25101957 Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957
25101957 Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957
I should like first to express the deep appreciation of my Government for the able and conscientious way in which the representative of Sweden, our President for the month of February, has carried out his mission.
It is true that Mr. Jarring felt unable to report to the Council any concrete proposals likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute; nevertheless, I hope that his report will prove to have a special significance in marking the beginning of a new phase of constructive progress under the auspices of the United Nations towards a settlement of the Kashmir problem, which has troubled the sub-continent for the last decade.
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom attaches the greatest importance to Mr. Jarring's conclusion that, despite the present deadlock, both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem, and to the expressions of sincere willingness which they made to cooperate with the United Nations in the finding of a peaceful solution. Although in both countries popular feeling has been very deeply engaged on this issue, both countries have in fact shown great patience and given proof of their desire to avoid the danger of a military clash.
Since so much depends on the willingness of both parties to seek earnestly for a solution of the problem which faces them. We have always attached particular importance, as I said on 15 February 1957 [768th meeting, paras 17 and 18], to the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, which, among other things, called upon both parties to immediately take all measures within their power to improve the situation. I am glad that the representative of India, in his speech at the 195th meeting, accepted this resolution as engaging India, together with the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
For these reasons, too, we attach the greatest importance to both the letter and the spirit of part I, paragraph E, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75]. Mr. Jarring reported the Government of India's emphasis on the failure to implement this section as one of the factors in the way of implementation of the two resolutions. I should like to repeat the wording of this paragraph because of the importance we attach to it: it says that the two Governments ``agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." But in my view paragraph E must be interpreted even more widely than that. To my mind it requires a continuing effort on the part of both Governments, and an effort which should animate them in their whole handling of the situation. For this reason we deplore charges like that of genocide being made in this Council.
We regard with great concern the recent bomb incidents in Srinagar, and we were glad to hear the Foreign Minister of Pakistan deny categorically that the Pakistan Government knew anything of them. My Government strongly holds that terrorist activities can only complicate difficult problems of this kind.
In general, therefore, I would wish to appeal to both India and Pakistan to do their utmost, in the world of part I, paragraph E. of the resolution, "to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations."
What other impediments to progress did Mr. Jarring report? He said that the Government of India felt aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question. of what in its view was aggression committed by Pakistan on India.
The views of the United Kingdom Government on this question are well known to this Council and to the Governments of India and Pakistan. They were set out by Sir Alexander Cadogan at the 467th meeting and by Sir Gladwyn Jebb at the 537th, the 539th, the 606th and the 611th meetings of the Council. The consistent attitude taken on this point in the past by the Security Council is also well known.
I do not feel that it would contribute to progress if we were to go over this ground again. This much, however, I would say since neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Security Council has felt able to pronounce on the Indian case on this aspect of the question, and since this is, so to speak, the major premise in the Indian argument as developed by Mr. Krishna Menon, it follows that we are unable to accept many of the deductions which have been drawn, however logically
they might seem to ensue if the major premise were accepted. It seems to me that the more fruitful way of making progress is to fasten on those points where there is some area of agreement between the parties and to see whether progress can be made from those points. Clearly, we have to admit that there has been little progress over the last nine years towards the goal contemplated in the two resolutions adopted by the Commission, that is, a decision as to the future of the State by means of an impartial plebiscite. Mr. Jarring was aware of the grave problems in connection with and as a result of a plebiscite. The United Kingdom Government, which stood so close to the convulsive events of 1947, cannot fail to be deeply conscious of these problems, which have grown no less with the passage of time. But what is needed above all in order to remove the obstacles to a settlement is a willingness to find a peaceful solution. Both parties, as I have said, have expressed such a willingness to Mr. Jarring. Given this willingness, I do not doubt that the wisdom and statesmanship of the parties is sufficient to enable progress towards a solution of the Kashmir problem to be found.
Mr. Jarring referred also to the emphasis which the Government of India put on their view that part I, paragraph B, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 had not been implemented by the Government of Pakistan. There is a grave difficulty here, too. In this paragraph, both High Commands agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment their military potential. This is clearly an important preliminary to the next stage-the stage of the withdrawal of the troops of Pakistan and the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces, to which both sides stand engaged. Clearly, there is a connection between augmentation and the removal or reduction of forces. Augmentation makes removal or reduction more difficult. Removal or reduction does away with any further problems about augmentation.
