18111957 Text of the speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957
Text of the speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957
In my last statement to the Council on 25 October (797th meeting] I indicated the direction in which Her Majesty's Government considered that the Council should proceed in this matter. We have now had the benefit of a second speech by the representative of India and by the representative of Pakistan. Having considered these speeches, together with Mr. Jarring's report, and bearing in mind the past history and present state at the question, we have joined, with several of our colleagues, in embodying our views in the draft resolution just introduced by the United States representative. My purpose today is to refer briefly to some points in the draft resolution in which additional explanation may be required in order to make our purpose clear.
First of all I should make it plain that we realise that this draft cannot give full satisfaction to either of the parties. It contains elements which we know both parties will consider incompatible with some of their contentions. That is clear, both from the speeches of Mr. Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon and from the long past history of the question. We regret this; but we feel it may be inevitable at this stage. The wideness of the difference which separates the parties is such that obviously the Security Council cannot satisfy both parties in full ; neither can it satisfy either one in full so long as it makes a serious attempt towards progress. But we can at least hope to make proposals which will assist the parties in attaining a solution of this intractable problem. That is our purpose and our hope.
Some of the points I propose now to make in dealing with the draft resolution will bear upon the criticisms of the United Kingdom attitude made by the representative of Pakistan in his speech of 15 November (802nd meeting] and by the representative of India in his speeches delivered on 5, 11, and 13 November [799th, 800th and 801st meetings]. I will not, however, attempt today to deal with these criticisms in full as I believe it is the general with of the Council to make progress as rapidly as possible. In would, however, like to make one general observation.
During his recent statements in this Council on this subject, the representative of India has often complained that the United Kingdom attitude is misguided and that I have been badly advised as to the true facts of the situation. I may be misguided, but I take responsibility, under directions from my Government, for all the statements I make here.
The Kashmir problem has in ten years produced a great weight of documents, a vast complex of statements and reports. I will not pretend that I have read every word of every document that has been printed. I imagine that others occasionally find themselves in a similar position. I have, however, as I am sure have other members of the Council, attempted to acquaint myself fully with the views of the two parties and with the position taken by the Security Council during its many discussions of the problem over the past years.
I have recently refreshed may memory by reading again the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and of Mr. Graham, including some of those from which quotation has been made in our recent discussions. I have been impressed by the careful and balanced drafting of these reports. I am convinced that it is unhelpful for either side to quote individual sentences or paragraphs from these reports in support of some disputed contention, without regard. for qualifications which appear elsewhere or for the context as a whole.
Anyone who reads the documents of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and in particular its third interim report cannot fail to be struck by finding how similar were the stands taken up by the parties at the time of the publication of that report in 1949 to the stands with which we are familiar from the latest speeches on either side. Then, as now, the Council was informed that a deadlock had been reached. That has not deterred the Council in the past from seeking ways of resolving the deadlock consistent with its own approach. I do not think the Council should be deterred from renewing these efforts now.
To come now to the draft resolution which is before the Council [S/3911]. The preamble seeks to put our proposals in their proper setting, that is, the setting of the previous decisions of the Council, the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan and Mr. Jarring's report..
The fourth preambular paragraph observes that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the commitments undertaken by them in the Commission's resolutions. This language is carefully drafted; it takes full account of the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan.
I am fully aware of the importance which the Government of India has attached to the assurances given to India by the Commission for India and Pakistan in the exchange of correspondence in August and again in December 1948. I am aware also of the importance which the Government of Pakistan attaches to the assurances received from the Commission. This paragraph is so drafted as to detract in no way from the importance to be attached to those prejudices no position. assurances. This language
The representative of the Soviet Union suggested that because the resolutions were adopted a number of years ago, they had lost their force and meaning [799th meeting, para, 4]. That was a surprising suggestion. One of the most encouraging features of the debate during the renewed consideration of the Kashmir problem this year has been the repeated reiteration by both sides that they stood by their engagements, commitments and obligations-all three words have been used as contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
Mr. Jarring's terms of reference were based on those resolutions. His report [S/3821] makes quite clear that his efforts were directed to exploring what impeded their full implementation. There are those who argue-but neither the representative of India nor the representative of Pakistan is among them that the Commission's resolutions should be disregarded, that some other approach should be tried. The simple fact, however, is that the Security Council, in proceeding under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, is attempting to find a basis for progress towards a settlement acceptable to both sides.
Both sides have repeatedly and categorically asserted during this phase of the discussions of the Kashmir question that they look for the implementation of the Commission's resolutions. The Security Council, in seeking to make progress towards a settlement, must surely proceed from this basis. These is no question of the Security Council attempting to impose a decision on this point; the draft resolution merely reflects publicity announced and reiterated decisions of the parties themselves.
I did not attempt to disguise in my speech at the 797th meeting of the Security Council that the United Kingdom Government was fully aware that there is a long and difficult road to a final settlement of this dispute Mr. Jarring himself was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connexion with and as a result of a plebiscite. The resolution of which we are one of the sponsors does not attempt to deal with these problems. It confines itself to the earlier phases of the question, dealt with in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of
13 August 1948. I come now to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution.
In operative paragraph I of the draft, words are reproduced from the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, and this wording has been combined with a reiteration of the words of part 1, paragraph E, of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para, 75]. The effect is to lay emphasis on the need to maintain an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.
