Atish-i-Chinar--Autobiography of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah An Analysis-X

K L Swarup

The next four chapters from 48-51 are perhaps the most important chapters of the book. In these the author has incorporated the details of political events of the State which, according to him, preceded his dismissal as Prime Minister of J&K State and arrest in August 1953. These chapters are full of such narrations as are undoubtedly controversial when compared to actual and factual accounts of political events of those days objectively reported and recorded. Though Sheikh's pleading of innocence is understandable, his subjective analysis of Indian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Maulana Azad can hardly stand the litmus test of objectivity. The Sheikh has also been somewhat sentimental in giving the headings to these chapters. There are:

Chapter IIL- All were our own whose hands were smeared with blood stains.

Chapter IL-Let us see against whom the crime of 'infidelity' is proved

Chapter L-Treacherous stabbing

Chapter LI- The Night of Military Plot.

Verbatim translation of some controversial passages is as under:

According to the Sheikh the accession of the State with India was strictly subject to the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and he harboured the notion that the agitation launched by the Praja Parishad against the special status of the State had the backing of the Central leaders including Jawaharlal Nehru. The Sheikh writes, "Jawaharlal once while replying to a question said: This movement (the agitation launched by the Praja Parishad) has been started at a wrong time and will prove counterproductive. We have no difference of opinion regarding the aims and objects of this agitation. We also want that Kashmir should come nearer to India, but the means adopted by the Praja Parishad for achieving their ends are not based on wisdom." Similar views were expressed by Maulana Azad. Commenting on this line of thinking I held the view that there was no difference between the views of the Jana Sangh and what Jawaharlal and Maulana Azad were saying. To the Indian leaders all those agreements and promises between them and Kashmir had no sanctity and the Indian leaders would not hesitate to consign these agreements and promises to the waste paper basket........ Later B.N. Malik, head of Intelligence Bureau, in whom Jawaharlal Nehru had complete confidence confirmed in his book that Jawaharlal had once told him that he had full sympathy with the cause of Praja Parishad and that he (Jawaharlal) could take measures of merging Kashmir with India but it would create an uproar in the security council....... Rafi Sahib (Rafi Ahmad Kidwai) was a close confidant of Jawaharlal. He had helped Jawaharlal a lot in the latter's confrontation with Sardar Patel and Purshottam Dass Tandon. He was well-adept in public liaison and political manoeuvring. In these matters his characteristics were like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad to some extent....... Rafi Sahib was very close to the Russian lobby. Known communists like Z.A. Ahmed, K.A. Ashraf, Rama Murti, Harkrishan Surjeet etc. were close to him. These communists wanted to espouse the cause of their favourites in Kashmir among whom the case of Sadiq Sahib is worth-mentioning. Thus these communists were helping Rafi Sahib a lot in getting me removed from the political scene. So far as Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was concerned, they wanted to make him the victim of that anger which would erupt as a result of his (Sheikh's) arrest, affording a chance to their (communist's) favourites to rule. Dogra (G.L.), D.P. Dhar, Qasim etc, were also with Sadiq Sahib. Those persons who say that the events of 9th August 1953 had taken place "without the blessings of Jawaharlal Nehru, should consider the statement of B.N. Malik......." He writes: "On 31.7.1953 I and Mehra (D.W. Mehra who was later I.G.P. Kashmir from November 1956 to September 1963) waited upon the Prime Minister at his residence. He talked to us for two hours. Explaining the background of Kashmir issue he said that there was no alternative to the replacement of Sheikh Abdullah by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohd. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that the transition would be peaceful, but he warned us that we should be prepared for facing the worst also because Sheikh Sahib was undoubtedly very popular in Kashmir and that pro-Pak elements will also join hands with pro-Sheikh elements. Mehra should be ready to head the State Police Force and if necessary he should gird up his loins to function as Chief Executive as well. Both of us had never seen Nehru in such a terrible mood. It seemed that Nehru was bent upon uprooting a mighty tree which he had himself nurtured and watered. While permitting Mehra to leave he instructed him that he should keep him informed and he should not hesitate to give him a ring even during night hours".

According to the Sheikh this sort of attitude of the Centre and its leaders including Jawaharlal widened the gulf between the centre and Kashmir and created enormous misgivings about him in the mind of Indian leaders. In its support the Sheikh quotes the following excerpt from a letter written by Jawaharlal Nehru to him on 26.6.1953 (about 40 days prior to Sheikh's dismissal and arrest).

