25101957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Khalaf (Iraq) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957
Text of the speech made by Mr. Khalaf (Iraq) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957
Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey to you the regret of the permanent representative of Iraq, Mr. Jawad, at not being able to be present at this meeting. Other Official duties have kept him in Geneva for a short period. This, of course, has brought on me the honour and duty of presenting my country's point of view before this Council.
It is my privilege and pleasure to congratulate Mr. Jarring on the efficient way in which he has executed the mission entrusted to him by the Security Council. My delegation wishes to express to him its deep appreciation of his sincere and earnest endeavour for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Jarring's report, with its brevity, is an accurate and concise document which leaves no doubt as to the character of the stalemate which if permitted to continue, might lead to further undesirable complications and, to a rift between India and Pakistan. My delegation, on the other hand, notes with satisfaction that Mr Jarring is of the opinion that "both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem" [S/3821, para, 22] These two facts leave no doubt that further efforts are required to narrow the gap between the two parties to the dispute by the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of a settlement.
The Council has seized this dispute since January 1948. A number of resolutions have been passed to arrest the conflict and to provide ways and means for a settlement.
Mr. Jarring was wise and within his terms of reference in making the point of departure in his efforts to find a settlement for this dispute the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were accepted by the two parties, and in exploring what was impeding their full implementation. This approach is commendable and is in conformity with the Council's resolution of 21 February 1957 [5/3793], which reaffirms the previous resolutions of the Council. It was not, therefore, necessary for Mr. Jarring to go over the ground already covered by the previous examination the dispute by the Council or to express an opinion as to the adequacy of the resolutions passed by it Mr Jarring has rightly interpreted the resolution of 21 February 1957 and the opinions expressed in the discussions of this Council in January and February of this year.
It is therefore incumbent on the Council in its present deliberations to proceed further in its consideration of a settlement of the dispute. It should, further, keep in mind its resolution of 24 January 1957, which states: that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations" [S/3779]
In other words, any attempt by either party to the dispute to raise issues which have been superseded by the resolutions should be considered by the Council as being irrelevant, at least as far as the problem before us is concerned, and not likely to lead to an easy solution of the problem.
In the light of these circumstances we should like to make a few observations on the stands taken by India and Pakistan with regard to the implementation of the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The two resolutions recommend a process for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which could be divided into two stages: first, the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, second, the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide on the question of the future of Kashmir. Since both India and Pakistan agreed and this is the opinion of the Council that the settlement of the dispute lies in the implementation of these two resolutions, the question is, as Mr. Jarring has found out, to examine what was impeding their full implementation.
India claims that the pre-conditions necessary for demilitarisation have not been complied with, while Pakistan takes the opposite view. But both Governments recognize that the steps envisaged by the Commission's resolutions constitute a single and continuous process. The cease-fire order, which is part I, paragraph A, of the resolution of 13 August 1948, has been accomplished. Paragraph B stipulates that both parties should not augment their military potential in Kashmir. In this respect India claims that there has been augmentation on the Pakistan side. Pakistan denies this, and in support of this denial refers to the findings of Mr. Graham, the United Nations representative, who, in April 1952, states in paragraph 32 of his third report [S/2611 and Cerr, 1] that the present number of armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line was estimated to be less than 50 per cent of the number of armed forces existing on 1 January 1949, when the cease-fire became effective If any such violation has taken place, it was the responsibility of the United Nations Military Observers Group to report it to the Council. There has been no such report. Furthermore, in all its previous deliberations the Council has proceeded on the assumption that there has been no augmentation of the military potential in Kashmir.
We submit, therefore, that India's position on this matter does not stand on real grounds
Part I, paragraph E, stipulates that both parties should appeal to their respective peoples to maintain an atmosphere favourable for negotiations. India produces arguments and information to show that Pakistan has not only failed to make such appeals but also has indulged in what they called hostile propaganda. On the other hand, there are statements coming from the Indian side which can be interpreted to show a hostile attitude towards the settlement of the dispute. The dispute has dragged on for such a long time, during which so many events I have happened and so many declarations have been uttered, that it is hardly feasible to make of such statements a legal issue so to block the possibility of proceeding to a settlement.
The contention of India that Pakistan has not implemented part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and in particular paragraphs B and E is not designed to help in reaching a settlement. In all previous negotiations, India has never raised the question of the non-implementation of part I of the 1948 resolution. The main impediment to the full implementation of the Commission's resolutions, as the Council may recall, was the differences of opinion between the two Governments on the question of demilitarisation as a prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite.
My delegation notes that Mr. Jarring has attempted to break the deadlock concerning part I when he enquired, and I quote, "of the two Governments if they would be prepared to submit the question of whether part I had been implemented or not to arbitration" [S/3821, para, 17]. Nevertheless, in paragraph 19 of his report, he tells us that his efforts in bringing this matter to arbitration failed because of India's refusal. He says in fact:
"While the Government of Pakistan, after a certain hesitation, fell in with my suggestion in principle, the Government of India, however, did not fell that arbitration, as outlined by me, would be appropriate" [ibtd., para, 19].
The Government of India contended that arbitration is not suitable in this case because "such procedure would be inconsistent with sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and the rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory" [ibid.]. On this my delegation would like only to say that the question of Jammu and Kashmir has been settled-and this is, indeed, the view of the Council-so as to give India any right or obligations toward this State.
