Rajaram Panda

Kim Jong-un’s master stroke was in sending his sister to Seoul, where she invited Moon to visit Pyongyang for a summit meet, says Rajaram Panda

The North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un staged a diplomatic coup by responding to South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s invitation to send a delegation to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics that South Korea hosted. More striking was that Kim Jong-un won his first “political gold” by sending his sister, Kim Yo Jong, to Seoul. Watched by North Korea’s nominal head of state, Kim Yong Nam, not only North Korean Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon shook hands with Kim Yo Jong, but President Moon also hosted lunch for her in the Blue House, were the young beauty handed over an invitation from her brother to visit Pyongyang for a summit meeting after the Games.

This was nothing short of a coup, particularly when the US Vice-President Mike Pence was present with the sole objective of putting more pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile programmes. Visibly embarrassed, Pence later admitted that he ignored the young woman. A land tour completed the accelerating thaw, which also included some Korean liquor over lunch and the shared joy of watching a “unified” Korea team play hockey at the Olympics. Kim Jong-un’s gold glittered more brightly than rest of other winners.

Having scored publicity points and diplomatic triumph, the next step remains shrouded in mystery. Moon may have gone overboard and might claim success in the first round of his diplomacy of engagement strategy, but this is just an opening for the North Korean leader in responding positively, certainly not surrender. A lot more work needs to be done. Given US President Donald Trump’s tough stance to rein in Kim Jong-un, how much Pence could digest this new bonhomie between the estranged siblings is unclear. The picture of Pence standing stiffly next to Kim Yo Jong at the Olympics Games splashed in newspapers spoke a thousand words. This is because Pence was in Seoul to enforce Trump administration’s no-talk policy without denuclearisation. As if to register his protest, he and his wife refused to join the crowd in standing when the Koreans marched in. While Moon used his sports diplomacy as a route to put aside bitter conflicts that would create space for peaceful sports competition and lead to opening of serious talks, Trump was unwilling to come down from his “fire and fury” position, while promising new and harsher sanctions on the North.

Kim Jong-un may have scored some badly needed publicity points by responding to Moon’s invitation with handshakes by his sister with Moon and extending an invitation to Moon to visit Pyongyang in the near future, but a lasting and positive change in the regional security situation is quite another matter. The issues that divide the Koreas are well known. Kim Jong-un may be seen cozying up to Seoul, but is extremely unlikely to change his policy on nuclear weapons and shall continue to maintain his totalitarian leadership style and expand nuclear arsenals.

Now that Pence is back in Washington and the North Korean delegation in Pyongyang, what can one expect in the inter-Korean relationships in the coming months? Irrespective of the feelings of people in both Koreas towards each other and favourable official climate at present, and despite criticism in Seoul about the Moon Government bearing heavy financial cost for hosting the North Korean delegates, the truism is that Kim Jong-un never had any sense of fear or threat from South Korea. His big fear has always been the US, which is why giving up nuclear weapons is never an option for Kim. By reaching out to the liberals in Seoul, Kim wants to project Trump as the main villain to the world. Kim feels that if he can reach out to Seoul with a hand of friendship and create a mood of detente, it would only lead to weakening Trump’s policy of putting maximum pressure.

There are initial indications that Kim’s strategy is on track as Moon eased a number of sanctions to allow the delegation from North Korea to travel and participate in the Games. Kim was also pleased that Moon succeeded in pushing Trump to postpone the annual US-South Korea military drills, which the North sees as a dress rehearsal for invasion. Though the joint annual drills are likely to be resumed after the Games, Kim Jong-un has already threatened to return to old hostility if that happens. Kim would push for its abolition altogether. China shall be happy too. That may not happen in the short term, however. Yet, Kim does not seem to have stopped pursuing that aim. The summit offer could have been made with such hope. At the moment, Moon remains non-committal to the invitation but is unlikely to reject it outright. If he does that, the entire Games diplomacy would have become useless in no time.

