Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965
Exactly fourteen long days passed since the Security Council was called to meet on the initiative of our President adopted resolution 209 (1965) of 4 September-an occasion of urgency reflected in the urgent and anxious language in which it was expressed. We had then asked for and hoped for a response within three days: but even before half that short period had gone by we became gripped with the fear that the course of the war was accelerating in its insane speed and gave no promise of halting or abating. We therefore met again-again in circumstances of grave urgency-and within two days adopted resolution 210 (1965) and sent the Secretary-General on this most difficult of all the tasks to which he had in four long years lent the strength of his hand and the persuasive talent with which he is immeasurable endowed. I then praised his courage for the readiness with which he undertook the accomplishment of this exhausting task, which I then felt could be matched only by his personal characteristics and the exalted position to which he so significantly adds lustre. He has returned with empty hands but with courage undiminished and his hopes for a successful outcome by no means lessened. He deserves our gratitude to the fullest measure. "Certain great questions are put to mankind," said Tolstoy, "not that men should answer them but that they should keep on trying." We should therefore continue to hope till, as the poet puts it, hope creates from its own wreck the think it contemplates.
In a very real sense without mincing words, we cannot help but regard the situation at which the Security Council has arrived as a test of its ability to stand up to the exacting burdens of international life and justify the hopes that mankind have entrusted to it. If the Security Council can be baulked, bent or beaten, there is no longer any hope for man in this pitiful world of ours. It is therefore our duty to give it the strength to face up to its present peril. But we must have a clear understanding of what we are about before we can decide our course of action. The representative of Pakistan cautioned us only this morning, at our previous meeting, against advocates who, if they cannot convince, at least endeavour to confuse the judges; I entirely agree with him. We should not either confuse ourselves or, what is even better, allow ourselves to be confused.
The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has had a very long and chequered history. We listened to some parts of it when we last met: we listened to more of it this morning. It is indeed almost as old as the United Nations. What is worse, it threatens to last as long as the United Nations is hopefully expected to last, that is, for ever. It is therefore quite easy without much ingenuity to plunge into its labyrinthine paths and bye lanes and satisfy one's predilection for the extremes of political polemics, and thus lose one's way. I venture to think that the present problem-I wish to repeat, the only one with which we in the present context are concerned-lies entirely within a small compass. It is capable of a clear and quick answer.
On 3 September the Secretary-General presented a report [S/6651]. It painted a picture of "the current situation in Kashmir'' which jolted us into activity. Neither India nor Pakistan we should bear this in mind-had asked for a meeting with a complaint in hand with regard to any political dispute which was gnawing at its mind. There was a sudden flare-up along the cease-fire line and you, Mr. The President rightly, if I may say so with respect, urgently called us into meeting. We were not concerned then with the simmering situation between India and Pakistan. It began simmering on that fateful day in August 1947 when one ancient country and one ancient people were cut into two unequal parts. It continues simmering to this day. It is most times quiescent: sometimes it bursts into flames as it did in August and September. Something suddenly went wrong on 5 August 1965.
May I digress here for a moment. My esteemed friend, the representative of Jordan, in a short intervention at the 1239th meeting, offered what he called a clarification to the significance which in the statement he made to us, the represenatative of India sought to attach to the date. He quoted me in support of his contention, and I wish to assure him and also to assure the Council that I stated by every word I said then. It is true indeed that we made no judgement on that occasion. We had taken no position on who committed aggression on whom nor indeed did I understand the representative of India to say that we had, by incorporating that date, judged one party as guilty of any misconduct. But and this is a vital fact the date is indeed of the greatest significance. I do not wish to mar by any words of mine this afternoon the very close and friendly personal relationship that the representative of Jordan, Mr. Rifa'i and myself have enjoyed over the years and the even more close and more affectional feelings that we have developed towards each other since we came to be seated at this Council. It was my good fortune that the arrangement of the English alphabet has made it possible for us to sit side by side. More than ever, speaking on this significant day-the last day Mr. Rifa'i will grace this table and add distinction to our company and the last day of my nine-month-long privilege to have been so closely associated with him, since he is leaving us tomorrow-more than ever, as I said, do I hesitate to enter into a controversy at all with him. But I am perfectly sure that he will agree with me that the date has a significance in the context of the Secretary-General's report: we, the sponsors of resolution 210 (1965), did not invent it for fun or choose it arbitrarily because we liked the look of it on a calendar. The date of 5 August is the vital date in this debate. It is in fact and in truth, the starting point in the long and sorry train of tragic events narrated by the Secretary-General in his report of 3 September [S/6651], which is, I repeat, the foundation of this debate.
