Does India deserve to be heard – Case Studies criticizing India’s track record of giving up on her people

 

In April 2025, 23 Indian citizens were murdered in cold blood on the Indian soil of Pahalgam. It did not take much effort to find out that the intelligence, ordinance, funds, and even some of the killers had come from Pakistan. While the killings got a global sympathy, the world did not take so much interest in calling out Pakistan. This attitude continued even when Indian delegations used foreign podiums to name and shame the delinquent neighbour. Or worse! For the month of July, Pakistan was elected as the President of UN Security council. Despite India sharing strong evidences proving Pakistan’s ill intentions, Pakistan continues to be out of FATF watchlist. Even recently, the US President appreciated Pakistan’s counter-terrorist operations. What is happening? There is no doubt that the geopolitical dynamics have brought a premium on Pakistan’s geographic location. Her blood-thirsty track-record in Afghanistan also supports the favouritism. But beyond all, there is a factor often overlooked, at least in India. And that is – does India deserve to be listened to? Nobody takes a health advice from a fat doctor. Nobody takes financial lessons from the penny-less. For someone not taking care of thyself, expecting others to care is stupid. Yes, we love our country. But beyond patriotism, we need to ask ourselves – Do we take care of ourselves? Now that is a big massive question, with an almost obvious answer. But I will not delve into everything. In this piece, we will go through some cases related to Pakistan, where we miserably failed to protect our people and interests. This is a series criticizing the actions we have taken in the past. DO NOT expect a ‘balanced’ account. Balancing is not the purpose here; and a lot of ‘balanced’ literature is already in the public domain. Indian economy is more than ten times that of Pakistan. The official expenditure of Pakistan on her military dwarfs against the staggering $74 billion Indian defence budget. Pakistan’s coastline is linear and vulnerable, unlike India’s vast shores spread across two seas, and one ocean, with countless islands providing immense military capability. Pakistan has suffered frequent coup d’état, secessionist violence, and overall political instability, whereas India has mostly been a functioning federation. Overall, India has all the means and reasons to be considered a regional power. But the following cases highlight the situations where we did not act like one. In fact, we let our menacing neighbour walk all over us. PoJK – Our people who saw us every day doing nothing “PoJK was discussed, sadly, only to firmly define the Line of Control instead of annulling it.” Let us start from the beginning. In October 1947, British-led Pakistani tribal and regular armed forces attacked the free state of Jammu & Kashmir. Already in negotiations, the Maharaja immediately signed the treaty of succession with the union of India. Indian Army rushed to Srinagar and pushed back the ruthless invaders. With victories soaked in its own blood, Indian Army saved massive lands of Jammu and Kashmir, and more than that, lakhs of citizens from the inevitable slaughter. Then came the ceasefire in 1949, and Pakistan retained her last holdout – among them the territories West of Uri, the ancient Sharda Peeth, and the entire Gilgit Baltistan. India hoped to get her amputated organs back some day. 24 seats of the constituencies in the Pakistan occupied Jammu & Kashmir were left vacant in the state assembly. It has been seventy-six years since then. The seats still remain vacant. Time heals a lot of wounds. The forceful occupation of PoJK may not be an active humanitarian crisis now. But it was so in 1947, and Indian citizens suffered. More than 20,000 Indian citizens are estimated to have been killed in the invasion. Thousands of others – most of them women and children – were abducted and sold to slave markets in Peshawar and Rawalpindi. More than one lakh Hindus and Sikhs, who resided in places like Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and Bhimbhar could not cross back to the Indian side of the ceasefire line, and are still unaccounted for. The horrific tales of the atrocities committed to the religious minorities in PoJK came to light due to people like Mr. Bal K Gupta – a kid who was later saved by the Red Cross – and Mr. Bhishambar Nath Saproo – a young school teacher at Muzaffarabad who escaped back to the Indian side in disguise of a Muslim merchant. The sad part is, India never put a serious effort in rescuing her hopeless citizens, who probably lived as outcasts and died seeing their homeland just across the Krishnaganga river. Not that India did not get the right opportunity. After the surrender on the Eastern front, and a ceasefire on the Western front in 1971, Pakistan was in a desperate state. Her economy was in shambles, her leader and Supreme commander of the Army was arrested, Indian Army was firmly based well inside Pakistan on both the fronts, and ninety-three thousand Pakistani soldiers were in Indian custody. But the subsequent negotiations in Simla turned the tide. “Pakistan entered the Simla meeting as a defeated nation; in a palpable economic and military stress.” writes Sayeda Hameed in the biography of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. “It had no cards in hand for the settlement” she continues. But India cheerfully agreed to hand-over most of the occupied territories on the Western front, and to exchange the Prisoners of War. PoJK was discussed, sadly, only to firmly define the Line of Control instead of annulling it. We will get back to the topic of the Indian PoWs in Pakistan later. But the point to take home is that India did not attempt to bring back her lost citizens and her lost land. These negotiations happened just twenty-one years after the ceasefire of 1949, meaning many of the Indian citizens stuck in PoJK must have been alive then. The lopsided Simla Agreement was indeed a betrayal of our citizens. The verbatim transcripts of the Simla negotiations were never publicly released, and hence, we don’t know what happened behind the closed doors. The government officials involved or deliberately kept out spoke years later on the intentions of the negotiators. But that remains out of the context of this discussion. Even after more than seven decades, the PoJK remains in the hands of a presumably weaker, unstable, and poorer nation. No fanfare of our favourite politician or patriotic Instagram reel can change this fact.

