27101965 Text of the Speech made by Mr. EL-Farra (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1248 held on 27 October 1965
Text of the Speech made by Mr. EL-Farra (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1248 held on 27 October 1965
The cease-fire which formally went into effect on 22 September 1965 has not become fully effective, and the steps to carry out the withdrawal of armed personnel have not yet been taken. Violations of the cease-fire are becoming more numerous and more serious, and the situation is rapidly deteriorating. So far, practical wisdom and restraint have prevailed, but the continuance of the present situation may have extremely dangerous effects.
Of course, we know that both parties are expected to honour the cease-fire, but violations, if continued, may invite other violations, and these, unless checked, may defeat the very purpose of resolutions 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). We know, of course, that it is difficult to have the complete picture without complete and adequate fact-finding reports, and this requires more United Nations observers on the cease-fire line. The original number of observers is certainly inadequate. The Secretary-General, relying on Council resolution 211 (1965), made certain arrangements to increase the number of observers along the 1,500 mile cease-fire line in order to provide more United Nations control of the cease-fire.
We note with appreciation the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement these resolutions. We know that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts to make the cease fire effective and to bring about the withdrawal of armed personnel on both sides. We endorse all the steps that have been taken to implement resolution 211 (1965); we express appreciation of the value of the Secretary-General's reports on this matter. Resolution 211 (1965) aimed at achieving three results : first, an effective cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops to the old positions; second, the reestablishment of the old cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; and, third, working for a political settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
We feel that those requirements should go together as far as possible. To concentrate exclusively on one of them, and to leave or postpone the others may result in our facing the real danger of a resumption of hostilities, the consequences of which no one could predict. I say this because I know that this is what happened in the past, and I am sure we all agree that this is what we are here to prevent.
The elements of the resolution, and here I am using the words. author of the resolution, the representative of the Netherlands, "are closely interwoven". I would say that they constitute one unit, and any discussion of any resolution which is one unit should cover all the resolutions; otherwise, it would be an inadequate and incomplete discussion. We invite both India and Pakistan to cooperate fully with the Secretary General and the United Nations observers in their efforts to implement all parts of the Council's resolutions,
What is going on in the whole area of conflict, and now. in Kashmir itself, leaves no room for doubt that an early settlement is essential and that the need for a political solution now is more urgent than ever. We cannot and should not ignore this fact. The dispute cannot go on without more violations and more violence and more bloodshed, and this may lead to the danger of war extending to more areas and bringing in more parties, thus threatening international peace and security and perhaps escalating to uncontrollable proportions.
With the cease-fire in effect, our Council is duty bound to formulate a procedure which would be workable, equitable and in conformity with standing resolutions. Lasting peace cannot be secured by any other means.
We stress the need for a cease-fire, and we want the cease-fire to continue. We want efforts to be made to bring about the withdrawal of armed personnel on both sides. We need to get on with the task of the cease-fire and with task of withdrawal of armed personnel: above all, we want to see permanent and brotherly relations between the two friendly States of India and Pakistan. We feel that to achieve all this the cease-fire should be followed by a real, workable and practical settlement in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. We have, therefore, to apply ourselves to the causes of the present unfortunate development.
Why is the situation today more dangerous than even at the time when the problem first arose? For an answer to this, we have to look at the problem in its proper perspective.
In his report of 3 September 1965 on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to the cease-fire agreement, the Secretary-General stated:
"...the cease-fire... would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences. The differences over Kashmir are sharp, great and ominous. They must be resolved if peace in that area is ever to be secure." [S/6651, para 2.]
This continues to be the case today. It is for this reason that we believe that we cannot ignore the background which brought about a kind of undeclared war in Asia. The historical background of the problem is essential, and the question must be viewed against that background. This Council should not overlook and it cannot erase the history of the problem, the most important part of which is that both India and Pakistan agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This stand was given the United Nations' blessing. On 21 April 1948, the Security Council endorsed this agreement [resolution 47 (1948)] and authorised a commission to implement it.
It is not open, at this stage, for either India or Pakistan. to claim that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of its territory. This will be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves. They have the right to choose their destiny, and until such time as they do, both parties are stopped from making any claims of sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it is not open to any of the parties to deny the arrangements reached. We need not remind the members of the Council around this table that human relations are regulated sometimes by other means than formal treaties, which are the substance of international law. Informal arrangements, especially when endorsed by the Security Council, are one of them. I submit, what is the use of conference tables and negotiations, agreements and arrangements of this kind if they are reached today only to be negated tomorrow? In fact, what is the use of the whole Charter, which is itself a negotiated agreement ?
Needless, to say, self-determination is a right we always support. But annexation which does not stem from the free will of the people is something we do not endorse. It does not convey a right. It imposes a duty-a duty on the people to oppose it, and a duty on us here to protect the legitimate right of the people to choose their own destiny.
We say this because we believe that 5 million people cannot, without their free will, be forced to share a single statehood with either India or Pakistan. Our stand stems from United Nations resolutions on this problem. None of the members challenged the validity of those resolutions. Some members here may take issue with the means, the methods or the timing but --and I stand to be corrected on this we do not differ on the validity of the Security Council's resolutions. They were based on the agreement of the parties. They were never negated. They still stand.
Needless to say, Jordan, which has always maintained close bonds of friendship with both of the two sister States of India and Pakistan, seeks in this case to express its strong desire and its unalterable wish to keep and to strengthen those bonds. However, its first desire and duty is to stress as a basic principle the necessity of respecting the decisions of the United Nations. Jordan has the greatest admiration for the ancient cultural heritage of India. It also stressed the importance of India as a major Power in the forces of nonalignment, the aim of which is to maintain world peace and security. With Pakistan, Jordan has close links of culture and religion, but neither of these factors can influence my country's position vis-a-vis the decisions of the Security Council, respect for which must be an unquestionable principle to be upheld by all Member States in the interests of the United Nations and of world peace.
