05111965 Text of the Speech made by Mr. De Beus (Netherlands) in the Security Council ting No 1251 held on 5 November 1965

Text of the Speech made by Mr. De Beus (Netherlands) in the Security Council ting No 1251 held on 5 November 1965

 

In our present debate on the conflict between India and Pakistan various questions have come up which, although they are all in some way related to the implementation of the Council's resolutions, nevertheless belong to two different categories. On the one hand, some members have discussed the steps taken. by the Secretary-General for the execution of these resolutions and the financing of the operation. Those are questions which, as the representative of the Soviet Union put it, have some significance in terms of principle, questions which reflect old differences of approach. On the other hand, the reports of the Secretary-General oblige us to pay attention to a number of unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of our resolutions notably, at the present stage, the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. For the sake of clearness, I intend to deal first with the more general, principal aspect-that is, the Secretary-General's mandate and the financing-and thereafter with the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces.

 

In dealing with the conflict between India and Pakistan, the Security Council has up to now been able to act with unanimity or near unanimity. The greatest significance of that lies in the fact that the Council in all its four resolutions has been able to achieve the unanimity of the permanent members. That is a new and hopeful departure, because that is how the Security Council was originally intended to operate. For many years it had been virtually impossible to obtain the unanimity of the permanent members on almost any important subject.

 

My delegation was therefore highly gratified at this return to action on the basis of the unanimity of the permanent members, and considers it of the utmost importance that the Council should, if possible, continue to operate on that basis.

 

It would, however, have been unrealistic to assume that the basic differences of opinion with regard to the organisation and financing of peace-keeping operations-differences with which we are all familiar and which played such a large and almost disastrous part during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly-would suddenly disappear. Therefore, it is certainly not surprising that at this moment, when the Security Council has initiated a new peacekeeping operation in the India-Pakistan conflict, the old differences of approach should come out again in our debate-as they did, in particular, on 25 October 1965 [1247th meeting]. Now that the question has been brought up, I should like to make clear my delegation's attitude on the subject.

 

In doing so, I should like above all to emphasise that my delegation can find no fault with the manner in which the Secretary-General has acquitted himself of the heavy and very difficult task imposed upon him by the Council. As has been proved here in the statements, supported by quotations, made by several speakers in the debate, the resolutions of the Council gave him a clear mandate to carry those resolutions into effect, and he did so expeditiously. Furthermore, in doing so he reported regularly and elaborately to the Council, in no less than ten reports, on all the steps he had taken. If the Council had been of the opinion that in some way the Secretary-General had gone too far, it could have expressed that view in connection with any one of his reports-but it did not do so.

 

That being said, however, I should add that the matter does not rest there. Our debate has shown that there are basic principles involved, on which the permanent members do not entirely agree. This my delegation highly regrets and I should like to make an attempt to find a practical way out, which we hope would enable the members of the Council to maintain their unanimity in a case such as this.

 

There is no urgent need at the present moment for the Security Council to lay down once and for all rules of precedents for future peace-keeping operations. The Security Council is confronted today only with the practical problem of how to have its resolutions carried out in the most effective way, without prejudice to future decisions on principle by the General Assembly, and in a manner which can command the unanimous support of its members. If is highly desirable, both for the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan and for future operations, that we should find such a method. The Security Council has raised great hopes and restored confidence in the United Nations by its unanimous and determined action in this conflict. It would be tragic if we were to squander part of that gain by differences of opinion, no matter how fundamental, over the margin of authority between the different organs of the United Nations. My delegation believes that it should be possible, and that it is possible, to achieve a practical way of proceeding further in such a case.

 

Let me first try to summarise briefly the different viewpoints which have been defended here. They are, roughly speaking, three. In the first place, there are those countries that hold that the basic resolutions of the Security Council contain sufficient authority for the Secretary-General to take executive measures for their implementation. Those countries believe that the Secretary-General, in doing so, should have a reasonable margin of authority and that it is sufficient if the Secretary-General regularly reports to the Security Council on his executive measures, to which the Council can then raise objections if it so wishes.

 

The second school of thought holds that the Security Council should be entitled, if not obliged, to pronounce itself upon the main characteristics of a particular operation initiated in the execution of its resolutions. Those directive should, according to the countries holding that view, deal with such aspects as the strength, the composition, the command, the duration and the financing of peace-keeping forces. With regard to the financing, the Council should, in that view, indicate a ceiling for the expenditures on the basis of the Secretary-General's proposals and indicate a method of financing. Within the context of the directives of the Security Council, the Secretary-General should then have freedom of action to take the necessary steps for the implementation of Security Council resolutions.

