1957-12-02 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 808 held on 2 December 1957

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 808 held on 2 December 1957

Before the Security Council votes on the draft resolution submitted by five Powers [S/3911, and amended as proposed by the Swedish representative, the delegation of the Soviet Union feels obliged to recall once again its position in principle on the Kashmir question, namely, that the discussion of the question in the Security Council should not be used as a pretext for outside interference in the affairs of Asian countries or for imposing an alien will upon them in any form.

From this point of view, the Soviet delegation continues to regard as inexpedient, and protests against, any attempts to impose upon the parties any kind of mediatory mission. It considers that the most suitable method of settling the differences between India and Pakistan in connection with the Kashmir question would be by direct negotiation between the parties; this would, in our opinion, best meet the interests of those parties.

The Soviet delegation therefore considers that, in the circumstances, the Security Council should give assistance to the parties along these lines and should refuse to endorse the property draft resolution, the amended version of which stage suffers from a number of serious shortcomings.

As the Soviet delegation has already pointed out, the draft resolution fails to reflect changes in political, economic and strategic factors of the Kashmir question and the changing relationship of forces in that part of Asia.

The draft resolution still by-passes Mr. Jarring's conclusion that an obstacle to the implementation of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan is the deadlock reached in carrying out part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75], proposing that the parties should promote the creation of a favourable atmosphere and should refrain from increasing the military potential in Kashmir. At the same time, the Security Council has heard evidence that United States arms are still being supplied, and bases are being built, to increase Pakistan's military potential in Kashmir and that tension is being aggravated in the area through the intensification of the anti Indian campaign.

In our opinion, these activities are complicating the situation in the Kashmir region and should be considered first in any attempts to find a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, Instead of this, however, the draft resolution, as we have already pointed out, lays primary emphasis on the question of "demilitarisation", although the meaning of the notion of "demilitarisation is not disclosed. As we know, the notion of "demilitarisation" is not found in the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan. It is therefore not clear what is meant by that word. Until this is made clear, the word "demilitarisation" can mean either a great deal, or very little. According to statements made by some representatives in the Security Council, the meaning they ascribe to "demilitarisation" is not, for example, the cessation of the rearming of the Pakistan Army and of the building of bases in the region, which, as has frequently been pointed out, are the principal causes of tension. These representatives mainly dwelt on the question of reducing the armed forces on both sides of the line, although this is a secondary problem at the present time. In our opinion. to consider the problem thus is to evade the essential reasons for tension in the region.

If any resolution is to be adopted, the most correct course would be to delete the paragraph on demilitarisation from the resolution. I have in mind the part of the preamble to the five-Power draft resolution which reads:

"Considering the importance which it has attached to the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the steps towards a settlement".

For the above reasons, the Soviet delegation cannot support the draft resolution even in its amended form.