The fifth of August as the vital date to this debate if referred to at least seven times in that report, and I crave the Council's indulgence to enumerate it.
First, the sub-beeding above paragraph 5 is entitled: "Events since 5 August 1965." Secondly, the opening sentence of paragraph 5 reads: "The current serious trouble affecting the cease-fire and the cease-fire line in Kashmir dated from 5 August 1965..." Thirdly, the concluding sentence of the same paragraph reads:
"The adequacy of the present number of observers and of their function may well be re-appraised in the light of experiences since 5 August."
Fourthly, the opening sentence of paragraph 6 begins: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side."
Fifthly, part II of the same report is entitled: "List of those incidents since 5 August 1965 which have been investigated by United Nations observers prior to 3 September 1965"
Sixthly, General Nimmo, on his letter transmitting that list said:
"This list comprises only incidents on which complaints have been submitted asserting violations of the cease-fire and the cease-fire line between 5 and 30 August 1965..." Seventhly, and lastly, the list itself sets out the first and second incidents as those of 5 and 6 August.
I do not think I need say more. Nor will it be proper for me to lift the veil over the varied and various consultations that indeed did take place relating to the incorporating of it, the formulation of words in it, the omission of some and the inclusion of others, the dotting of the I's and the crossing of T's, the inspiration and perspiration behind the final form. That would provide good copy, but it would hardly be good diplomacy.
I now return to where I left off. In the remarks that I propose to make, I do not wish it to be thought that I am more critical of the one side or less critical of the other. My country enjoys the most friendly relations with Pakistan as well as India and we are anxious that this relationship should continue and mature. For that reason alone I have guarded myself from accepting one version of what happened or another as proceeding from the two parties. But we are bound to accept the reports of the Secretary-General, beginning with the report of 3 September, which we know are unbiased, objective, impartial. I shall therefore confine myself in such comments as I may make to the statements contained in the reports and no other version of what one side or the other has alleged to have happened.
According to paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report [S/6651] of 3 September, General Nimmo, as a result of investigations and "in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities", reached the conclusion that large-scale infiltrations of heavily armed irregulars from Pakistan across the cease-fire line took place on 5 August and subsequent days. If one examines, as I have, the annotated list of incidents annexed to the Secretary-General's report, one finds that not until after the first eleven incidents, spaced within 5 August and 14 August, had occurred, each with increasing intensity and severity, did the Indian troops for the first time cross the cease-fire line and reoccupy the position northeast of Kargil, from which previously in May, upon the appeal of the Secretary-General, they had withdrawn.
In these eleven incidents there are to be found confirmations by General Nimmo's observers of attacks within the Indian side of the cease-fire line by large armed groups varying from forty and seventy to as many as "exceeding 1,000", leaving large quantities of arms with tell-tale markings. This could not go on with impunity and indeed provoked self defensive reactions. Subsequently, the pace of the response kept in step with the pace of infiltration, until by the beginning of September everything went out of hand.
One realises-none more than I do that the Security Council is not a court of law. How I wish it were, if only to a limited extent of requiring the rules of relevance being observed in debate. But it inevitably must function as a quasi judicial body examining facts and weighing probabilities before it can make determinations and take decisions which are indeed judgement-making processes that fall within its sole competence. I would venture to suggest that from the Secretary General's report, supported by the careful findings of General Nimmo as a part of it, one can only and I say this with the deepest regret reach the conclusion that the highly armed, well-trained and well-led infiltrators came from Pakistan's side of the cease-fire line.
We in our part of world have been facing for over two years this kind of war-infiltration, subversion, sabotage and we may speak with some large knowledge learnt in the hard school of experience. It is an exhausting, exasperating war where the initiative is forever with the aggressor, where the real casualties are not so much human bodies or valuable material, but the slow erosion of the steel, the determination, the will to fight, the will to stand firm in the face of odds, possessed by the passion to give one's all to save one's country.
