25101957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

The occasion for the present series of meetings on the Kashmir question is the report (S/3921) of Mr. Gunnar Jarring, the representative of Sweden, submitted on 29 April 1957 in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1957 (S/3793).

I wish first of all to express to Mr. Jarring my delegation's deep appreciation for his excellent performance of a very difficult mission. When, on 21 February 1957, the Security Council decided to send Mr. Jarring to India and Pakistan, 1 stated in the Council that I did not envy him the task that had been entrusted to him. I added that I anticipated-and I was sure that he also anticipated a hard and difficult assignment. (774th meeting, para. 62.) My appreciation of his performance states in spite of the lack of results.

According to the report, Mr. Jarring made the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the starting point-indeed the centre-of all his efforts. His reason was that these two resolutions were the only ones which both India and Pakistan regarded as binding on them. The resolution of 5 January 1949, the Council will recall, had as its central point the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide on the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan. The resolution of 13 August 1948 fixed the procedure preliminary to a plebiscite. Part I of that resolution had to be implemented before action on part II could be taken. Pakistan has always contended that part I has been implemented: India, on the other hand, has contended that part I has not been implemented,

Mr. Jarring, in his mission to India and Pakistan, made a great effort to remove this difference of opinion between India and Pakistan. I consider his efforts on this point to be the heart of his mission. For that reason, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I should like to read out verbatim paragraphs 17 and 18 of Mr. Jarring's report:

"17. In order to break the deadlock concerning part I, I inquired of the two Governments if they would be prepared to submit the question of whether part I had been implemented or not to arbitration. In substance, suggestion to the two Governments did not envisage simple arbitration, but the arbitrator or arbitrators would also be empowered, in case they found that the implementation had been incomplete, to indicate to the parties which measures should be taken to arrive at a full implementation. It was also envisaged that in the latter case after a given time-limit the arbitrator or arbitrators would determine whether the given indications had been followed and implementation did obtain.

"18. Being aware of the earlier negative attitude of the Government of India on the question of arbitration with relation to the Kashmir problem as a whole, I made it a point to explain to it that I was not suggesting anything of that nature, and that what I was proposing, while termed arbitration, in all likelihood would be more in the nature of a determination of certain facts which, in the Indian view, were incontrovertible. In addition, the procedure suggested might lead to an improvement in India Pakistan relations in general, a development which I assumed could not be unwelcome to either of the two countries." (S/3821, paras. 17 and 18.)

In the opinion of my delegation, Mr. Jarring's suggestion for removing the difference of opinion between India and Pakistan, in relation to Part I of the resolution of 13 August. 1949, was objective, realistic and constructive. It is in harmony with the ideals and practices of the United Nations. Unfortunately, while Pakistan accepted this suggestion, India rejected it. This is the reason for the failure of the Jarring mission.

During our meetings in January and February, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan put before the Security Council. another suggestion which many members of the Council, including myself, considered to be very constructive (761st meeting, para, 112). It was included in one of the draft resolutions put before the Council. (S/3787). The suggestion was that a United Nations force should be sent to Kashmir. It is obvious that, during the plebiscite, peace and order in Kashmir must be maintained. It is also obvious that any national forces, whether from India or from Pakistan, or from both, stationed in Kashmir during the plebiscite period would be suspected of coercing or intimidating the voters. Our problem is, therefore, to maintain peace and order in Kashmir without any appearance or possibility of coercion or intimidation of the voters. I cannot conceive of a solution better than that of the use of a United Nations force for this purpose. This proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was also rejected by India.

In our meetings in February and also in our recent meetings we have been given long and complicated expositions of the Indian Constitution and of the legal position of India in Kashmir. Since I am not versed in these questions of law, I do not presume the judge on the legal claims which India has put forward. I do not dispute or affirm these claims. There is, however, one great consideration which I should like to put before the Council.

All colonial empires have the backing of law. All of them have been fortified with treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements and what not. The British empire in India had ample legal foundation. In the face of India's claim to self-determination, all British legal claims were swept aside. These claims were solidly based on treaties duly signed and ratified, and even sanctified by time and tradition. When the Indian people demanded self-determination, the legal documents in the hands of the United Kingdom seemed to have no moral or political relevance. What the Indian people demanded and won from the United Kingdom should, I hope, be granted to the people of Kashmir.

In one of my previous interventions in this Council I called attention to the fact that, in the post-war period, Asia, for the first time in its history, has had the possibility of building up a community of free and friendly States. We have the possibility even of improving upon the international practices in some other parts of the world. [765th meeting, para 58] Now we face the tragic situation in which India refuses to grant to a fellow Asian people, that is, the people of Kashmir-the same rights which India demanded and won from the British people. I hope that India will yet reconsider.

In regard to the essence of the problem I have only two points to make. One is that the principle of a free and fair plebiscite should be applied. My second point is that all the conditions preliminary to a plebiscite, which India or Pakistan may demand in order to make the plebiscite really free and fair, are legitimate and worthy of our consideration. All other conditions, which are calculated either to strengthen or to weaken claims and pretensions of either side, are simply obstructionist and illegitimate.