Kargil – From Surprise to Victory to Betrayal

“Islamabad retained its moral high-ground by being the mediator of peace between New Delhi and the Mujahideen.” Clearing the intrusion in the Kargil, Dras, and Batalik in 1999 was a feat very few military operations in history can match. Fighting an enemy well-fortified at strategic heights, under strict timelines, when damaging their supply lines was not permitted, was a gallant display of Indian military capabilities. But, as a grim repetition of history, all Indian military achievements were knocked down by political incapability. Although the Indian Prime Minister showed an exemplary leadership during the operation, the later actions and the indifference of New Delhi were the betrayal to the armed forces and Indian citizens. Having lost his stand militarily and morally after India’s strong retaliation, and clearly seeing the writing on the wall, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif left for the US on 3rd July 1999. Later, on the American Independence Day, the heads of states of the US and Pakistan gave a joint statement, sensitizing the need for a peaceful end of the Kargil conflict. As per Indian intelligence, Nawaz Sharif expressed his willingness to withdraw his army, which at some point was also communicated to New Delhi. On 8th July, Indian Prime Minister Pandit Vajpayee met his Chief of Army Staff General VP Malik and asked for his opinion on allowing Pakistani forces to withdraw peacefully to their side of the LoC. General Malik expressed his displeasure on the proposal. According to him, Pakistan should be held accountable for all the lives of Indian jawans lost in the war. Islamabad still held the position that the intrusion was rather by the Mujahideen fighting for the freedom of Kashmir, and it was just playing a mediator between them and New Delhi. But the elections were right around the corner, and the Prime Minister wanted to play it safe. Hence, the request of a peaceful withdrawal was accepted, and the CCS was asked to resolve their reservations through a well-drafted withdrawal plan. On the 9th July phone call with Indian DGMO (Director General of Military Operations), his Pakistani counterpart stated that his leaders had persuaded the Mujahideen to honour their commitment and were ready to withdraw as per Indian terms. By this time India had submitted enough evidences to prove the deployment of active Pakistani forces and Pakistani ordinance in Kargil, and even the communications from their top-brass. In fact, several Pakistani soldiers were being treated in Indian hospitals. But it is impossible to convince someone who is paid a salary to not get convinced. And hence, Islamabad retained its moral high-ground by being the mediator of peace between New Delhi and the Mujahideen. The evidences of Pakistani involvement remain “India’s side of the story” subject to acceptance by others. What would have been the situation, had India demanded a surrender? Twenty-six years after the war, this question must be asked. And investigated. By 1999, Kashmir had gone through an ugly phase of terrorism, and incidents such as the kidnapping of the foreign nationals by Al-Farhan, the Hazratbal standoff, and the destruction of Charar-e-sharif shrine had allowed Pakistan to project the terrorism as a struggle for freedom against the ‘oppressive’ India. Had Pakistan surrendered in 1999, it would have helped India to expose the theory of this freedom struggle, and forced Pakistan to accept her direct involvement with men, material, and money. Pakistan negotiating for the safe release of Mujahideens would not have been a convincing argument for the world. Or, it could have gone in a completely destructive way. Nobody can tell. But, from the evidences available, and from the known habit of Indian polity to keep military out of post-war negotiations, it is quite convincing that out of all the bad paths to end the Kargil conflict, India probably handpicked the worst.

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Courtesy: ADITYA GANJOO  and  Spade A Spade,2025