Nalin Kumar Mohapatra   

Four major developments have taken place in the Eurasian space since 2017 Astana Summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) having an impact on its geopolitical structure. These are: spurt in strategic rivalry among Russia, China and the United States, thus having an impact on security architecture of Eurasia. Second, re-election of Vladimir Putin for the fourth time as Russian President that gave a decisive blow to West’s obsession for regime change in Russia. Similar developments have also occurred in China where Xi Jinping became the President for life without any election. Third, despite international efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan, there is prolonged instability. Fourth, informal diplomacy initiated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to mend fences with China and Russia during his visit to both the countries ahead of Shanghai Summit at Qingdao. Some of the above strategic developments shaped the trajectories of the SCO Summit held on June 9-10, 2018.

One interesting issue which generated much debate in the Qingdao Summit is that the Summit has failed to arrive at a consensus on the OBOR project which the Chinese are promoting to expand their sphere of influence across the globe. In fact, they are using Eurasian region as a launching pad for operationalisation of the OBOR. One may underline here that the Chinese policy-makers are promoting infrastructure connectivity as a means for fulfilling its role as a “trading state” to paraphrase Richard Rosecrance word. Modi in his address to the plenary session summed up India’s position on the OBOR by stating, “We welcome connectivity projects that are inclusive, sustainable and transparent, and respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The speech of Modi reflects India’s opposition to the pursuing of “grand imperial” design of China through connectivity. Indian PM’s speech has also to be understand in a context because over the years both in Central Asia (which Beijing treat as “extended periphery”) as well as in Russia there is a growing resentment among the masses towards Chinese penetration. This is happening despite the fact that political leadership of these states are with China for reaping some short-term benefits from this “connectivity project”. The growing indignation at Chinese penetration in Central Asia can be evident from the fact that in April in Kyrgyzstan’s Jalalabad province, the locals torched one Chinese joint project (Times of Central Asia, April 13, 2018). Similar incidents can also be noticed in other states through which the OBOR is going through. In 2016, there was a growing protest in Kazakhstan when the Nazarbaev regime brought out a law for land reforms. As a result, the Government was forced to cancel the new legislations. (Astana Times, August 23, 2016). Kazakh analysts are of the opinion that if this process continues, they may act as a satellite to Chinese economy. Incidentally, in 2013, the Chinese President unveiled his much-hyped OBOR initiative in Astana. Russian policy-makers also understand the malicious intent of the OBOR project. However they are looking towards China to ward off financial sanctions imposed by the West since the Crimea incident. It may be noted that literature of Classical Geopolitics suggest that trade, territorial expansionism and colonisation process go side by side since 15th Century. And Chinese policy on the OBOR is quite similar to the dictum of the above-mentioned geopolitical strands. India’s intention over not to endorse the OBOR initiative at the SCO Summit was evident when, just before the SCO meeting, Modi made a veiled attack on the OBOR in his Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore on June 1 by stating, “We must not only build infrastructure, we must also build bridges of trust”. (MEA,1 June 2018). Modi’s statement can be understood in the context of “trust deficit” over the OBOR project largely due to the overarching role of China. On the other hand, Modi urged for International North South Transport Corridor Project (INSTC) in the Summit as the connectivity project gives a sense of equitability to all the member countries.

The second issue which got much attention in the 17th SCO Summit is the resolute fight against terrorism and extremism. In this regard the Declaration adopted an action plan titled “Programme of Cooperation between the SCO Member States in Opposing Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for 2019-2021”. The Summit also stressed on “UN Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism”. It is a well-known fact that the SCO member states have been experiencing the menace of terrorism even before 9/11. However some member states of SCO, like China and Pakistan, are adopting double standards in fight against terrorism. One may add here that political elite of some of the SCO member states since 1990s (particularly Central Asians) voiced their concern over the overt and covert role being played by Pakistan in supporting terrorist activities to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The political establishment of Pakistan is also providing tacit support to terrorist groups like Taliban and its affiliates. In addition to Islamabad, both Beijing and Moscow too are inching towards cementing its relations with Taliban citing “strategic compulsions”. On the other hand, the four Central Asian SCO member states — Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan — along with India are the bearing the brunt of terror activities carried out by religious extremist groups like Taliban and its sponsored groups. This raises serious apprehensions as how the SCO can evolve as a common, coherent and effective policy towards fight against terrorist?

In addition to fight against radical religious extremism and terrorism, the SCO Summit at Qingdao also dwelled on narco-trafficking and its impact on regional security. It is an acknowledgeable fact and also supported by United Nations Organisations on Drug and Crime (UNODC) reports that radicalism in Afghanistan and other parts of Eurasia is closely interlinked with production and proliferation of drugs.

One heartening aspect which got attention in the Qingdao SCO Summit was on energy and sustainable security. It has been observed by various energy reports as well as EIA analysis that the largest consumer of energy in the world — China and India —and largest producer of energy — Russia — Kazakhstan along with Iran, which is having an observer status, and Turkmenistan with a guest status — are in this body. This is in addition to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan having largest chunk of hydro reserves in Central Asia. Thus the SCO presents a mosaic picture on the question of energy security. However “energy poverty” in turn is affecting the food security of SCO member countries also. The summit also renewed its emphasis on accessibility to clean energy in the form of renewable energy and discussed at length on repercussion of climate change on human security. It may be noted that some of the SCO states are the worst victims because of climate change. What hinders in achieving sustainable energy security is lack of institutional coordination among the SCO member states in ensuring free flow of energy. Some of the states like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are also reeling under a spell of “energy poverty” a phenomenon associated with “lack of accessibility” to energy.

Looking, at the declarations of Qingdao SCO Summit, how one envisages its role in promoting security and stability of Eurasia? In this regard four issues need attention. First, though the SCO operates as a cohesive bloc, within this regional group two simultaneous alliances are in operation. One led by China, both Pakistan and Russia serving as tutelage to it and the four Central Asian states are not in a position to challenge Chinese hegemony especially in their bilateral relations. On the other hand India can provide leadership to these Central Asian states in the bloc. Third, the SCO is not taking measures to reprimanding and suspending Pakistan from this organisation despite knowing the fact that it is one of the biggest supporters of terrorism as foreign policy. Finally, over the years, the SCO as a coherent regional bloc failed to evolve shared cultural norms which will facilitate greater interaction among the member countries. Though, some efforts in this regard made in the present SCO Summit by stressing on common Buddhist cultural legacy. This regional body will play a key role in the Eurasian security structure only when it can able to take a consensus decision and no one member state will be allowed to dictate terms as China is doing now.

India should take the lead in the forthcoming SCO Summits to initiate a process to democratise the SCO body further. In this regard it can rally support from four Central Asian states — Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia also.

( Nalin Kumar Mohapatra   is Assistant Professor, CRCAS, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Saturday, 30 June 2018