It was originally contemplated that the three parts of the resolution of 13 August 1948 should be implemented in quick succession; and, as early as 1949, the Commission for India and Pakistan was pointing out the difficulties arising from delay. Undoubtedly, the passage of time has added to the difficulties about the implementation of paragraph B. In the further eight years since 1949, new difficulties have arisen. Armies have become more efficient; old equipment has been replaced; new roads have been built on both sides.
If I understood Mr. Krishna Menon correctly, he was concerned with what is in the resolution-the principle that forces should not be augmented after the cease-fire-and with something that is not in the resolution; that is, the question of "Azad" Kashmir forces. The Commission did not explicitly deal with this latter point. Now these are very real problems, and the Security Council must be deeply concerned at any augmentation of military potential on either side.
Certainly we regret that Mr. Jarring was unable to suggest a means of dealing with the subject acceptable to both sides. But we must do more than try to ascertain the facts; we must try to find some method of reducing the state of tension, of reducing the burden of armaments and of dealing effectively with a situation which has become crystallised in a form never contemplated when the resolutions were passed. What helpful action, then, can be taken ?
Since 1949 the Security Council has, as I pointed out at the 768th meeting, attached the greatest importance to demilitarisation, and it directed its efforts, until the phase of direct negotiations began, towards achieving progress in that direction. Surely, this is the right approach.
Both the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan have referred to the heavy burden of armaments. The cost of this continuing tension has been made apparent to us all. Mr. Krishna Menon and Mr. Firoz Khan Noon have both made it clear how greatly their countries would prefer to devote as much of their resources as possible to peaceful development. And we all know how much easier and more economical development in the area would be if it could be planned on a basis of cooperation.
After ten years the compelling arguments for making progress towards demilitarisation are stronger than ever before. The Security Council cannot ignore all the patient work and endeavour which has gone into attempting to make progress over the years. Although Mr. Graham's labours five years ago did not get beyond the edge of success; although the direct
talks four years ago were successful; although the Government of India has stated that it does not regard itself as bound by any previous conditional agreements, yet I cannot believe that there are insuperable obstacles to progress on the withdrawal of troops starting from the Pakistani side.
In some ways, time and change make implementation of the agreements, as Mr. Jarring has said, more difficult. But there is a reverse side to the coin; in other ways difficulties may become less acute.
I cannot but think that the compelling reasons for making progress are such that, if a United Nations representative is able to begin conversations with the two parties and they enter upon them with a determination, in both of their interests, to make such advance, progress will in fact be possible. I believe that Mr. Graham could again play a useful role in this
To sum up, I would first wish to appeal to both sides to do their utmost to create an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. I would also appeal to them to agree to an investigation as regards the facts concerning the augmentation of forces. But I would go beyond that and urge that both sides should again attempt to make some progress towards the implementation of part II of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948. There is no question here of interfering with national sovereignty, and no question of arguing for any change of national defence policies. It is a question of carrying out international obligations by which both sides are engaged.
There are those who suggest that the United Kingdom, as a member of the Commonwealth, should avoid being involved in red discussions in the Security Council about the Kashmir questions, since to do so is inevitably to attract criticism from both sides. I need not explain to members of the Council what importance we attach to our relations with India and Pakistan. If we could, we would gladly avoid any action which might give offence to either of them or in any way impair our relations with either country.
Nevertheless, we have a duty as a permanent member of the Security Council and we cannot shrink from playing our part in trying to find a settlement of this dispute which, in the words of the Security Council's second resolution, that of 20 January 1948 "might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". [S/1100, annex 1) So long as this tension continues, not only will it have a profound effect on the lives and fortunes of some 500 million people in the sub continent, but it cannot fail to have its effect on the international policies of both countries. The Kashmir problem affects not only India and Pakistan, it is of concern to the whole world. The reasons for attempting yet once more to make progress towards its settlement are compelling.
I have confidence in the statesmanship and wisdom of both India and Pakistan. I have confidence that this problem will be solved-because it must be solved.