"My Government works for secular democracy in the same manner you have been doing this sacred work. I do not know what is your thinking on this subject now. I apprehend that the tendency of Kashmir is now opposite to this. Unfortunately it will have its bad effects on India in the manner in which events in India have their repercussions on Kashmir". The Sheikh feels that such an allegation against him from a friend was very regrettable. He was convinced that New Delhi had finally decided to remove him from the political scene and, in order to accomplish that end, they had made full preparations. Sheikh writes, "In Delhi complete arrangements were made to remove me from power and send me to jail. The fact that I had asked Saraf (Shyamlal Saraf, one of the Ministers in Sheikh Abdullah's Cabinet) to resign, forced New Delhi not to make a delay in stabbing me in the back. Saraf immediately and secretly went to the camp where conspiracy against me was being hatched and where General Kaul, D.W. Mehra, Ajit Prasad Jain were also present...... It is quite significant that just one week before my arrest N.B. Khare, Hindu Mahasabha leader, had suggested that I should be dismissed and arrested. Indian Press had given wide publicity to it. Karan Singh had received a secret message from Jawaharlal on 27.7.1953 in which the green signal for my removal had been hinted at. Zero hour for the action had also been fixed. The plan was being given practical shape like a very sensitive Army operation keeping each and every aspect in view."

Writing about his dismissal and arrest on 9.8.1953 the Sheikh says, "On 8th August 1953, it was Saturday. On that day I had made a programme to visit Gulmarg where I had also decided to hold a meeting of concerned officers to discuss measures regarding development of Gulmarg. I proceeded in the evening along with my other family members. My Private Secretary R.C. Raina; Director, Information, Jankinath Zutshi; and Director Visitor's Bureau, Shyamlal Wath were also with me........ It was at about 04.20 hours during the night (8/ 9.8.1953) when the door was constantly knocked. I opened the door and found my Secretary, R.C. Raina there. He told me that the Army had surrounded my residence and that Machine guns have also been installed. He said that L.D. Thakkur who was Superintendent Police then had come to arrest me. I opened the door of the Drawing Room. L.D. Thakkur entered accompanied by an A.D.C. of the Sadar-e-Riyasat. He handed over a closed envelope to me. The closed envelope contained a letter regarding my dismissal from the Prime Ministership.

He handed over another envelope also which contained a memorandum signed by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, Pandit Shyamlal Saraf and Pandit Girdharilal Dogra expressing no-confidence in me. It was the first time when any intimation regarding their no-confidence or difference of opinion with me was sent to me. I could imagine about the attitude of Saraf Sahib but the terrible posture of Bakshi Sahib and Dogra Sahib was quite surprising for me. I told L.D. Thakur that the Sadr-i-Riyasat had no constitutional power to dismiss me and I continue to be the Prime Minister of the State and you are a subordinate Superintendent of Police. He, pointing out to the Army outside, said: This was my authority and power. I said to him that I have no reply to this. I also told him that only a couple of days back Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad had expressed at Mujahid Manzil that his loyalty to me was the 6th cardinal principle of his faith*. I never expected he would go to such an extent, because I had myself offered to resign if he did not want me. Be that as it may, he showed me the warrant of arrest....... Later it was learnt that immediately after my departure from Srinagar, situation in the State had started changing swiftly. Jawaharlal was informed that I had been to Gulmarg to meet a messenger who had come from Pakistan. So the Sadar-e-Riyasat was asked to order my dismissal and invite Bakhshi Sahib to form new Ministry....... In the morning at 8- 9 a.m. I surrendered myself. Members of my family were left to the care of God. The office files which I had brought with me were handed over to Private Secretary R.C. Raina. When I stepped out of the house, I saw the Military was on all the four sides. The command of this operation was under B.M. Kaul deputed by Jawaharlal. According to his own statement he was watching all the scenes of my arrest at Narabal quite secretly. B.M. Kaul who was later elevated as General and had fled from NEFA and taken refuge at Nepal was a Kashmiri Pandit with full access to the house of Jawaharlal. He bore enmity with me and there was a reason for that. After tribal raids of 1947 he was at Udhampur as an Army officer. In those days his soldiers kidnapped a Gujjar woman. I took a serious notice of this matter and demanded from the centre that he should be called back. I also conveyed that in case he was not recalled I would arrest him. Despite the resistance of the Army, he was re-called and deputed somewhere else........ Besides this, B.N. Malik has also recorded in his book that Jawaharlal was informed that I was in Gulmarg to meet a Pakistani officer for hatching a conspiracy for a rebellion in Kashmir. It was such an utter false-hood that later on no Indian leader ever dared repeat it. The question is how was it possible. Indian Army is deployed the State. Without the permission of the Army even a bird cannot cross the cease-fire line. If, as stated by Malik, it was within his knowledge that some army officer of Pakistan was going to meet me at Gulmarg through the good offices of Maqbool Gilani, then who had prevented the authorities to arrest that Pakistani Army Officer also along with me at Gulmarg. Moreover as Home Minister of the State, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had full control on all the branches of Police and C.I.D. Under these circumstances how could I meet a spy of a foreign power for hatching a conspiracy. It is futile to test all this on the balance of logic....... There were three Kashmiri Pandit officers also with me at Gulmarg."

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Courtesy:- K L Swarup and April-May 1995 Koshur Samachar