Some members called on the two parties to respect all Security Council resolutions of September 1965. I in turn, would like to call on all members of the Council to respect its resolutions in order to protect the prestige and dignity of the council and protect the hope of mankind. Jordan is a small country. Small countries derive their strength from, and depend for their security on, the effective discharge by the United Nations of its own responsibilities to protect its own Charter. By ignoring or disregarding its resolutions, the Security Council would create an unhealthy precedent. We cannot insist on the implementation of our resolutions in a given case and overlook it, or let expediency play its part, in another case.
Quoting a great leader of our time, a former Republican President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower :
"We cannot, in the world any more than in our own nation, subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be but one law, or there will be no peace."
President Eisenhower also stressed the point that :
"There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."
My delegation subscribes to these views. It is through. the collective will and wisdom of the members of this Council. that we can put these sound views of the former President of United States into effect.
Much has been said recently about the scope of the authority of the Secretary-General. Some uncertainties have been expressed in this connection. We know that complete clarity and understanding of this matter the work entrusted to him may be hampered. We deem it fit, therefore, to make a few observations on this important matter.
The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Security Council's recommendation unanimous agreement among the five permanent Council members. This is a Charter requirement embodied in Article 97 of the Charter. And the question arises: Why is all this? It is simply because of the importance of this office. It is one of the main organs of the United Nations. To be able to use this office effectively, the Secretary-General, in his election, needs to have the unanimous support and acceptance of all permanent members of the Security Council. His functions are not only administrative, but diplomatic and political, at times, as well.
Whether the Security Council, in interpreting the Charter and acting within the scope of its authority, would give the Secretary-General special mandates and/or more power is up to this body. The Security Council can always do this. But, I submit, we have nothing to say about vested rights embodied in our Charter, and interpreted in the past through the practice of this United Nations organ. When powers are clear, to invoke them the Secretary-General need not come to the Council for directives. When, for instance, Pakistan requested the Secretary-General to go there, or to send a representative on his behalf, to see and report to the Council on certain charges, we do not believe that this needed the Council's approval. It is his discretionary right. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of Article 99 of the Charter, which gives the Secretary-General, besides other functions the right to bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security ? This authority, which involves a task of great responsibility implies the discretionary right to visit places of conflict and to make inquiries. This is the more so since the Charter made provisions for securing the independence of the United Nations.
We do not want to see his activities freeze and become ineffective. I am sure the Secretary-General would wish to help us in this respect. It is his office, which is one of the main organs of the United Nations, and his authority which should be protected.
Where to draw the line between matters which need the Council's directives and approval and those which do not, is something which has been determined through past practice. In some cases, the Secretary-General can play a part which neither the Security Council nor a State or group of States would be able to play. Let me reiterate that the Secretary-General takes his office after the unanimous consent of the permanent members of the Council's recommendation of the Security Council and the appointment by the General Assembly. We do not believe that those who drafted our Charter and incorporated all these conditions and limitations in the Charter intended, after all this, to confine the role of the Secretary-General to "negative neutrality". Certainly he is expected, being an independent body, to play a more effective, positive and helpful part.
I have one more general observation. As the United Nations grows close to achieving universality, it becomes imperative for all its main organs to function properly and effectively, even if this requires a liberal interpretation of the Charter. The United Nations Charter is our constitution, which is bound to respond to the changing needs of our international society. It is an evolutionary document and it must live in the evolutionary world in which we live. It must be interpreted, therefore, in such a way so as to reflect the intention of those great statesmen who drew it up. And I must say once more, Mr. President, that you are one of those statesmen who drew up and signed this great document, the Charter of the United Nations. This kind of liberal approach is the one that has been adopted by the United Nations on the domestic jurisdiction issue, on the colonial issues, on the issue of human rights and on many issues involving international conflict. Before concluding, I should like to refer to a letter submitted by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, dated 22 October 1965 [S/6821]. This letter embodies charges of a serious and alarming nature. The same. is true of the statement that the representative of Pakistan made on Monday [1247th meeting]. These charges, if established, should arouse our deepest concern, as issues of a humanitarian nature are also involved. We are glad that the Secretary-General has already sent his representative to the area of conflict. His representative could also be directed, if this is possible, to look into these charges and ascertain the facts. On the other hand if the Secretary-General deems otherwise, we think that, by virtue of his own right and the powers. entrusted to him by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 211 (1965), the Secretary-General may want to consider visiting again the area of conflict. His personal and prestige and weight would be of great help, and his visit at this. time may certainly bring fruitful results.
In conclusion, my Government feels that urgent steps are needed in order to have an effective cease-fire and withdrawal, with a time-limit for complete implementation. This is a preliminary step to arresting the deterioration of this situation. We should ask the two Governments to cooperate with the Secretary-General and with the United Nations observers in their efforts to fully implement Council resolution 211 (1965). We should remind the Governments of India and Pakistan of the Council's wish and determination that, pending further action by the Council under paragraph 4 of resolution 211 (1965), they should utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, with a view to reaching a just and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which is underlying the present conflict.
The Council also needs to reaffirm its decision to reconvene in order to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a just and honourable settlement of this dispute. We would like to see the observer machinery of the United Nations now on the cease-fire line made more effective, and we endorse all steps taken on this matter. We express the hope that the Secretary-General will visit the area involved as soon as possible. The Council, in its wisdom, may want to establish a special committee with a special mandate to help the Council in this respect.
Finally, I would say that all organs of the United Nations can be effective if we have the will to make them so, and I hope we are all in agreement that there is such a will.