Military pundits have calculated the defensive human costs of such operations in the ratio of at least ten to one. The art and science of this wearing, wearying, wasteful war have now been perfected in Asia. The peril of our times is the expansion, export and propagation of this kind of war into regions farther beyond, regions which are judged to be ripe for revolution. Today, however, Asia is its testing ground.
When the truth with regard to these infiltrations became known, Pakistan answered with vague details and claims that these are but the symptoms of an ancient malignancy and the Security Council should direct its mind and employ its energies in exterminating the root cause of all: the denial by India of a plebiscite in Kashmir, agreed to by India as long ago as 1948. This was repeated this morning at our previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan. This has been a time-honored refrain.
I have referred to the chequered history of this ancient conflict, and were it relevant to the matter in debate I should have felt compelled to address myself to it. But for the moment let me say only that it is claimed by India that it is capable of an answer as effective as it is complete. But I suggest that is not our task in this debate.
Pakistan has claimed that a cease-fire should be purposeful and should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The only "purpose" that I see in this argument is that the purpose of this infiltration was to provide Pakistan with a lever which at one stroke releases it from the obligation of November 1962 to engage in direct talks with India to settle all outstanding differences and enables it, at the same time, to return to the pre-1962 claim of nothing but a plebiscite in Kashmir. I must venture this thought If a plebiscite or an undertaking to have one is to be regarded as an essential prerequisite for a cease-fire, the logic of that argument would commit the Security Council to have secured for a State the happy position of provoking a conflict so as to be able to secure a political profit from it.
I suggest that we take good care that the Security Council does not walk into any position of that kind. Our duty was and is plain. In resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) we called for a halt to hostilities-the sole concern, I repeat, in the present context of the Security Council. It is not to recall ancient resolutions from the musty records of the past, nor to express pious hopes for a peaceful settlement in the future, nor to get side-tracked from the main objective.
Far be it from me even remotely to give the impression of being critical of the Secretary-General. But I must confess I do share slightly the grievance expressed by the representative of India when he spoke to us at the 1239th meeting. as I read the Secretary-General's preliminary report of his Even visit to India and Pakistan, the terms of his second letter to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan caught my attention because they contained the following words:
"I note however, that both Governments, to their replies to my request for an unconditional cease-fire, have added conditions and qualifications upon which I have no right under the Security Council resolutions to give firm undertakings." [See S/6683, para. 10].
The moment I read those words, I underlined the words "both Governments" and put a double query in the margin, as if to ask myself "How come ?" Presumably the pattern of the letters lends itself to the view they were composed in identical terms to avoid obvious suggestions and difficulties. But the replies, quite patently, are not cast in the same terms. It was only fair that there should have been some indication of the essential difference between the ready willingness of the one and the reluctant response of the other.
But in Prime Minister Shastri's reply of 14 September, we find this statement :"In deference to the wishes of the Security Council and to the appeals which we have received from many friendly countries, we accept your proposal for an immediate cease-fire. We would, therefore, be prepared to order a cease-fire effective from 6.30 a.m. Indian standard time, on Thursday, 16 September 1965, provided you confirm to me by 9 a.m. tomorrow that Pakistan is also agreeable to do so." [Ibid., para. 8.]
This letter concludes with these two sentences :
"We sincerely hope that the forces of peace will win and that humanity will go forward towards ever increasing progress and prosperity. It is in this spirit that we are agreeing to your proposal for a cease-fire." [Ibid].
It is therefore entirely understandable that in a reply couched in the politest terms a note of incredulity can be detected in Prime Minister Shastri's second letter. In the report the Secretary-General sets out the reply that he received from Prime Minister Shastri on 15 September:
"Thank you for your message of 14 September, which was conveyed to me late last night. "You have said that you cannot give any undertakings.
I fully appreciate and understand this and in fact I did not ask you for any. It was, however, essential for us to state clearly our stand in regard to certain matters which are of vital importance to us.
"I reaffirm my willingness, as communicated, to order a simple cease-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you...". [Ibid., para. 11].
I regret, with the utmost deference, that I cannot agree with or accept the analysis of this correspondence made at the previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan when he gallantly tried to graft on to an unconditional acceptance a series of conditions that are not there.
