Rajaram Panda

A history of mistrust clouds Japan-China ties. Despite the bad blood, Japanese Foreign Minister’s recent visit to China proves there’s still some hope, says Dr RAJARAM PANDA

Despite strong economic fundamentals in the Japan-China relations, there are several other problems — historical, political and territorial — that remain as constant irritants in the bilateral relations. The visit of Japan’s foreign minister Taro Kono to China in the last week of January 2018 signalled a thaw in ties. Though this could be a positive sign, one can’t count on it. Given that both the parties have had significant rows over territorial and historical issues as well as differences in regional strategies, drastic progress is doubtful. Yet, Kono’s visit is significant in the sense that it marks 40 years since the signing of a bilateral peace and friendship treaty. This comes after President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have bolstered their domestic power bases in their respective countries.

There could also have been other considerations as to why Abe decided to send Kono to Beijing. As said, both leaders’ domestic power bases are strong now. While Xi began his second five-year term alongside trusted allies following the Chinese Communist Party’s twice-a-decade Congress in October 2017, Abe consolidated power by leading his ruling bloc to a two-thirds majority in the powerful House of Representatives in the snap election in October 2017, thereby putting him on track to become the longest serving post-War Prime Minister. As a result, both leaders found themselves in the same situation. This new-found stability bolstered their positions and both found a new opportunity to reconsider their ties and also deal with the North Korean threat seriously. In a situation in which one side has a weak power base, the other side enjoys certain leverage and tends to put pressure on the weaker side. The new situation provided both with equal confidence to deal with each other at par. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was found as a bigger risk, which pushed both to concentrate their diplomatic efforts.

Though both Tokyo and Beijing try to create an amicable environment, differences in historical and territorial issues, besides regional issues remain in which both are not on the same page. North Korea’s nuclear and missile launches make Japan worry. Despite China’s disapproval to some of Pyongyang’s recent activities, Japan is aware that Beijing continues to remain Pyongyang’s economic lifeline, notwithstanding Beijing’s support for UN-imposed sanctions on North Korea. China is worried about radioactive fallout from nuclear testing and the likelihood of war triggering a massive influx of North Korean refugees. The stances of both on the South China Sea are significantly different too. But what remains a serious issue between the two are their conflicting claims on the territorial issues in the East China Sea.

The dispute escalated after Abe’s predecessor PM Yoshihiko Noda decided to effectively bring the Senkakus under state control in 2012 amid a bidding war with former Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, an outspoken nationalist. Against this backdrop, Abe and Xi did not have talks in the format of an official visit since both took office in 2012, signifying the fragility of the relationship. This changed when Abe visited Beijing in November 2014 for the APEC summit meeting. It was seen as a step towards normalisation.

But mutual distrust continues over control of the islands, which Japan administers and calls as the Senkakus Islands. China claims the uninhabited islets as Diaoyu, and Taiwan which too claims the islands, refers to them as Diaoyutai. The differences between the two sides reveal a great deal about the two countries’ current global standing. The historical basis of claims and interpretations of documents remains disputed.

1. the Comfort Women issue between Japan and South Korea that has threatened to assume the dimension of a cultural war, China cannot easily forget Japan’s brutal invasion and occupation of large parts of China before and during the World War II. Despite Japan’s defeat, China feels that Japan has never shown adequate contrition for its past acts and thus cannot forget its painful history. The Communist Party in China has been also fueling anti-Japanese sentiment by using heavy-handed nationalist propaganda in schools and state-controlled media. The governments of post-War Japan find it difficult to correct the historical wrongs committed by the predecessor rulers. The fact remains that China remained the underdog for much of the 20th century and remains even today less articulate on the global scene than Japan. China’s latest stance stems from the confidence it has acquired from the economic and military might during the past four decades or so and therefore seems determined to rewrite the global rules on its own terms. Whipping up domestic anti-Japanese sentiment is a part of this narrative.

Given the enormity of the stakes involved, the dispute over the islands is indeed a time bomb. The interests of the three countries in the islands are guided primarily by the possibility of major oil deposits, besides the islands’ strategic considerations. As a result, there has been little constructive dialogue between the three parties involved in the question of the disputes over ownership.

When a Chinese, nuclear-powered attack submarine was found operating just outside Japan’s territorial waters in early January, Japan expressed concern. The submarine later surfaced in the high seas flying the Chinese flag. It was first such incursion since June 2016. Undeterred, China announced three of its Coast Guard vessels conducted a patrol in Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the East China Sea islands. This was the third such intrusion in January itself. China was probably trying to study Japan’s ability to patrol the area and detect intrusions. From its own side, Japan is also on guard. With a view to educate its people, the Japanese government recently opened a museum in Tokyo to present evidence intended to support its position and garner popular support. In his meeting with his counterpart Wang Yi, Kono lodged a protest against the presence of the submarine in the contiguous zone around Japan’s territorial waters near the uninhabited islets.

