban — no Islamic entity anywhere is more fundamentalist — and the Northern Alliance headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Uzbek leader, Gen Rashid Dostum, could be ending in a Taliban victory.

The Taliban’s jubilant claim of having taken over Mazar-e-Sharif, the bastion of the Northern Alliance, is still disputed. However, bitter fighting is focused on this all-important city. It is possible, indeed probable, therefore that the Taliban might be in control of Mazar-e-Sharif before long. Even that would leave the legendary Tajik warlord, Ahmed Shah Masood, still in control of this stronghold of Panjshir. He is bitterly opposed to the Taliban and all that it stands for. But it is doubtful if he can keep the Taliban at bay for too long.

How has this ominous situation, fraught with the gravest repercussions, developed? After all, General Dostum and the Northern Alliance had beaten back the Taliban’s earlier offensive at the start of this year despite the temporary defection to the Taliban of one of General Dostum’s principal acolytes. This time round, however, it seems that factionalism within the Northern Alliance has proved to be more destructive than factional strife within the Taliban even though this organisation represents almost exclusively the Pushtoons in a society which is divided bitterly along ethnic and tribal lines.

It is also clear that Iran, Uzbekistan and, at one remove, Russia, which are principal supporters of the Northern Alliance, have not been able to match the massive support given to the Taliban by their mentors, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have contributed money and material. Pakistan’s contribution also includes fighting men, such as ISI operatives, ex-servicemen and carefully selected serving officers. Teheran has pertinently pointed out that the Taliban is but a “creature of the Pakistani ISI”. On the other hand, Pakistan has never made a secret of its hope that a like-minded regime in Afghanistan would lend Pakistan “strategic depth” that it has lacked all along.

Above all, the Pakistani gameplan has benefited a lot from America’s quiet withdrawal of its earlier reservations about the Taliban. Since the US policy in the region is driven by the oil companies entrusted with the task of establishing control of Central Asia’s gargantuan oil and mineral resources, and to get them to the sea without having to transport them across either Russia or Iran, Washington may well have decided that a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan would suit its purpose.

There is no guarantee that the gameplan will necessarily succeed. For, the Afghans are not only deeply divided but also volatile. More importantly, they are staunch nationalists, as the British and the Russians have discovered in the past, and the Americans and the Pakistanis might do in future.

Unfortunately, India is nowhere in the picture. At this late stage we may not be able to do much. But surely we can speak up — in sympathy with the Afghan people who have suffered more since the withdrawal of the last Russian soldier than during the occupation by the Soviet Union. Delhi can also urge the UN to bestir itself and bring about an all-Afghan conference as a prelude to ending the agony of the Afghans.

If climacteric developments are taking place in Afghanistan, in Burma, a stalemate that is wholly oppressive for the people has been frozen. By a strange coincidence the day on which the Taliban claimed to have captured Mazar-e-Sharif was also the 10th anniversary of the terrible crackdown by the Burmese military on the people’s movement for democracy.

On that day, the military junta, through a tremendous show of force, prevented any popular demonstration. But there is no doubt that Burma boils under the lid. It is not accidental that Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party won a huge majority in parliamentary elections eight years ago, has fixed August 21 as the deadline for the restoration of the parliament that was never allowed to meet.

Nothing may be gained by shouting. Especially at a time when India must be careful that the regime in Rangoon is not driven completely into China’s embrace. But surely there is room for quiet diplomacy. In particular, with members of the ASEAN who have invited Burma to join their fold.

DISCLAIMER:

The views expressed in the Article above are Author’s personal views and kashmiribhatta.in is not responsible for the opinions expressed in the above article.

Courtesy: The Tribune: 12 August, 1998