18091965 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Rifa i (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Rifa i (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

We have come to an important stage in the debates of the Security Council on the question before us-more substantive in nature and, I hope, more productive.

At the 1237th and 1238th meetings of the Security Council, held respectively on 4 and 6 September, the discussions we held and the resolutions we adopted were of an emergency character. Most of the members tried to confine themselves to the question of maintaining a cease-fire on the demarcation lines in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan. Therefore, the debate did not go, as it normally should, into the fundamental political question of Kashmir; nor did it deal with any claims or counterclaims by the two parties to the dispute. Since then armed activities between the two nations have reached wider dimensions and rendered Security Council resolutions 209(1965) and 210(1965) of 4 and 6 September respectively a failure. Indeed, the question became no longer a violation of the cease-fire line but rather military operations across international borders. The question, therefore, required a broader treatment.

We were disturbed at the fact that these activities were taking place at a time when the Secretary-General was undertaking his peace mission to the area and indeed during his visit to the two countries. The conclusion we draw from that reality is that efforts towards the enforcement of a cease-fire can in no way be practical, nor can they yield positive results, if the basic issue is not squarely faced. That is why in all past resolutions and agreements related to a cease-fire between India and Pakistan the political issue, namely the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir, was always emphasised side by side with a cease-fire. Special references could be made to Security Council resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948 and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which resolutions were repeatedly reaffirmed in all subsequent decisions of the Council.

It follows that an enforcement of a cease-fire in such a way as to seal the basic issue would amount indeed to a political gain to one party and a loss to the other. Therefore it was easy for us to understand the difficulty which the efforts of the Secretary-General encountered when he went with a limited mandate to cope with a situation as grave as the one obtaining at present between India and Pakistan. Recognizing his devotion to the cause of peace, his integrity, his impartiality and his deep involvement in the problem-an involvement which stems from the responsibilities of his high office and from the fact that he is a faithful son of the Asian soil recognizing all this, we felt that the political problem in the question of Kashmir weighed heavily on the practical implementation of a cease-fire. The Secretary-General correctly said, as he was about to leave on 7 September 1965 from Kennedy International Airport on his mission :

"I have no illusions about this mission: the issues are infinitely complicated and difficult and the situation out there is extremely grave.

"Kashmir has posed a baffling problem for the United Nations for seventeen years." [See S/6683, para 3.]

We therefore attached great importance to the efforts and accomplishments of the Secretary-General and to his talks with the two Governments of India and Pakistan. The preliminary report of the Secretary-General [S/6683] which he made available at the time of his return to Headquarters is a valuable document which presents the official positions of both Governments in the present crisis. As I was reading the report of 16 September 1965, my admiration for the honesty and objectivity of U Thant was, as usual, at its highest. The Secretary-General addressed the two Governments of India and Pakistan in the letter and spirit of the Council's resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965), adding to that his own faith in his mission of peace. His request and his endeavours were aimed at securing an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the whole area. For this he worked and it was this he urged. The reaction of both Governments, however, did not correspond to his hopes. In his report of 16 September, he says:

"The replies from both Governments to my message of 12 September have shown clearly the desire of both for a cease-fire, but both pose conditions which make the acceptance of a cease-fire very difficult for the other side." [Ibid., para. 13.]

In analysing the positions of the two Governments as stated in their official messages to the Secretary-General, one can conclude that India's conditions for a cease-fire could be summarized as follows: first, there must be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attack on India, open or disguised; second, a cease-fire should have no bearing on the political issue of Kashmir; and third, Kashmir is an integral part of India and falls under its sovereignty. These are the bases which constitute India's acceptance of a cease-fire and which India invites Pakistan to accept.

In direct opposition to this Indian stand is Pakistan's acceptance of a cease-fire which is qualified as follows: first, that the cease-fire must be purposeful: second, that arrangements must be made for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which is the root-cause of the India-Pakistan conflict: and third, that the pledges to the people of Kashmir that they may choose their own destiny must be honoured and fulfilled. Comparing these two sets of contradictory views, one fails to find any common ground on which the two parties could meet or even be called to negotiate. My delegation wishes to stress in this regard, and as a general rule, the point that no direct discussions or negotiations between two parties can serve any positive purpose if there is no agreement on either the basis of such discussions or the objectives thereof. It is to our deep regret that this element of common understanding on the fundamental issue in the conflict is lacking between India and Pakistan. This regrettable but does not enable the members of the Security Council to cherish the hope that a settlement of the basic problem can be reached through direct talks between the two Governments. The Security Council should therefore itself turn its attention to the problem.

The Security Council will be prolonging the difficulties between India and Pakistan and perpetuating the dispute if it does not take serious and definite steps to resolve the question of Kashmir, which has proved to be the real cause of the unpleasant situation between the two sister States. I am afraid that we would be reducing the responsibilities of the United Nations to the minimum if we were to restrict them to the mere task of stopping the fighting. The responsibilities of the United Nations are much greater and much higher than this. The responsibilities of the United Nations are mainly directed towards the settlement of the disputes which are the causes of fighting among nations. If we are to live up to our duties in the maintenance of international peace and security, we much accept this fact.

The passing of time did not bury the question of Kashmir; on the contrary, it allowed the pressure of the years to create an explosive situation. This is the case with all other old, long-standing problems, where the blue waters we see are no more than a mirage. The Security Council must act not only for the sake of preserving peace between the two Asian nations, but even more for the purpose of suppressing the flame of war before it is blown by political winds in directions yet unknown. And if this fear is present in our minds and it seems that it is-them let us look at matters from the right angle and let us act promptly before it is too late. Let us save the situation from falling into other hands.

The question of Kashmir is knocking heavily at the door of this Council. We are all called upon to propose practical means for its settlement and in order to be practical, steady and correct in our proposals, we must uphold the principle of self-determination as it is embedded and reaffirmed in all past pronouncements of the Council on this problem. My delegation will not fail to join in any efforts in this Council aimed at serving this end. We have therefore noted with satisfaction the following remark of the Secretary-General in his report :

"I am sure also that the Council will wish to explore, as a matter of urgency, methods for achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan." [Ibid., para. 6].

The Secretary-General, in his unrelenting efforts to surmount the present acute crisis, has introduced to the Council in his report [S/6686] some ideas and has stated his own view. The general and deep concern at the situation between India and Pakistan, together with the fear that further serious developments might be underway, has preoccupied the minds of the members of the Security Council with what should be done to face the immediate necessities. I wish on behalf of my delegation to emphasise, in this regard, some essential points which determine our position in evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of any suggestions or proposals for meeting the situation.

First, the continuance of fighting must in no way be allowed and a cessation of hostilities must be enforced at once. Second, the immediate necessity for dealing with the crisis is part and parcel of the permanent necessity. Third, in order to give effect to its orders for a cease-fire, the Security Council must widen the base, not only increase the pressure.

We want, therefore, to proceed on the main road that leads to a clear destination, not on the sideways which lead to dead-ends.