 

Different variations of flexibility of this point of view are possible. The reasoning behind this attitude is that under the present system extensive commitments are being made on behalf of the United Nations before the Security Council knows it, commitments which could afterwards not be rejected even if the Council should wish to do so. So much for the second school of thought.

 

There is a third school of thought, which goes even further and holds that decisions concerning all aspects of peacekeeping forces should emanate exclusively from the Security Council.

 

My delegation believes that if the aim is to guarantee a certain degree of control by the Security Council over the execution of its own resolutions, it is possible to achieve that by steering a middle course, based on a few general considerations. A first, and in our view self-evident, consideration is that the Security Council should always be entitled to interpret its own resolutions. Consequently, and in addition, it would be helpful if the Council would from time to time, whenever it. deemed that desirable, give broad directives-I emphasise the word "broad" for the execution of those resolutions. A second principle is that the ultimate approval of the financial aspects and the apportioning of the expenses rests with the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the United Nations Charter. A third principle to which we believe one should adhere is that the Secretary-General, as principal administrative officer of the Organisation, should have sufficient freedom of movement to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council without having to ask the authorization of the Council for every step in detail. If the Secretary-General should have to ask such authorization for each separate step, once the task of the implementation of a resolution had been entrusted to him, his work would, we fears, become practically impossible and the implementation of the Council's resolution would become fictitious.

 

A practical system based on those three principles implies that the Secretary-General should continue to report formally and regularly on the steps taken, as he has always done, but also that it might be helpful if in the future, perhaps more than heretofore, the Secretary-General and his staff would consult informally with members of the Security Council about any intended steps.

 

With regard to financing, it means that the Secretary General should, as soon as possible after the adoption of a Security Council resolution of this nature, make an estimate of the expenses so that the Security Council could give a directive on the general level of expenses, but that the final approval and the apportioning of these expenses should be left to the General Assembly.

 

These are only the rough outlines for a procedure which we could try to apply in cases such as the India-Pakistan conflict. We believe that such a procedure would go a long way in meeting the desire, which we understand, of those members who hold that the Security Council should exercise greater control over the execution of its own decisions; at the same time this procedure would, we believe, be flexible enough to leave the Secretary-General the necessary leeway in order not be hamstrung in the exercise of his important and heavy executive functions.

 

It may be an advantage that the Council need not take decisions on these matters as a general rule for all cases and for all time, but that it can feel its way through by practical experience. What we wish to achieve above all for the moment is a practical solution which maintains the unanimity of all permanent members in order that we may, through experience, gradually arrive at a permanent system.

 

So much for the questions of principle raised by the implementation of the Council's resolutions. The attention given to these aspects, important as they are, should, however, in no way take precedence over the more immediate and urgent aspects of the implementation of the Council's resolutions, which constitutes today the real problem before us.Unfortunately, these aspects give rise to serious concern.

 

The appeals which the Council addressed on four subsequent occasions to both parties to effect a cease-fire and a withdrawal of their armed personnel have received only partial response. Although both India and Pakistan have expressed their readiness to accept a cessation of hostilities and, in spite of the fact that the cease-fire came into effect more than six weeks ago today, it is obvious from the Secretary General's many reports on the maintenance of the cease-fire that its continuance is constantly danger. There reports on further shooting and shelling, on actions on both sides to improve positions and on other military activities that are in complete contradiction with a cease-fire. It is to this ominous situation that the Council has now to direct its immediate attention.

 

It is clear, at least in the mind of my delegation, that the cause for these many violations of the cease-fire does not lie with the military observers of the United Nations, who are performing an admirable and difficult task. It is thanks to their activities that the existing explosive situation has not reverted again to open hostilities.

 

My country is also deeply disturbed by the stream of Press reports coming out of Kashmir about the total suppression of the liberty of political expression as well as about excesses reportedly taking place in the fighting area. The representative of Pakistan has asked the Council: "Will the world remain unmoved ?"

 

My answer would be, "No, the world is certainly not; nor is the Council. "But the remedy lies not in condemning or investigating specific examples of such acts, but in putting an end to the circumstances which gave rise to such excesses. The Council, therefore, has to concentrate on the three elements of its resolution, just as they have been enumerated by the representative of Uruguay: the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the forces, and tackling the underlying political problem. These elements are closely interwoven, as I said in the Council [1242nd meeting] when introducing resolution 211 (1965), and my delegation stands by that declaration. It is not because we have departed from quoted in the Council meeting last week. I did not do so because, in our view, it was not the interconnexion between the different parts of the resolution which was then at stake, but the old tradition that representatives on the Security Council should be entitled to speak their mind on all questions connected with the subject under discussion, as long as they do not use insulting language.

