1962-06-22 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Stevenson (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Stevenson (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

Mr. President, I do not have much more to say. Before I proceed I must say that I was not aware, if I understood the representative of the Soviet Union correctly, that my shoe was on the table. I wonder if he could have confused me with someone else who has still other uses for shoes and tables.

When I was interrupted for the second time, I was saying that the veto has been frequently used to prevent the United Nations from investigating charges brought to the Security Council by the Soviet Union itself. On at least four occasions, with the use of six vetoes, the Soviet Union refused, after using the Security Council to air its charges, to let its own assertions be examined.

I invite your attention to 1950, when the Soviet Union charged the United States Air Force with the bombing of Communist-held areas of China. The Soviet Union vetoed a commission of investigation.

In 1952, the Soviet representative climaxed one of the most shameless falsehoods in history, the long crescendo of accusations that the United States and the United Nations troops were employing germ warfare in Korea, by bringing the issue before the Security Council and then promptly vetoing a proposal for an impartial examination.

In 1958, when the Soviet Union purported to be concerned about United States flights over the Arctic Circle, the United States proposed an Arctic inspection zone. That, too, was vetoed.

In 1960, when Soviet fighter planes destroyed a United States RB aeroplane over international waters, the Soviet Union vetoed two separate proposals for investigations, one of them asking only that the International Red Cross be permitted to assist any surviving crew member of the plane.

In each of these cases, the Security Council tried to exercise its proper peace-keeping function through systematic investigation. In each case, after having brought the charge, the Soviets vetoed the attempt at a remedy..

One of the most disturbing facts also revealed in the history of a hundred vetoes is the consistent effort to prevent the Security Council from developing processes of peaceful settlement. Not only do many of the vetoes I have referred to fall into this category, but most of the remaining ones were also cast against efforts to promote peaceful settlements: four times with respect to Spain in 1946; once again on a resolution on troop withdrawals from Syria and Lebanon in 1946, not because the resolution was wrong but because it was not extreme enough; twice in connexion with problems arising at the time of Indonesian independence; once against Security Council recommendations for a solution of the Berlin blockade in 1948; once on Goa; twice to prevent extension of United Nations peace-keeping functions in Lebanon in 1958; and five times since 1960 in the Security Council consideration of the Congo. The USSR also vetoed four resolutions in the field of disarmament.

Distortion of the veto power has been a fact of life in this Council. It is a fact that led to the "Uniting for Peace '' procedure, adding to the United Nations peace-keeping machinery a flexible means whereby United Nations Members can assure that the United Nations primary function of preserving the peace will be carried out. The veto does exist, within its proper context, as a recognition of political reality. But it is a privilege to be used, not to be abused. And abused it has been, for the Soviet Union has wilfully obstructed the operation of this Council. It has violated that part of the four-Power declaration at San Francisco in which the Powers agreed not to use their veto wilfully to obstruct the operation of this Council.

So much for yesterday and for today. What of the future? The Council is a vital, purposeful organ of the United Nation, in spite of the veto. It provides vital and purposeful direction and leadership, and, in areas of its work where the veto does not apply, we believe the Council might well widen its activities and increasingly provide that direction and that direction and that leadership in our affairs.

As for the veto itself, we hope that, long before the Soviet Union approaches its two hundredth veto, it will realise that its own interests lie not in national obstruction but in international cooperation, not in wilful vetoes for narrow ends but in willing assents for the broad and common good for which the United Nations stands.