In his statement on 5 November [799th meeting], the representative of India indicated that he regarded the idea of a request of the kind in the first operative paragraph, which I had adumbrated in my speech at the 797th meeting, as superfluous so far as the Government of India was concerned, but he stated that he did not object to it. I also recall the stress which he has laid on the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948.
Mr. Firoz Khan Noon has contended that in my speech adumbrating this part of the resolution, I have placed a far wider interpretation on part I, paragraph E of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 than its terms suggest. But an appeal to both sides by a United Nations organ such as that in the draft resolution is, of course, a normal and useful practice with which we are all familiar. I believe members of the Council will agree, having listened to what has been said on both sides, that an appeal of this kind is desirable and would be desirable even if both sides were not engaged by the Commission's resolution. A continuing effort is required to create the right atmosphere for negotiation by both sides. I now come to operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution.
In my statement on 25 October [797th meeting]. I dealt at some length with the relationship between parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. I think I made clear our view that the connection between these two parts of the resolution is such that it would be difficult for the Security Council at this stage to take action on either part without regard to the other. In view of the firmly held conviction of the Government of India that part I has not been implemented, and in spite of the view of the Government of Pakistan to the precise contrary, it would be wrong! to exclude part I from the terms of reference of a United Nations representative. I regret that we and our co-sponsors have felt obliged to record this view in face of the known objections of the Government of Pakistan.
In view of the need to make progress and of the connection which I described in my previous speech [797 meeting], between parts I and II, it has seemed to the sponsors that some step forward on part II is necessary. Conscious of the view of the Government of India that no progress can be made on part II until part I has, in its view, been implemented, we have made an attempt to bridge the opposing views of the two Governments in this matter of demilitarisation. It will be seen, however, that our draft resolution gives considerable discretion to Mr. Frank P. Graham. We do not lay down a rigid sequence for the various tasks entrusted to him. We feed it is desirable that he should be able to use a flexible approach. As regards part I, we hope that he will be able to make recommendations which will be acceptable both to Pakistan and to India. We hope that the necessity for making such recommendations as he considers desirable will in no way militate against progress We also hope that he will be successful in making progress on a plan for a reduction of forces; for this, in our view, is a necessary preliminary to the creation of conditions in which progress towards a final solution will be possible. Surely no single step could do so much to reduce tension and restore confidence between the parties, and until a basis of mutual confidence is established, progress towards a solution obviously is extremely difficult.
As I understand the position of the Government of India, as expressed by Mr. Krishna Menon, it is that it does not consider itself bound by the twelve-point proposals made by Mr. Graham in the course of his discussions with the Governments of India and Pakistan and embodied in his fifth report [S/2967, annex II] This is fully understood. Certainly M Graham must seek an agreement on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions; but equally, he cannot ignore. whatever is applicable from his previous discussions. All that our draft resolution says is that Mr Graham should have regard to his own fifth report. This is no restraint on his freedom of action; nor is it an attempt to give some special authority to a previous series of suggestions which proved unacceptable. It is simply a statement of the obvious fact that he will have regard to the previous history of discussions when making his own new approach.
Operative paragraph 3 merely asks for co-operation from the two Governments to work out procedures for putting whatever agreement is reached into effect within three months. Its sole purpose is to say, as has said in the past, that when agreement on demilitarisation is reached, that agreement outright. rapidly to be translated into action.
Such then are the purposes and hopes that lie behind our action in joining in sponsorship of the draft resolution. We recognize that the success of Mr. Graham's mission will depend on the co-operation which he receives from the parties. I am confident that this cooperation will be forthcoming. What we are proposing is a modest step forward towards the settlement which both parties have told us they desire.
In summing up my remarks I would point out that nothing in the draft resolution prejudices, or is intended to prejudice, the stands of the two parties on the various points at issue. On the other hand, it is only out of the exercise of compromises and a willingness to try to find common ground that the solution will be found.
I would like to appeal to the representative of Pakistan not to reject this draft resolution because of its request to Mr. Graham to make any recommendations which he considers desirable in connection with part I of the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948. I appeal also to the representative of India. Nothing would contribute more to a settlement, which is so much in the interests of both parties, than a reduction of mutual suspicion and hostility. Surely the first and most effective step in this direction would be in the words of the draft resolution-an agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line.
It is the task of the Security Council to help to bring about an easing of tension and to foster conditions of mutual confidence between the parties in order that a solution may more easily be attained. That is the purpose which animates the United Kingdom in joining the sponsors of the draft resolution now before the Council.
It is the earnest wish of the United Kingdom to see a settlement of a problem which so troubles the relations between India and Pakistan. I therefore appeal to both Governments to accept any recommendations that Mr. Grahom may make in respect of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948. I would also appeal to them to regard the draft resolution as a constructive effort to make progress-progress towards a settlement, by Whatever means it can ultimately be achieved, which is so important to the subcontinent, and which is so earnestly desired by their friends in the United Nations.