Text of the Speech made by Mr. Paysse Reyes (Uruguay) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Paysse Reyes (Uruguay) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

The dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir directly involves peoples who make up almost one-quarter of the population of the earth. Since that is the cease, it might he said that this question imperils the fate of all Asia. As Mr. Shastri, the Prime Minister of India, said in his letter of 14 September 1965: "the world may find itself embroiled in conflict which may well annihilate mankind." [See S/6683, para. 8.] In turn, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan on 13 September 1965 said that we must "save the subcontinent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastrophe" [Ibid., para. 9]

Such facts lead us to inescapable conclusions. First, no amount of attention, tact, care and prudence given to the consideration of this problem will be excessive. Secondly, the responsibility of the great Powers in the consideration and application of solutions is enormous. Lastly, those of us in this Council who have lesser obligations are in duty bound to remain silent at times about the truths in which we believe in order to be constructive and useful. But we cannot avoid the responsibility of stating where we stand.

Given these conclusions, I must, as the representative of the Government of Uruguay, say a few words.

First, we enecase the unanimous concern-stressed, in this most recent episode through which we are living, by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Malaysia-about the essential requirement: a complete cease fire and respect for the line marking the positions held by the armed personnel and troops on 5 August 1965.

Secondly, we appreciate the noble efforts which the Secretary-General has unstintingly made to this end and we support the decisions he has taken. However, we note that for some weeks now he has found it difficult to act. We do not think that an extensive discussion on the formal aspects and on the exercise of competence should divert the Council's attention from the main issue. Since, fortunately, there is unanimous agreement to facilities and finance the Secretary General's programme, within reasonable limits, we see no objections in this case-to proceeding in this manner, so long as the Secretary-General continues to inform the Council of any new steps which he proposes to take.

Thirdly, Uruguay voted for resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965). 211 (1965) and 214 (1965), of 4, 6, 20 and 27 September. In doing so, my delegation stated that it understood that the Security Council was considering the problem of Kashmir as a whole that is, both the present crisis and the need to make some effective contribution to removing the cause of the crisis. The means, in our view, that resolution 211 (1965) implies that the protagonists should make a triple commitment: a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and armed personnel, a decision or a desire to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the basic problem which has been under the jurisdiction of the Security Council since 1948. To think otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the facts. If we are given a bleeding foot with a raw would, it is logical to cure it, anaesthetize it and calm the pain. But it would be neither wise nor adequate to do all that and then to put back the same shoe so that the same puncturing nail, becoming sharper each day, would immediately reopen the wound. What would have been gained? How can we not but think it logical to oppose a return to facing the cause of the crisis without any guarantee that it would receive, at the very least, immediate attention from the Council ?

With this thought in mind, I personally tried during the period when I had the honour to be President of the Council to see if it was possible to bring the parties concerned together so that, if there was a feeling that the spirit of operative paragraph 4 of resolution 211 (1965) was being respected, it might be possible to insist on an immediate cease-fire and the complete withdrawal of armed personnel. I found the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan quite willing to undertake direct conversations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of India also gave me sure guarantees that his Government was willing to achieve a complete and immediate cease-fire and to respect the line of 5 August. This was all an initial step before any conversations of a political nature. I agree with the Secretary-General's desire to obtain at this stage from the Governments of India and Pakistan a statement analogous or similar to that made by them on 29 November 1962. That would be a basis for the immediate and unqualified implementation of the resolutions of the Council on the cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces and armed personnel and would demonstrate the feeling of unity we attributed to resolution 211 (1965).

Fourthly in his statement of 25 October to the Security Council [1247th meeting], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan while speaking about the concrete problem of the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops-made in dramatic manner a series of grave charges about the whole problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and invited the Council to substantiate the truth of his charges. We recognize that that statement creates a profound impression, but it should not be a condition for the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. At the same time, we should like to point out that the Council's reply should not merely be a debate on the formal aspects of the application of the resolutions in question, although that may be of vital importance.

As long ago as 1948, the Council appointed first a committee [resolution 39 (1948)], and later in 1957 its President [resolution 123 (1957)], to collect direct information on the spot. The experience was fruitful. My delegation, if there seemed to be a favourable atmosphere for it, would support the idea that our President or a special three-man committee should be entrusted with the task of gathering impressions on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir without the power to investigate.

Fifthly, the Security Council is on the eve of facing other problems concerning the self-determination of peoples. Its legal, moral and political authority depends on its subsequent acts and conduct. Wl at the Council says and does now regarding this lamentable situation will constitute a precedent for the situations with which the Council may have to deal tomorrow We certainly realise that a complete and effective cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops and armed personnel must be achieved immediately, but we are quite convinced that this will only check the effects; it will leave the cause untouched. Since this is the case, any brezee might fan the flames again unless we do something specific to prevent it.

Sixthly, the time factor-the mere passage of years has an overwhelming influence. This dispute has already been before the Council for eighteen years. No one could contend that the present-day realities are identical with those of 1947 and no one can deny that the present-day realities have legal and political consequences which affect the rights claimed by the parties. Often time, the passage of time, is a wise arbitrator of troublesome situations. In the present case we are concerned test time may be giving rise to complications; instead of working as a sedative, it may become a cause of aggravation. For this reason, the Council cannot renounce, its obligation to work towards a solution of a dispute which might he termed a threat to universal peace.

This being our state of mind-and since we are anxious to maintain the points of view common to the so-called great Powers, which, as Raymond Cartier says, now seem to be breathing the spirit of Yalta-we are going to vote for the draft resolution before the Council. It does not fulfil all our wishes, but at least it is one step forward.

Lastly, it merely remains for me to regret the absence of any representatives of the Government of India from this debate and the withdrawal of the representative of India from this chamber. As President of the Council, I considered it my duty to do all I could to ensure the presence of the representative of India and I must pay a tribute to the very kind attention he paid to my request. For that reason, since I was aware of his state of mind, I did allow myself to speak as President in order to prevent something which I considered was hardly conducive to direct understanding between the parties. Without impairing the President's position of complete impartiality, I acted in accordance with my judgement-without giving any views on any substantive matters and without attempting to restrict the right of freedom of speech. Now I urge the representative of India, and I think I am expressing the feelings of all of us, to honour us with his presence and to cooperate with us in our heartfelt desire to relax the tension which exists between two noble and friendly peoples.