We wonder, therefore, if the new stand of the Government of India regarding the non-implementation of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 is not on the one hand an afterthought, and on the other, an attempt to reopen issues which have long been closed. In this respect it should be asked: if Pakistan has not implemented part I, why did India enter into negotiations for the implementation of part II, the truce agreement? It was in January 1949 that India should have raised this matter. In fact the negotiations conducted by the Commission for India and Pakistan and the United Nations representatives were all directed towards finding a basis for the formulation of the truce agreement.
Such arguments on the part of the Government of India should not, however, deter the Council from proceeding with the implementation of parts II and III of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Even if there is a difference of opinion on the question as to whether or not the military potential of the forces in Kashmir has been increased, the proper solution still remains to demilitarise the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The demilitarisation, in accordance with the principles laid down in the 1948 resolution, will certainly remove any augmentation of the military potential that may have taken place. It is the duty of the Council at this stage to find ways and means to objective, and once demilitarisation has been achieved, the procedure laid down in the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949 for the holding of a plebiscite should be set in motion.
The second complaint of India is that although the case had been brought before the Council on 1 January 1948 as an act of aggression committed by Pakistan, the Council had so for not expressed itself on the question and that it was incumbent on Pakistan "to vacate the aggression". Mr. Jarring has rightly declined to entertain this complaint by pointing out that the Council had properly taken cognizance of India's original complaint and that "regardless of the merits of the present position taken by the Government of India, could not be overlooked that it accepted the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan" [S/3821, para 14). The acceptance of the two resolutions no doubt embodies a definitive agreement between the parties with regard to the settlement of the dispute. This position had definitely been accepted by India. stated in the Council: On 9 March 1951, Sir Benegal Rau
"Here again India has already explained its position on more than one occasion namely, that under the guise of arbitration issues which have already been closed by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and by the assurances given to India by the United Nations Commission cannot be reopened" S/536th meeting, para, 27].
There is reference in paragraph 20 of Mr. Jarring's report to the concern on the part of both sides "in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question". This is why my delegation is convinced that a speedy implementation of the Council resolutions is the only alternative left after the continuing deadlock between the two parties. As a matter of fact, paragraph 21 of the report means exactly this when it says:
"The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreement of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change." [S/3821, para, 21.1
Of course, this does not in any way refer to the permanent and final solution of the problem, which is the free and impartial plebiscite that should dispose of the dispute once and for all. This is, in our opinion, the solution to the problem, a solution which takes into consideration, and rightly so, the right of the people of Kashmir to self determination.
What India and Pakistan do or abstain from doing in the wide field of international relations has no connection whatsoever. with the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, no purpose Cair oc served in arguing about the implementation of the different parts of the resolutions. The Security Council should proceed to the implementation, the full implementation, of these resolutions by proceeding to a complete demilitarisation on both sides. Once this demilitarisation is achieved, then all the other steps stipulated by the resolutions in question can be taken in an orderly and effective manner.
Before concluding my remarks on this subject, I should like briefly to sum up the main points contained or implied in Mr. Jarring's report, as follows:
1. The two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan are and shall be binding on both Governments.
2 India's charge of aggression against Pakistan and the repetition of that charge during Mr. Jarring's visit were not relevant to his mission.
3. Both countries are desirous of finding a solution. To this, however, we must add that a solution is already prescribed by the Council and the Commission through their resolutions, add all that is to be done is to implement the resolutions.
4 Both parties have expressed their sincere willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution.
We make a special appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to facilitate the solution of this dispute by bringing to bear more efforts and more co-operation, so that the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination may be safeguarded and the Charter of the United Nations upheld.
I should now like to say a word or two on another subject which, although not entirely relevant to the problem now being discussed by the Council, has nevertheless been dwelt upon by the representative of India.
The representative of India saw fit to enter into a discussion of the purposes and objectives of alliances and pacts, and He made a point of mentioning several times during his statement the Baghdad Pact, in which my country is a participant. My delegation categorically denies that the Baghdad Pact has any aggressive aims. Its members have chosen to get together for defensive, economic and social purposes. I am not here to express an opinion on the quotations which the representative of India produced before this Council at the 795th meeting, since, as he said, they were quotations from declarations made by Pakistan statesmen. I should, however, like to assure the Security Council that not a single statement from any responsible Iraqi can be produced to show that the Baghdad Pact is designed for anything other than good neighbourliness and defensive purposes.
We also believe that no country has the right or prerogative to question the right of other countries to enter into a purely defensive alliance or pact which not only is known to everyone and based on Article 51 of the Charter, but also is registered with the United Nations.
To accuse Pakistan of trying to involve other peoples of the Middle East in what the representative of India termed Pakistan's aggressive intentions against India is contrary to the facts of the situation and surely a reflection on the intentions and intelligence of other members of the Pact. That is why we were shocked to here the representative of India say the following at the Council's 795th meeting :
"After all, when there is a contract, there are two parties and there really should be a common intention even if each party goes in for a different reason" 795th, meeting, para, 98].
I should like to say here and now that our common intention is nothing else but common defence and wellbeing. My delegation had not wished to enter into this subject, was it my intention to enter into an argument with the representative of India about what other Governments should and should not do. I did not, however, wish to leave the allegations levelled, although implicit, against my Government without any refutation.
It would not do justice to the case before us or to the people of Kashmir if we or others were to create or entertain the impression that our judgement was in any way related to or based upon considerations other than the merits of the case, the resolutions of the Council and the principles of the United Nations Charter-the most important of which is the principle self-determination.