Japan launched an official protest after its navy spotted the 4,000-tonne Jiangkai II class frigate and an unidentified submarine in waters surrounding the Tokyo-administered islands.Japan’s Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera confirmed the submarine was China’s Shang-Class nuclear-powered which can be equipped with long-range cruise missiles. He said, nuclear-powered submarines can also cruise for long hours and it is more difficult to detect them because they dive deep. Expressing serious concerns, he reacted with such Chinese act as they “unilaterally raise tensions” and vowed to “respond swiftly if a similar incident happens”.

Contiguous waters are a 12-nautical-mile band that extends beyond territorial waters.Under international rules they are not the preserve of any single country, although the resident power has certain limited rights. While not confirming first that it had sent a submarine, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang repeated China’s claim to the islands, saying that “the Chinese naval vessels conducted surveillance over the activities of the Japanese side”. Japan is clearly not happy that Chinese Coast Guard vessels routinely travel around the disputed islands. In particular, bilateral ties remain frosty since 2012 when Tokyo “nationalized” some of the islets. It is unfortunate that at a time when efforts are being made to push for a trilateral summit with leaders from China and South Korea, the submarine’s intrusion into disputed waters comes as a setback.

The blame-game goes on. Kenji Kanasugi, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau summoned the Chinese ambassador Cheng Yonghua and expressed grave concern about China’s move. Reiterating the often-stated position that rejects Japanese criticism of such patrols and takes the position that Chinese ships have every right to operate in what China calls its territorial waters, the Chinese ambassador only reiterated China’s stance on the islands. In response, Lu Kang, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, rubbished Japan’s objection by saying that the islands were a part of Beijing’s territory and warned Japan to stop complicating the issue. Kang justified the action by its military as exercising China’s territorial rights in its naval deployment. Reasserting the Senkakus/Diaoyutai as a natural part of Chinese territory, Kang defended China’s decision to guard the sovereignty of the disputed territory as remaining unshaken.

Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga resolved to defend Japan’s territory, territorial waters and airspace by all means. Japan’s Defence Ministry accused China also having sent two submarines near Japan-claimed territory, including the Miyako Island in Okinawa and Taisho Island in the Senkakus. As reported in the Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s military could be increasing its defence capability to cope with Chinese incursions. Onodera also announced that Japan would consider seriously deploying missile interceptor system Aegis Ashore, which could be used to intercept Chinese cruise missiles, a decision that surely would make China worried. On its side, China retains a large number of cruise missiles and is also developing a new missile that can reach speeds of up to Mach 5.

Despite the differences mentioned above, there is an inner urge in both the countries to maintain peaceful relationship. Japan is seized of the fact that China has been seeking to expand infrastructure networks in Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa to achieve its goal of connecting countries under its “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Japan is considering carefully whether and how it could cooperate. This is because Abe advocates a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” apparently designed to counter China’s assertiveness at sea in the Asia-Pacific region. China harbours concerns as it centres on Japan, the US, Australia and India but excludes China. There is also a widely-held impression that Beijing’s financing lacks transparency and that there is a hidden agenda for ultimate economic domination of the smaller countries participating in the OBOR projects and receiving Chinese financial assistance in liberal terms.

Still, Kono’s visit resulted in some tangible result. It was agreed to plan defence exchanges. After a six-year hiatus, both sides agreed to restart education and training exchanges of defence officials from September 2018. Since September 2012 when Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, the Chinese military suspended dispatching its officials as trainees to the Defence Ministry and the Self-Defense Forces. China shall dispatch trainees for a 10-month program starting in September to the National Institute for Defense Studies, a political think tank of Japan’s Defence Ministry. This is a welcome move to improve bilateral relationship further. The bilateral exchange program for defense officials had started in fiscal 2003 as part of efforts to promote trust among them and it is good that it shall resume after a spell of suspension. Japan too dispatches Defence Ministry officials and SDF personnel to Chinese military training institutions. Another confidence-building initiative that was agreed during Kono’s visit was a project that aims at inviting as many as 1,000 young Chinese people to visit Japan, something similar to Abe Initiative for the African countries and JENYSES for the Asians. These small measures demonstrate that despite the present turbulent times of today, there are also rooms for hope towards peace and stability.

The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Reitaku University, Japan. Views expressed are personal.                                                  E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com

Courtesy: Pioneer: Sunday, 11 February 2018