Pravin Sawhney
India appears all set to buy the S-400 missile systems from Russia. But to recalibrate its relationship with Moscow, it must allay all Russia’s concerns — including accepting its ties with Pakistan
The Russian S-400 Air Defence Missile Defence (ADMS) system has been elevated from a weapon system to symbolise the re-set of Prime Minister Narindra Modi's foreign policy: From being a global power to a balancing power, which, given its national attributes, it actually is.
Global powers have credible Hard Power comprising economic, technological, military and defence-industrial capabilities. Balancing powers, on the other hand, are those who maintain
even relations with all geo-strategic or global players who have the capability, capacity and political will to influence events beyond their borders.
In an interview on May 30, 2015, Prime Minister Modi had said, “It is clear in my mind we are no more just a balancing power, but a global player”. That belief came crashing in the aftermath of the 2017 Doklam crisis, when India realised that its tactical victory was short-lived.
China had, in the winter months of 2017-2018, started mobilising its military capabilities for a likely border war which would have jeopardised Modi’s 2019 General Election plans. Once this reality dawned, the Prime Minister sought two informal summits in quick time — with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi.
The Wuhan understanding arrived in April 2018 and ensured that both sides were satisfied. China agreed to keep the disputed border peaceful, that Modi wanted. And, India agreed to cooperate with China on development and connectivity projects in the neighbourhood, as Xi desired.
In order to ensure that Xi kept his side of the promise despite a few provocations (which could not be ruled out with General Elections looming large), Prime Minister Modi met Putin in Sochi to make him the confidante of the Wuhan understanding since he is the only global leader Xi would listen to.
To spur Putin to do his bidding, Modi offered to invest more time in strengthening ties with Russia, and to sign the S-400 contract, which had been hanging fire since over two years.
Signed as an inter-governmental agreement in October 2016, the S-400 contract, according to the head of the Russian Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, was expected to be signed by the
middle of 2017. His assessment was premised on the fact that the Defence Acquisition Council had cleared the deal in December 2015. Since then, the S-400 file has been shuttling between the Finance Ministry and the Prime Minister’s office.
There were two reasons why the Modi Government was hesitant to sign the deal. The first was the cost. Russians were asking for close to six billion dollar for five regiments of the weapon system without any ‘Make in India’ and offsets component.
They, however, were willing to set up maintenance facilities in India; help integrate the S-400 with India’s indigenous systems like Akash (which was made with Russian hand-holding); expedite procurement despite having a full order book till 2022; and consider the transformational S-500 system (with capability to kill low-earth satellites) which are under trials for sales to India.
Once the Contract-Negotiation-Committee (CNC), comprising Russian and Indian officials started work, Moscow appeared more amenable. The price was brought down substantially close to five-and-half billion dollar; Moscow offered to transfer the S-400 in the Russian military inventory to India over two to three years; and showed flexibility on payments.
It soon became clear that price, though an issue, was not the main concern. It was India’s growing partnership with the United States and the belief that it could help position India as a rival to China in a multipolar Asia.
Since Russia was close to China and was building relationship with Pakistan, India, while downplaying its traditional ties and special support in areas of civil nuclear reactors, defence technology and procurements, kept ties with Moscow at a low keel.
Welcoming the opportunity, the US, which views India as the maritime pivot in the Indian Ocean region, sought interoperability (ability to fight together on common mission) through defence sales, military bilateral and multi-lateral exercises, and by seeking to align India’s foreign policy objectives with its own.
Delhi was asked to sign the two fundamental agreements which would allow inter-operability by greater transparency in classified equipment onboard US platforms bought by India.
In a symbolic gesture to highlight India’s grown status, the US re-named its largest theatre command as the Indo-Pacific command. This suggested a role for India across the two Oceans — Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Just when Prime Minister Modi thought India had got recognition as a global power based much on his personal diplomacy style, Doklam happened followed by the re-set, a euphemism for the forced foreign policy correction. The coming days would likely witness a major shift in India’s relations with Russia. While side-stepping the US’ concern (impact on growing interoperability) and threats (of sanctions) Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has been emphatic on buying S-400.
Each S-400 regiment comprises two batteries with four launchers each; this makes a total of 40 launchers for five regiments. Five regiments of S-400 will protect two to three major Indian cities, including the capital city of New Delhi.
Interestingly, India has ordered a total of 1,000 missiles in the very long-range and long-range category (range 400km), with none in the medium and short ranges category.
Sitharaman has not ruled out considering the Russia Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) — SU-57 — at a later date. Supposed to be a joint development programme, India had pulled out of the detailed design and development stage on differences regarding the distribution of work and technology transfer with Russia. However, the SU-57 might well emerge as the dark horse in the new race for the acquisition of fighters for the Indian Air Force.
As India once again works on deepening its relationship with Moscow, it will have to come to terms with Russia’s ties with Pakistan. In 2004, Russia under Putin took the unusual step of supporting Pakistan. Speaking to this writer, the Russian Ambassador to India, VI Trubnikov had said, “Our relations with Islamabad have their own agenda chiefly aimed at developing trade and economic ties and cooperation at the anti-terrorist front. They [Pakistan] have always been and will remain subject to our greater and traditional interest for stability in South Asia.”
(Pravin Sawhney is editor, FORCE newsmagazine)
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Courtesy: Pioneer: Thursday, 19 July 2018