Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962 .
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962 .
It is not difficult to see that the draft resolution which the delegation of Ireland has submitted for the consideration of the Security Council (S/5134] basically corresponds to the so-called "summary" made by the United States representative at the meeting held by the Council yesterday.
Immediately after this statement the USSR delegation demonstrated that this so-called summary, being inaccurate and incomplete, did not correctly reflect the course of the discussion and that, in particular, the draft resolution, which is practically a photo-copy of the United States summary and reproduces some of its conclusions, or in fact any resolution on this subject, is absolutely unnecessary in view of the wide exchange of views that has taken place.
Historians may be interested by the report emanating from Press circles at the United Nations that the draft resolution was originally co-sponsor by yet another delegation, not only by the delegation of Ireland, and that at the last moment this second sponsor's name was removed from the document issued under the symbol S/5134. I do not know whether that was really so, but in any case a comparison between the record of yesterday's meeting of the Security Council and the text of this resolution offers abundant proof of the correctness of the Indian representative's remark that the initiator and moving spirit of this resolution is the delegation of the United States of America. Of course, every delegation is entitled to act as it sees fit, and I can see nothing prejudicial in this from the procedural point of view, but on the political plane I cannot fail to stress this circumstance and to associate myself with the conclusion advanced here just now by the representative of India.
I should like to remind you that, as recently as yesterday, not only the USSR delegation, but also the delegations of other countries represented in the Council commented on the United States representative's incorrect interpretation and incomplete and inaccurate description of the positions they took here in the Council.
The USSR delegation considers that the Council should reject all attempts, at this stage of the discussion and after such significant delays and protraction of the debate under various pretexts, to impose on it at all costs a draft resolution which reflects a one-sided and hence incorrect view of the question of Kashmir.
A careful study of the draft shows that its central idea is, as the United States representative asserted more than once, that our earlier resolution on holding a plebiscite in the (territory of Kashmir in order to determine whether this territory belongs to India or to Pakistan is still in force at the present time.) This idea is still the central factor of the draft resolution now before the Security Council, as is perfectly evident from the fact the operative part of the resolution begins with the proposal to remind both parties of the principles contained in earlier Security Council resolutions and, in particular, in its resolution of 17 January 1948 and in the resolutions of the so-called United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
And yet, gentlemen, it is no secret to any of you that these are the very resolutions which contain detailed proposals for holding the plebiscite. Accordingly, the crux of the matter, as was amply proved during these debates, lies in the fact that certain members of the Council still consider it necessary to hold a plebiscite for the above-mentioned purposes.
We have already pointed out in our statement of 4 May 1962 [1010th meeting] that the resolution about this plebiscite was adopted by the Council in quite a different set of practical circumstances and that the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan rested on conditions which were prerequisites for carrying out this whole plan. The most important condition-and I must apologise for having, so to speak, to return from Z to A, but that is not the fault of the USSR delegation was the preliminary withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the entire territory of Kashmir.
Let us not embark now upon a repetition of all that we have heard and said during all the meetings and they were lengthy and protracted enough-that the Security Council has devoted to the examination of this question. Suffice it to say that years have passed since these proposals were submitted and adopted, and life has taken its course. In the territory of Kashmir which is under Indian jurisdiction, three elections have been held, in which the population of that part of the country, representing three-fourths of the whole population of Kashmir, successively and freely expressed its will. During these years, Kashmir has become an inalienable part of India.
That is why in the present circumstances the request for a plebiscite in the territory of Kashmir is, as we have already pointed out, quite unreasonable. It is perfectly obvious that this request casts doubt on the fact that Kashmir belongs to India.
That is why we cannot endorse the proposal that the Council should now reaffirm all the resolutions which it and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan adopted in quite different circumstances. The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that this main difference of opinion concerning the situation between Pakistan and India should be settled in favour of Pakistan, that is to say, settled in favour of one of the parties.
Assertions have been made here-as in the statement of the Irish representative, who defended this draft, to our deep regret that the question is simply one of noting that the relevant resolution was at one time taken by the aforementioned organs of the United Nations. Such references and such assertions only serve to show that some delegations are so anxious to bring about the adoption of the draft now before. the Council that they are ready to contradict the very text of the draft and their own earlier comments on it.
It is obvious to all that the key reason for introducing the draft is the holding of the so-called plebiscite, which in the present circumstances would be nothing but open interference. in the domestic affairs of India, as Mr. Krishna Menon, the Minister of Defence of India, so rightly said here. If that is not the aim of the authors of the draft resolution, why do they include in their text the aforesaid reference to earlier resolutions of United Nations organs which mention the holding of at plebiscite? Surely they have not set themselves the task of writing from their seats. in the Security Council, a kind of historical monograph in which everything that happened in the period they are describing must be stated with equal emphasis ?