Moon is likely to buy some time before taking a final decision to the invitation. Consultation with Washington could be a first step. But Moon may not be bound by Washington’s decision either. At the same time, Moon may not like to put the alliance relationship at risk. If he does that and travels to Pyongyang for a summit meeting, thereby overruling Washington’s counsel, will he be exposing South Korea’s security to North Korean threat? That may not be the case. This is because, as said, Kim does not see South Korea as the main enemy but the US.

There is another dimension to this. Moon might prefer to take his own decisions and may not care much about what Trump says. Second, Moon is miffed with Trump’s criticism of the bilateral trade deals. Third, Moon might be upset that Trump has not made an effort to name a new Ambassador and even withdrew the name of Victor Cha, which was already announced, because his views were seen by Trump as incompatible with his own. So, for the time being, Trump shall remain less relevant, if not fully irrelevant, in Moon’s North Korea strategy.

It is clear that Moon does not want hostility with the North. Moon is unsure if the US would defend Seoul should war break out. Moon is also aware that if war breaks out, which Seoul would not surely rejoice, but cannot have a significant say in. Moon would hate to surrender entirely to the US policy that subsumes Korea’s own identity and sovereignty. Such a new situation would put the alliance relationship at risk. South Korea is clearly not happy that Trump with his fire-and-fury rhetoric was putting to tremendous risk the lives and livelihood of its people.

For South Korea, Trump’s “America First” policy was never a comforting concept. Besides threatening Seoul to rework the trade deal, Trump has been also threatening China and Russia with punitive economic measures if they do not put more pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. Seoul is feeling less confident that it can count on the US to defend if war breaks out because of Trump’s action. The fragility of the alliance relationship is beginning to be exposed.

The scenario in the Korean Peninsula and the US-South Korea alliance is similar to the Cold War period. During that period, when then Soviet Union acquired the ability to strike the US with ICBMs, France decided to cease its dependence on the US for its security. Instead, it developed its own nuclear weapons to defend itself. Moon may be troubled with similar questions: Whether the US would come to Seoul’s defence if doing so raised the risk of North Korea launching a retaliatory strike on San Francisco or Chicago, for example? If Moon does not get a clear answer from the US of its response like Cold War France, Seoul may be compelled to explore its other defensive options, including revisiting the nuclear option. If such could be the case, then Kim’s Olympic truce is a master stroke because that is exactly what Kim wants. The path would be clear for the security scenario in Northeast Asia to have been dramatically altered.

The North-South sports diplomacy and speculation of a split between Seoul and Washington also presented Japan, another US ally, with a nightmare scenario. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was seen quite uncomfortable during the Games’ opening ceremony and even irritated Moon by suggesting that he should immediately resume the joint military drills after the Games. The annual exercises between the US and South Korean forces, which normally take place between February and March, were suspended until after the Olympics to create the right climate. Moon was less enthusiastic to hear Abe’s reminder as holding the military drills does not seem to be his immediate priority as his goals are for long-term peace. Without being undiplomatic, Moon replied that it was not appropriate for Abe to have raised the issue, which he described as an internal affair. It transpired that with the Olympic Games’ charm offensive, Kim Jong-un has succeeded skilfully in driving a wedge between the US, Japan, and South Korea.

There is yet another dimension to this unfolding scenario. Amid all these talks of Olympic-driven thaw between Pyongyang and Seoul, there are speculations about direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang after months of sharp tension and heated rhetoric. It was the US that indicated previously that it was open to direct talks, but was clear that no incentive would be offered to Pyongyang on the table. The US has made it clear that while no carrot shall be offered, the large stick would be at hand for use when necessary. What the US meant was that there shall be no change in the series of UN Security Council sanctions over its banned nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and the military strike option would not be abandoned until the objectives are achieved. In contrast, Moon argues for closer involvement to engage the North in talks. The situation is fluid as well as complex. So, what could be Kim Jong-un’s next possible move? It is tough to speculate.

Rajaram Panda is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Reitaku University, Japan. Views expressed are personal.

E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com

Courtesy: Pioneer: Sunday, 25 February 2018