 

But even if it is true that the three elements of the resolution are closely interconnected, and that none should be overlooked, it is nevertheless obvious that they cannot all be achieved at once and at the same time, and therefore we have to proceed in phases. The first phase was the cease-fire. It has been achieved, but is still precarious; it will remain precarious as long as huge armed forces remain in close contact facing each other. Therefore, we must now concentrate on the second phase, the withdrawal of forces. Almost six weeks have elapsed since we adopted our key resolution of 20 September [resolution 211 (1965)] and since the Secretary General first asked the parties to draw up withdrawal plans, but precious little progress has been made in this direction. Undoubtedly, commanders on both sides are understandably inspired by what to them is a duty and a primary consideration, namely to safeguard their positions. Therefore, the clear orders to withdraw should come from their Governments, orders based on higher considerations and on greater interests than that of maintaining a few hundred yards of terrain or a favourable strategic outpost. If such orders should not be forthcoming or should not be fully understood or fully carried out, it is the duty of the Security Council to act and assist the Governments by indicating in clear and concrete terms what action should now be taken.

 

For this reason, my delegation has, in very close co operation with all the other members, both permanent and non-permanent, worked out a draft resolution [S/6876], which I should now like to submit in the name of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. The

draft is submitted in the name of these five non-permanent members of the Council, but it has been drafted in constant consultation with the permanent members. I think we can say that it contains no language which could give rise to objection. It indicates, we believe, in clear and unmistakable language what concrete steps could and should now be taken. to achieve a withdrawal of forces.

 

The text of the draft resolution needs, I believe, little comment. Paragraph 1 reaffirms the key resolution of the Council of 20 September 1965 on this subject in all its parts``, and should dispel any possible doubt about the fact that the Council stands by its previous resolution in its entirety and intends to see it carried out in all its parts. This reaffirmation is put first in the text because the next two paragraphs concentrate on those phases which are at the moment the most urgent, namely the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed. personnel.

 

Paragraph 2 requests the parties to cooperate towards a full implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965), calls upon them to instruct their armed personnel to cooperate with the United Nations and to cease all military activity, and insists that there be an end to violations of the cease-fire. It will be noted that this language is stronger than that of previous resolutions, for the reason I mentioned earlier, namely that this insistence may be needed to overcome the present deadlock.

 

Paragraph 3 demands the prompt and unconditional execution of the proposal which has already been agreed to in principle by the Governments of India and Pakistan, for a meeting of their representatives with a suitable representative of the Secretary-General, to be appointed after consultation with both parties but without delay, for the formulation of an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties. It furthermore "urges that such a meeting take place as soon as possible and that such a plan contains a time limit on its implementation; and requests the Secretary General to report on the progress achieved in this respect within three weeks". The demand contained in this paragraph has been formulated by the co-sponsors in this stringent form because the failure to arrive at a common plan for withdrawals has hitherto constituted the main obstacle to progress in the implementation of resolution 211 (1965).

 

Finally, paragraph 4 requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council as soon as possible a report on compliance with the resolution. Insofar as is necessary, I should point out that this applies to the resolution as a whole, while the request in paragraph 3 applies particularly to the content of that paragraph.

 

This draft resolution, as we hope is apparent from the text, is not directed against any of the parties. It is, on the contrary, intended to help them to break the present deadlock in order that we may thereafter proceed further with the implementation of resolution 211 (1965).

 

The draft resolution concentrates, as I said, on those points which are at the moment most urgent; the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. We realise, of course, that some members of the Council would have liked to see some other aspects dealt with as well in the draft resolution. The co-sponsors have tried very hard, their utmost, to achieve this, but they have in the end come to the conclusion that the best way is, consciously and deliberately, to leave out of the draft any matter which does not deal directly with the most urgent points, anything which might be controversial and might, therefore, endanger it.

 

As the text now stands, every word of it has been the subject of extensive consultations. All members of the Council have had their say on it and the co-sponsors believe that all their wishes have been accommodated. I am sure, therefore, that I speak on behalf of all the co-sponsors if I appeal fervently to all the members of the Security Council that no one should, because of any subject that might not be mentioned, break the unanimity of the Council. If it should be possible to adopt this draft resolution with unanimity, or near unanimity, this would be an important step towards solving the conflict between India and Pakistan and also towards the firm establishment of a new basis for action by the Security Council such as we have inaugurated.