20111957 Text of the Speech made by President Mr. Hashim Jawad as the representative of Iraq in the Security Council Meeting No. 804 held on 20 November 1957

Text of the Speech made by President Mr. Hashim Jawad as the representative of Iraq in the Security Council Meeting No. 804 held on 20 November 1957

I have listened most carefully to the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan on Mr. Jarring's

Security Council Meeting report [S 3821] as well as to the opinions expressed thereupon by members of the Council. During the present series of meetings as well as in the previous ones since Iraq was elected to the Security Council, there was occasion to review the whole history of the case with endeavours by both parties to the dispute to throw some light on the nature, origin and development of the problem. My Government, however, remains convinced that its views on the question, which were based on an objective appraisal of the facts connected therewith, are still valid. The ultimate goal has been and still is to decide the future of Kashmir by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, and the fundamental issue impeding the achievement of this goal has been the failure to create satisfactory conditions for carrying out the plebiscite.

A number of the resolutions adopted by the Council reflect the principles according to which a settlement should be sought. The series of endeavours made by the United Nations representatives up to the end of 1952 were directed towards overcoming the obstacles which stood in the way of implementing the principles initiated in the decisions of the Council. Although a number of years have elapsed since the Council had occasion to consider the question, Mr. Jarring has emphasised in his report that the basis for a departure on a new endeavour at settlement is still the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which both Governments consider binding.

Thus the problem in its 1957 setup remains within the context of the Council's resolutions up to 1952 and revolves around the search for means of implementing the two resolutions. In this connection, Mr. Jarring has pointed out that despite the lack of progress made with regard to the implementation of these two resolutions, a state which could be described as a stalemate, both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem. It should, however, be recalled that the explanations given by the representatives of India and Pakistan with regard to the implementation of Part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 shows the existence of differences between the two parties to the dispute.

The main difference as presented by both parties centres around the augmentation of the forces after the cease-fire. This is a very real problem which, if true, runs contrary to part I, paragraph B, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 We have already stated our opinion in respect of the adherence of Pakistan so the recommendations contained in part I, paragraph B, and we do not wish to repeat it now. We know, at the same time, how much importance the Council has attached to the question of demilitarisation and the great bearing this question has on reaching a settlement. In fact, the reports of Dr. Graham which covered his efforts to bring the two parties to agree to his twelve proposals [S/2375, annex 2] centred around solving the question of the quantum of military forces-that is, the specific number of forces which should remain on either side of the cease fire line. His proposals, however, did not bring agreement between the two parties, and therefore the central point of demilitarisation remained unsolved. This stage, it should be recalled, was reached by the end of 1952. The Council's resolution of 23 December 1952 [S/2883] failed to bring about an agreement, and Dr. Graham's fifth report [S/2967] provided a pointer to that effect.

We note that after a period of five years some members of the Council think it appropriate that a new effort for solving this deadlock should be made, starting from the point where it was left off in 1952. This approach is indicated in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution [S/3911].

Although it is our sincere desire to collaborate in finding some basis for advancing towards a settlement of the dispute, we feel, in the light of the arguments presented on the question of the military situation, that the joint draft resolution deals only partially with the real issue. Furthermore, we fear that the procedure suggested might lead to a prolongation of the existing state of affairs, as we are very much discouraged by the attitude of India, firstly, in respect of its assumed legal position in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, secondly, by its effort at introducing a number of alien elements into the issue of demilitarisation. For these and other reasons, we are inclined to think that the procedures suggested in paragraph 2 and 3 of the operative part of the point draft resolution, though following logically upon the elements which were previously envisaged in the general framework of the settlement, fall short in meeting the requirements of the case as it stands at the present time.

We believe that the representative of Pakistan, who has shown the sincere and keen desire of his Government to assist the Council in reaching a decision which would lead to breaking the deadlock and would provide grounds for a final settlement of the dispute, has made very constructive suggestions. As it is the consensus of opinion in the Council that demilitarisation is a prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite and that efforts have so far failed to bring about an agreement on this point, it is only logical that we should proceed by another path in order to reach the same objective-the objective being the creation of conditions favourable for the holding of a plebiscite.

The representative of Pakistan suggested very sound and practical methods for the solution of the question of demilitarisation. He stated in his first settlement to the Council:

"In order to facilitate the task of the Security Council in demilitarising Jammu and Kashmir as well as to end the long-drawn-out arguments about the implementation of the Commission's resolutions so far as Pakistan is concerned, I would urge that all troops, whether of India or Pakistan, should be withdrawn from the cease-fire line and a United Nations force be stationed on the cease-fire line to prevent any violation of the line. Alternatively, the Government of Pakistan would be prepared to remove immediately every Pakistan soldier on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line provided a United Nations force, strong enough to defend these areas and ensure their integrity, is stationed beforehand along the cease fire line; and provided that India reduces its own troops to the level prescribed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 December 1952 [S/2883]. India cannot object to this course being adopted, which safeguards it from any possible attack from the Pakistan side. Nor should India have objection to a United Nations force being posted in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which at present is neither Indian or Pakistan territory, particularly since such a force will be stationed only on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire." [191st meeting, para 79].

These suggestions, in our opinion, are the proper answer to the deadlock of which Mr. Jarring spoke in his report, to the objections raised by the Indian Government on the specific question of the augmentation of military potential on the Pakistan side, and to the doubts expressed by certain quarters as to the possibilities of the Security Council to settle disputes of an acute character. It has, furthermore, come from a party to the dispute-a fact which guarantees 100 per cent cooperation on its part. Last but not least, the implementation of such a plan would uncover the true intentions of the parties concerned in their international relations.

It will have been noted that we do not completely agree with the procedure suggested in the joint draft resolution. But I should make it clear that, because my Government desires that every effort should be made to advance towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and because the present joint draft resolution is the only proposal containing measures which might lead to widening the areas of agreement between the two parties, and in view of the fact that, despite its drawbacks, it provides an approach consistent with the practice followed in settling international disputes, we shall consequently vote for its adoption. We should have preferred, however, to see the Council adopt a procedure similar in essence to that suggested by the representative of Pakistan, as that suggestion seems to be practical and in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

In conclusion, I should like to say that, in his statements, the representative of India referred to certain aspects of my country's foreign policy and tried to interpret certain engagements in a way which is completely alien to our understanding and intentions. I do not, however, desire to reply to his statements, as such a reply would be, as the statements themselves, irrelevant to the question we are discussing and would contribute in no way to its advancement. On the other hand, my country cherishes great respect and friendship for the Indian people, and we prefer therefore to overlook certain personal excesses. Since the desire of my Government is to lessen and remove the existing tension between India and Pakistan through the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, I feel certain that, when normal conditions are established between the two neighbouring countries, the Indian Government will view the efforts of a small country like mine in another perspective Mr. Krishna Menon will find out that we are a people who could, as Shakes peare said, "feel the future in the instant." The future is always stirring beneath the surface of the present, and it is therefore those who live closest to their time that can surely sense the future.