I pass on to another aspect of the reports. This readiness. and willingness-as I read it in the correspondence-of India, to my judgement, contrasts strangely with the consistently unhelpful attitude of Pakistan. I now go back to the first report that was circulated to the Council [S/6651]. In that report there is a chapter entitled "Efforts of the Secretary General". With the indulgence of the Council, I should like to read out paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report by the Secretary-General :
"On the morning of 9 August 1965, a cable was received from General Nimmo warning that the situation was deteriorating along the cease-fire line. On the basis of this report, I saw the representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government my very serious concern about the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian military positions on the Indian side of the line, and also my strong appeal that the cease-fire line be observed. That same after-noon I saw the representative of India, told him of the information I had received from General Nimmo and of the demarche I had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked him to convey to his Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In subsequent days, I repeated these appeals orally for transmission to the two Governments, asking also that all personnel of either party still remaining on the wrong side of the line be withdrawn to its own side. I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the cease-fire and the ceasefire line will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by its representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire line if Pakistan does likewise. In the meantime, reports from UNMOGIP as of 2 September indicate a continuation of violations of the cease-fire and the cease-fire line from both sides.
"In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation as of 16 August, I gave consideration to a further step in the form of a draft statement about the cease-fire violations which was designed for public release. The draft was handed to the two representatives to be transmitted for the information of their Governments. Both Governments reacted promptly. The Government of India had no objection to the release of the statement but at first wished certain modifications which in part at least regarded as unacceptable. The Government of Pakistan was strongly negative about the statement in general on the grounds that it favoured India in that it dealt only with the current cease-fire situation without presenting the political background of the broad issue and thus was lacking in balance since a cease-fire alone supports the status quo to India's benefit." [S/6651, paras. 9 and 10].
On the question of the attitude of the Pakistan Government to the cease-fire, I wish to draw the attention of the Council to two extracts from that report. This is a reply from the President of Pakistan to the Secretary-General's first letter:
"Nevertheless, Pakistan is not against a cease-fire as such. In fact, in order to save the subcontinent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastrophe, we would welcome a ceasefire. But it must be a purposeful cease-fire one that effectively precludes that catastrophe and merely postpones it. In other words, it should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict.
"While you propose a 'cease-fire without condition' you go on to add that the Security Council would, soon after the cease-fire, proceed to implement its resolution of 6 September. The provisions of the Security Council resolution of 4 September and 6 September that the cease-fire be followed immediately by withdrawal of all armed Pakistan personnel to the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and the consolidation of the cease-fire line through the strengthening of the United Nations Military Observer Group would result in restoring India's military grip over Kashmir. We would thus merely revert to the same explosive position which triggered the present conflict." [S/6683, para. 9].
Lastly, I quote the final paragraph of the second letter from the President of Pakistan : "However, a cease-fire can be meaningful only if it is followed by such steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the subcontinent. To bring about such a settlement, it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute." [Ibid., para. 14].
Mr. President, I have done.
My delegation feels that in the present context any resolution of the Council should have these four essential parts first acknowledgment of India's ready acceptance of the Security Council's call for a cease-fire; secondly, regret that Pakistan felt unable to agree to an unconditional cease-fire; thirdly deploring of the recourse of large-scale armed infiltrations into Kashmir as a design by no means consistent with the continuing desire to settle all disputes with India on peaceful terms; and, fourthly, a call on Pakistan, not on India which has not once but twice accepted the Secretary-General's, proposals to cease hostilities as of a particular date and a particular time.
Those without embroidery or irrelevance, are the immediate need. My delegation would be happy to support every effort to get a resolution of that content passed by the Council. No more can be or should be expected of the Council - certainly, no less.
Before I conclude I wish to say this. I have listened with great sorrow to the catalogue of human tragedy that the representative of Pakistan narrated to us this morning. I have not the slightest doubt that the representative of India does have his own story to tell of unspeakable tragedies. In human terms they should tug at our hearts and stir our souls with revulsion for war; and pity and compassion for those that are the unwilling legatees of the misery, starvation, homeless ness and sufferings innumerable let loose by war, a situation in which swift death would be a great mercy. I trust that that mental picture alone will give this debate a sense of urgency as nothing else can.