25101957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Wadsworth (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Wadsworth (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

Last February the Council gave to one of its members Ambassador Jarring-a delicate and important task. I want to express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the outstanding manner in which he carried it out. We are fortunate to have the benefit of his review of this highly complex question. It cannot fail to help the Council decide how it can best aid in finding a settlement acceptable to both parties. There was a long interval in the Council's consideration of this question between December 1952 and January 1957. Ambassador Jarring's recent discussions with Pakistan and India shed light on the current problems and help us view the situation in perspective. We find one aspect of Ambassador Jarring's report particularly encouraging Both parties have again declared their desire to find a peaceful solution to the problem and have again declared their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations to this end. More recently they have given the Council the same assurances. In this atmosphere the Council should continue, therefore, to assist the parties in finding a just and equitable solution to the problem. This long-standing and difficult I should like to turn now to the specific situation with which the Council is confronted.

It may be useful at the outset to recapitulate the main lines of Ambassador Jarring's report, because it is from that report that our current sessions start. The representatives of India and Pakistan during our discussions early this year indicated that they continue to recognize their international obligations under the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. Ambassador Jarring therefore based his mission on these statements of the parties, and he made it his task to explore what was impeding the implementation of the resolutions.

He tells us that the Government of India laid emphasis on two restraining factors, one relating to the "cease-fire order", the other to the "truce agreement". India further stated that it was premature to discuss the implementation of those parts of the 1948 resolution dealing with the truce agreement and the plebiscite until the cease-fire order was fully implemented. The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained. that the "cease-fire order" had been implemented by it in good faith and in full. It believed that the time had come to proceed to the implementation of the "truce agreement". In order to break this deadlock, Ambassador Jarring asked if the Governments would be prepared to submit to arbitration the question of whether the "cease-fire order" had been implemented. The Government of Pakistan accepted this in principle; the Government of India did not feel that, as explained, arbitration would be appropriate. Ambassador Jarring was unable to break the deadlock and reported back to the Council.

We have now heard statements in the Council by the representatives of India [795th and 796th meetings] and of Pakistan [791st and 796th meetings]. My delegation has given the most careful study to these statements. Insofar as they were related to the Jarring report, they seem to be further elaborations of the positions which are reflected in the report. Other issues and suggestions were also raised in their statements, on a number of which there significant disagreements. So this is where the Council finds itself at the moment, and we are faced with the problem of selecting the most useful basis on which to proceed.

The present case is different from that of many problems which are brought before the Security Council: we are fortunate in having an area of agreement- and a large one between the parties and with the Council. There are, of course, many complexities to the Kashmir question, and I do not in any way wish to minimise the difficulties lying in the way of reaching a final solution. We would delude ourselves if we did so. Nevertheless, there does exist in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan an agreement for resolving this conflict. That agreement calls for the following action: first, for a cease-fire order; second, for a truce agreement; third, for the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan to be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. These are the basic elements of the Commission's resolutions, which both India and Pakistan accepted, and which the Council has repeatedly endorsed. They are obligations which have been recognized by the parties for nine years. Both parties have reaffirmed their recognition of these obligations before the Council this year, as Ambassador Jarring pointed out in his report. And Under these circumstances the Council's most constructive contribution will undoubtedly be to help implement the resolutions.

This, indeed, has been the primary task to which the past efforts of the Council and its agents-the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the various representatives who have been sent to the sub-continent-have been directed for many years. In our view the Council's most useful role at this time continues to be to proceed on the basis of this area of agreement, to seek to enlarge upon it and to make it finally a reality. May I recall that on 15 February 1957 Ambassador Lodge stated in our previous discussion on this issue:

"The Security Council's overriding endeavour in connection with Kashmir has always been to secure an amicable settlement acceptable to both parties. In doing this, it has sought to build the gains which have been made in the past and upon agreements which have been reached by the parties." [768th meeting, para. 26].

My delegation continues to believe that this is the best approach.

On what aspects of the Commission's resolutions do we need to make progress? We need, for one thing, to make progress towards demilitarisation, or the implementation of the truce agreement. This has been the focus of every resolution of the Council since 1950. Most of Mr. Graham's work has also been concentrated on it. Prior to his last report, in fact, he was requested by the Security Council to enter into negotiations with the parties to reach final agreement on the specific number of forces which should remain on either side of the cease-fire line within limits the Council had previously set. Mr. Graham submitted his report on this effort on 27 March 1953 [S/2967]. Although he had put forward precise proposals, he did not succeed in reaching full agreement with the parties at that time, so that this important aspect in implementing the resolutions remains before us.

I suggest that efforts to bring this about, and to achieve agreement on the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, should be an important aspect of any further action we take. Surely, a reduction in the number of troops in the area would in itself be a forward step in improving relationships.

Secondly, there are the questions which have been raised. about the status of implementation of the "cease-fire order". Attention has been paid by both the Indian and Pakistani representatives in the Council to previous reports which touch upon this question, especially to Mr. Graham's third and fifth reports. A considerable portion of Ambassador Jarring's report also deals with his arbitration proposal on the question. In the light of this background it would seem desirable that the Council include this as one of the issues on which it might take some action. An appropriate resolution might include an authorization for recommendations to be made on the "cease fire order" if they should seem necessary.

The achievement of these objectives, requiring as it would the positive support and agreement of both India and Pakistan, is not easy. I do not suggest that we can complete the process at this session of the Council. In our opinion we need again to call for assistance.

Fortunately, the United Nations has retained the services, as the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, of Mr. Frank P. Graham. It would seem appropriate to us if the Council were to call upon him to consult again with the parties in order to bring about implementation of the agreements concluded under the Commission's auspices along the lines I have indicated. No one possesses a more intimate knowledge of the background and facts of this problem than Mr. Graham, and I am confident that he can perform another valuable service for the Council and, more importantly, for India and Pakistan. I am hopeful that if the Council decided to take this action, India and Pakistan would agree to receive him and to consult with him in good faith in an effort to reach an early agreement. In closing I would like to say this one of the Council's overriding responsibilities on all questions is to maintain peace and security. Its efforts in this case to help the parties implement their commitments are based on a sincere desire to achieve stability and friendly relations between these two important countries.

In its first resolution, that of 17 January 1948, the Security Council called upon India and Pakistan "to refrain from making statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation". Again in its first resolution, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan also called on the parties ``to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiation" [S/1100, para, 75]. These requests, as well as others that the Council has adopted from time to time, are as pertinent today as when they were adopted. We call them again to the attention of India and Pakistan, both of whom have expressed their intention to conform to these principles.

We believe that a final solution to this problem can only be of benefit to both parties. It is in this spirit that I have spoken. We have concentrated on the favourable aspects of the issue in the hope that we may encourage progress towards its solution and an improvement in relations between these two great Asian countries.

We have made our comments in the hope that they will assist in finding a way to end the frustrations that have hitherto beset every effort to bring about a permanent and peaceful solution of this problem. We do not and should not despair at these difficulties. We should patiently and persistently continue our efforts until mutual agreement can be reached and issues resolved, and we believe that every constructive step towards a solution of this problem contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability

We would appreciate hearing the views of other members of the Council with regard to these important matters.