Ramesh Davesar 

The National Security Council in its present form is dependent on a single channel. The need is to give its charter broad representation so it becomes the focus of all decision-making relating to national security

Prevailing global geopolitical scenario — ranging from bilateral disputes, power blocks’ strategic interests and the looming threat of terrorism — all manifesting towards the revival of a ‘Cold war-like situation’, led to the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 by various countries with the US taking the lead. Closer home, hostile postures along our international border, Line of Control (LOC), cross-border terrorism and the ongoing Maoists threat too warrant an effective and meaningful outfit to not only preserve the nation’s physical integrity but to safeguard our economic interests from outside intervention.

India, therefore, created its NSC in 1998, thereby encompassing the broad Charter to rally allies and isolate military threats, marshal economic power and resources, maintain the Armed Forces and optimise its potential in civil defence, counter insurgence and terrorism. One wonders why it took so long for India to think of raising this Charter, knowing it very well that our independence came with inherited hostilities from our neighbours — in October 1947, Pakistan ventured military intervention to annex Jammu & Kashmir. Since then, we have had four major wars with Pakistan and China.

Ironically, India was also thrust upon the legacy of personality oriented national policies set out by Jawaharlal Nehru. National security is a case in point which was virtually relegated to “not so important list” when he summarily rejected the Paper on Defence Policy of India prepared by General Robert Lockhart, the first Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, in 1947 with the remarks: “Rubbish, total rubbish, we do not need a Defence Plan, our policy is non-violence. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the Army! The Police are good enough to meet our security needs.”

The outcome was evident with China annexing the Aksai Chin, which was followed by India’s humiliating defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Though we reversed this trend during the 1965 and 1971 wars, it somehow got ingrained in our national psyche and took over 50 years to formally concede the significance of national security when on November 19, 1998, NSC was setup with Brijesh Mishra as the first National Security Advisor (NSA).

Now, with the NSC being two-decades-old, we need to carry out an audit to assess its performance and streamline procedures to achieve tactical and strategic objectives. There are ample reasons to believe that the NSC was created, like any other organisation, without going into professional imperatives leading to subjective appointments, which further led to amateur decisions like conceding our involvement in Balochistan at Sharm-el Sheikh and allowing Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence comprise a team to visit Pathankot air base. These are indelible policy failures.

We must be clear that national security and military potential are synonymous to each other. Security of a country is measured by its military potential. Going by this adage, it is axiomatic that our national security mechanism must also be headed and well-represented by those with military background, albeit corresponding representations from other fields, such as economic, intelligence and foreign affairs.

Conversely, the ground situation is totally incongruent to its core spirit with minimal or marginal military voice. While both NSA and Deputy NSA are from civil stream, the Armed Forces are relegated as members of the strategic policy group. Prima facie, it appears that we have not been able to come out from the shackles of Nehruvian security model of keeping the Armed Forces out of the National Planning Policy, which was willy-nilly pursued by subsequent regimes.

The military high command stood isolated from decision-making. The main Charter of the NSC is to formulate national military strategies. With marginal representation from the Armed Forces, how do we perceive accomplishing it? Forget that, even routine functionig of the Armed Forces has been seriously impinged — the NSA is functioning as the de-facto Chief of Defence Staff. The manner in which the Pathankot air base counter-terrorism operation was conducted, and the preferred deployment of the NSG to Army Special Forces located just 150 kms away, are glaring exacerbations into military operations. This set the precedence of such intrusions in the future. Counter insurgencies, as universally accepted, are military-centric operations, and it goes without saying that officers in the Armed Forces are best suited to advise the political set up.

As regards appointment of the Security Advisor to Jammu & Kashmir Governor in the wake political reshuffle, the moot point is: Who should have been more suitable: Whether the retired Army/Corps Commanders, who have operated in that area, or an IPS officer without such exposure? Such actions also indicate serious covert attempts to not only clip the wings of the Armed Forces but also superimpose the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) over them.

Now look at other countries who uphold military values and impose faith in their Armed Forces. Russia took the lead and appointed General Alexander Lebed as the NSA Chairman in 1996, followed by Israel, where Major General Yaakov Amidror succeeded Netanyahu as Security Chief in 2012. They went ahead and on record acknowledged that performance of the NSC had been most effective under the Army General. On the other hand, France has unique security mechanisms. The Estate Major Particular (EMP) is an elite group of high-ranking military officers posted in the President’s office as advisors. Additionally, they have a prestigious “military think tank” who advises the French NSC equivalent on security matters.

As a take off step, we must improve the military representation in the NSC. And to start with, it could be the NSA. But most appositely, there is a need to clear the long-awaited appointment of Chief of Defence Staff, who can pursue military interests and assist the NSC in enhancing its operational efficiency. The bottom line is: Armed Forces are sine qua non and must be accepted as the major stakeholder in the National Security Policy Planning.

Now look at other aspects — one issue where we have maximum beating is our total lack of intelligence, both externally and internally, resulting in unabated deterioration of internal situation, free flow of ‘slush money’ from the Gulf and indiscriminate expansionism of Wahhabism in the Valley. Elsewhere, of late, agitations have undergone drastic changes and have turned into a violent mob, inflicting avoidable loss to property and life: Dera Sacha Sauda flare up, the Dalit agitation at Bhima Koregaon and the Maratha reservation agitations are recent instances of macabrism. It is prudent to assume that these developments have not happened overnight. The Wahhabi movement, for instance, stepped up its operations in the last 12-15 years and the number of Wahhabi-controlled mosques has now gone upto 2,000 in the Valley.

All these developments raise serious questions on the efficacy of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Foremost, the requirement is to induct professionalism, integrate various agencies into one entity to effect collective processing of intelligence inputs. We should also explore tie ups with security agencies of other countries to share or exchange intelligence.

Professionalism is inversely proportional to favouritism and yet again, this thumb rule has been repeatedly put on test. The 32-member National Security Advisory Board, the third arm of the NSC, is supposed to have been organised by drawing non-Government personalities with expertise in security, defence, intelligence and strategic affairs. But its purpose got defeated when 26 retired officers were rehabilitated with only six members meeting the criteria. Though later, in January 15, its strength was pruned to four.

Overall analysis of the performance of NSC vis-a-vis its objectives leads to one deduction: It must switch over from vacation to vocational mould. Foremost, in order to maintain the continuum as also to ensure accountability, the NSC needs to be legislatively institutionalised as a constitutional body.

It must be structured in an objective manner by taking only those with requisite professional culture on whole time basis; tendency to accommodate retired civil servants or the favourites must be curbed. The Charter of all committees and the NSA in particular needs to be redefined. It should open new channels of information so that the political leadership is not dependent on a single channel. The US, Israel and other Western countries have highly developed national security infrastructure. Suiting our requirements and security threats as also keeping in mind the future evolution, we surely can explore inheriting their experience.

(Ramesh Davesar is a retired Infantry Officer with vast operational experience)

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The views expressed in the Article above are Author’s personal views and kashmiribhatta.in is not responsible for the opinions expressed in the above article.

Courtesy: Pioneer: 25 Aug 2018