Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957
My delegation has examined the amendments submitted by Colombia and the Soviet Union to the draft resolution tabled by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States, and has listened to the statements made by the sponsors in explanation of their respective proposals and also to the statement of the representative of India.
After careful study, my delegation is unable to agree with the first Soviet Union amendment [S/3789, para. 1], which would throw overboard the preamble of the draft resolution. I agree with the representative of Colombia that might be taken as overlooking what the Council has already done in the past. The most that my delegation could accept would be to consider the Soviet proposal as an amendment to the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution, but not as a substitute for the whole preamble.
For the same reason, my delegation is unable to support the first amendment, proposed by Colombia (S/3791/Rev. 1, para. 1), which is intended to replace the entire preamble of the draft resolution. Moreover, if the letter addressed to the President of the United Nations Commission on 20 August 1948 by the Prime Minister of India is mentioned by the Colombian amendment in order to incorporate the clarifications of the Commission to the Government of India, it is believed that a similar reference should be made to the clarifications of the Commission to the Government of Pakistan, so that the Governments could be placed on an equal footing vis-a-vis the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission.
As far as the terms of reference of the President of the Council in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution are concerned, my delegation believes that there is a certain merit in spelling out what kind of proposals the President is expected to take up with the Governments of India and Pakistan. It is obvious that the "achievement of demilitarisation" is necessary in order to create conditions under which a free and impartial plebiscite could be held. In the opinion of my delegation, that should be the prime concern of the President in his mission to the sub-continent.
It should be remembered that some progress had been achieved in the past towards the goal of demilitarisation, so much so that the issues have been concurred particularly as to the quantum of forces that the Governments of India and Pakistan would like to have remain on their respective sides of the cease fire line. Obviously, my delegation cannot support the second amendment proposed by the Soviet Union (S/3789, para. 2) which would delete all reference to the "achievement of demilitarisation".
My delegation does not understand the objection by the Soviet Union to the use of word "demilitarisation" in the draft resolution. It is true that particular word nowhere appears in the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 13 August 1948 (S/1100, para. 75) and of 5 January 1949 (S/1196, para. 15). However, a perusal of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 shows that it is concerned with the withdrawal of armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side, of Pakistan troop as well as of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting; and from the Indian side, of the bulk of Indian forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Then the resolution of 5 January 1949 speaks of the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces.
The process of withdrawal, reduction or disposal of armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line as provided in the two resolutions of the Commission was described as "demilitarisation" by General McNaughton who was first commissioned by the Council on 17 December 1949 [457th meeting] to meet informally with the parties concerned. So did Sir Owen Dixon and Mr. Frank P. Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, and the Security Council itself in its resolutions of 14 March 1950 [S/1469] and 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ Rev. 1], use the term "demilitarisation" without objection from anybody.
However, if it will enhance general agreement, my delegation would not object to the use of another term provided it accurately describes the withdrawal or disposal of armed forces as envisaged in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
The formula contained in the second Colombian amendment [S/3791/Rev. 1. para. 2] would seem to be preferable so far as it refers to the achievement of the provisions contemplated in the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. For one thing, it is more comprehensive and more precise than the clause "the achievement of demilitarisation". For another thing, it conserves the principle of a plebiscite which is expressly provided for in the two aforementioned resolutions but which principle is rejected in the second Soviet Union amendment [S/3789, para. 2], according to the explanation of the representative of the Soviet Union. Another alternative would be to use the term "truce agreement" which is the heading of part II of the resolution of 13 August dealing with "demilitarisation". It is meet that the President should be further empowered to examine other proposals likely to contribute to "the establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute". That way, substance is given to the pledge of faith made before the Council that the parties may never be found wanting in the methods of exploration and finding agreement. That way also, it is hoped that the President will be given the necessary freedom of action to avoid falling into a rut. The Soviet and the Colombian amendments seem to accept this point of view. However, they both skirt the argument of the representative of India that what the Council is seized of is a situation and not a dispute. Instead the Soviet Union and Colombian amendments adopt the word "problem" which does not appear in Chapter VI of the Charter. It is not seen how the Council can get away from its resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] finding that the continuance of the dispute between the Governments of India and Pakistan is likely to endanger international peace and security.
My delegation has already expressed its views with respect to the proposal to use a United Nations force temporarily [768 the meeting, para. 115] as a means of achieving demilitarisation. It goes without saying that we can only commend it to parties. The parties, jointly or single, are free to accept or rejected it. Nevertheless it is the Council's right and duty to express its opinion. We would be failing in our duty if after deliberation we did not express what in our opinion would be a reasonable proposal to solve the deadlock on the question of demilitarisation.
In this connection, my delegation cannot but reject the statement that there is an attempt to introduce a "war atmosphere" in the way of the United Nations force [769th meeting, para. 176]. I do not think any Member State would be justified in placing a United Nations force engaged in a mission of peace on the same footing as an invading alien force.