It is self-evident that what may be appropriate for historical studies, which must refer to everything that happened during the period under discussion, is naturally inapplicable to the political decisions of the Security Council, which are taken in the light of the practical circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time when the decision is taken. The attempt to create the impression that all this is mentioned, so to speak, for the love of the art of history is doomed to failure; it cannot and should not mislead anyone.
Moreover, it is perfectly obvious from the context of the draft resolution that the negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan, the renewal of which is urged in the draft, are to take place on the basis of the principles set forth in the now outdated resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations Commission on Kashmir. That, gentle men, is the real purpose of "recalling" the principles contained in those resolutions. Neither references in the draft resolutions to the provisions of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which no one has contested, nor any other references to the provisions of the Charter, nor the greatest skill and vigour in argument can conceal this central aim of the draft, which we consider to be basically defective for reasons we have repeatedly stated. No references to the Charter or the most pious quotations from it can conceal the barefaced attempts that some members of the Council are making to adopt positions on the Kashmir question which are contrary to the facts and to the true historical development of the situation. That is why the appeal in the draft resolution that India should enter into negotiations with Pakistan on the substance of the question represents, in light of what I have said, an attempt to impose on India negotiations which would be conducted on a basis pleasing and advantageous to one side only and unacceptable to the other side.
At the same time, although the paragraph of this draft resolution which relates to the negotiations does not refer to mediation by a third party, as did the draft which was not submitted, but was so widely bruited about in the halls of our Organisation that it has long been an open secret-although the new draft does not refer directly to mediation by a third party, paragraph 5 of the draft nevertheless in essence contains this idea of mediation, in a somewhat different form. And yet we have already heard several statements here from the Indian representative to the effect that interference by third parties in the negotiations between India and Pakistan would be unacceptable. Then what grounds are there for believing that the adoption of such a resolution can help to clear the atmosphere and to ensure the normal course of any negotiations which may be conducted between India and Pakistan?
Moreover, it should be noted that, as the Indian representative has pointed out, India has never in principle rejected the idea of bilateral negotiations between itself and Pakistan. However, as it has rightly been pointed out here, these negotiations should take place on an equal footing, without any interference by third parties and without any attempts to impose an obviously unacceptable basis for such negotiations.
Moreover, it should be noted that the proposed draft also fails to reflect the real situation in that it absolutely ignores the historical fact that, as early as 1948, it was India, gentlemen and this cannot be disregarded if we are to see this question in its proper historical perspective-which brought the question before the Security Council, after Pakistan troops had occupied the territory of Kashmir. As we all know, Pakistan troops continue to occupy approximately one-third of the territory of this country, containing about one-fourth of the total population of Kashmir.
Accordingly, when the draft resolution attempts to place on an equal footing both the State which originally brought the question before the Security Council and the State which was called upon to answer for its actions at that time, we cannot regard that view of the situation as objective. And yet that is manner in which the question is presented in operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the draft resolution. Accordingly, seemingly well-intentioned appeals for negotiation, for the maintenance of a favourable atmosphere, and so on and so forth, assume an obviously hypocritical character in the light of the motive to which I have just referred. These proposals should be viewed not outside the context of the resolution as a whole, not outside the context of the whole course of historical events over the past fourteen years, but in close connection with this course of events. It will then be seen that it is impossible to support even that part of the draft resolution which contains what people who are not familiar with the history of this question and have not studied the relevant documentation might regard as harmless provisions, resembling the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We have never yet allowed the correct provisions of the United Nations Charter to be interpreted in contravention of the factual situation and, in the final analysis in contravention of the spirit and principles of that Character. Accordingly, the wording of these paragraphs cannot mislead anyone and, in my opinion, ultimately will not mislead anyone.
That is why, in the light of all the aforementioned circumstances, the USSR delegation opposes the adoption of this draft A decision such as the one which is being imposed on us here, under the guise of the best and most pious intentions, can only serve to aggravate tension in the relations between India and Pakistan, and that is obviously contrary both to the interests of the peoples of these countries and to the interests of the maintenance of universal peace and security and hence undoubtedly at variance with the functions and role of the Security Council, as the organ of the United Nations bearing the principal responsibility for the maintenance of universal peace and security.
In conclusion, we feel obliged to repeat what we said in our statement on 4 May and in our statement at yester day's meeting of the Security Council, that the Council would do well to note that the Government of India and subsequently the Government of Pakistan declared during our debate that they would not take the initiative in using force to settle the question of Kashmir, and also that neither side rejects the idea of bilateral negotiations.
We believe that such an outcome of the discussion in the Security Council would be the best way of promoting the rapid elimination of differences between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir question, differences which, moreover, are nothing but a consequence of the era of colonial domination. We believe that such an outcome of the discussion would further the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries in the future and that this would be in the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan and would promote the strengthening of peace in that region and in the whole world.