I must emphasize that the sovereignty of India or of Pakistan is not involved in the proposal to send a United Nations force into the State of Jammu and Kashmir for a temporary and limited purpose. In the view of both the Council and the Commission, neither India nor Pakistan can bring into question the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This position is crystal clear in the assurance given by the Commission to the Governments of India and Pakistan and which forms the basis of their acceptance of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 (see documents S/1100, annex 12, p. 105, and S/1430/Add. 1; 1/see also annex V, section A, of the documents submitted as annexes to the statement made by Mr. Krishna Menon (S/PV. 762/Add. 1). Under the circumstances and pending the holding of a plebiscite, neither India nor Pakistan can claim sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Given the purpose of the United Nations force, there can be no stigma attached to its introduction into the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The force is being sent there precisely to assist in securing a free expression of the wishes of the people of the State to determine whether they will accede to India or to Pakistan That salutary objective delimits the tenure and circumscribes the authority of the United Nations force which will function under and derive its powers from the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Purely as a matter of drafting, my delegation would have no objection to the deletion of the words "and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nation force", at the end of operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. This clause is redundant because the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force is embodied in the statement of the representative of Pakistan, which the President of the Council is already asked to bear in mind in the same paragraph. I can see no reason for the repetition except for the purpose of emphasis. Moreover, the last paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution expresses the belief of the Council that the Pakistan proposal deserves consideration in so far as the use of a United Nations force might contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation. Certainly, the President cannot ignore it as one of the proposals he may examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan as likely to contribute to demilitarisation. My delegation considers premature that part of the second amendment proposed by Colombia [S/3791/Rev. 1, para 2] which mentions the possibility of referring the question to the International Court of Justice, which is alleged to have been suggested by the representative of Sweden. If I understood the representative of Sweden correctly, he suggested reference to the Court only as an alternative to negotiations between the parties [769th meeting, paras 39 and 40] My delegation does not believe, therefore, that the proposal to refer the problem to the Court should be among the proposals which the President of the Council should, in the first instance, examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan. The Council will be in a position to examine and study that particular proposal only if the procedure envisaged in the draft resolution should to achieve any result Indeed, the representative of Sweden declared that this Government might deem it advisable to have the legal background of the problem clarified should the question again come before the Council in the future.
As regards operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, it was suggested the other day that the time limit within which the President should report to the Council might be too close, The Soviet Union amendment [S/3789, para 3] would delete any mention of a time limit. While my delegation holds no particular brief for the date of 15 April 1957, it considers a time limit essential both as a stimulant and as an incentive to achieve progress with the least possible delay. For that reason my delegation is more inclined to accept the third amendment proposed by Colombia [S/3791/Bev. 1, para 3], which would require the President to report to the Council "if possible not later than 15 April 1957."
It has been said here, unfortunately, that some States "Continue to foment an artificial hue and cry on the subject of the so-called 'Kashmir question' in order to force the reconsideration of the decision taken by the people of Kashmir themselves" [770th meeting, para 136]. It was said further that "this hue and cry will in no way help to bring about the re establishment of normal conditions in the area" and that "the object of those who started this hue and cry is not to find a solution to the differences still outstanding between India and Pakistan, but rather to aggravate them" [tbid.]. I said that it was unfortunate that a matter as vital as the India-Pakistan question should be used for the usual propaganda purposes. We all know, in this Council, that no one here is guilty of encouraging any "artificial hue and cry" and that there are no so-called initiators of this "hue and cry" the implication being, as usual, that these must be the Powers habitually accused by their chronic accusers of the vilest imperialistic motives.
I wish to place before the Council my Government's desire. that Kashmir, as part and parcel of the Continent of Asia, should not be involved in the ideological conflict and the propaganda warfare of our time. Kashmir is Asia, and Asia must have no more of the perplexing disputes of ideology with which we have been afflicted recently. The issue before us can not be plainer than it is: we want the people of Jammu and Kashmir to express their own will in a peaceful and perfectly untrammelled way. That is why we have decided on a plebiscite as the best instrument to that end; and if we are discussing this issue again at the present time, it is because that will has not been expressed as desired.
That was the original omission, and it still is. We who are here representing our Governments and the collective will of the United Nations are concerned that there has been no compliance, which, in the interest of world law and order, must come through specific performance by the parties. At the same time, we are bound to take the position that, if anything has happened for the good of the people of Kashmir-as has been alleged that good is in mitigation, but not in condonation, of the original omission.
We have been told here that a plebiscite in Kashmir would be "imposed by force" through the instrumentality of the proposed United Nations contingent, and that the plebiscite would constitute "outside interference" [770th meeting, paras 138 and 139] With all deference to those who think this way, we must say that nothing is more repugnant to the ways of our Organisation than the use of force, and for this reason the mission of the contingent-if the Council decides to create such a contingent will be strictly for peaceful ends. As to the charge of interference from outside, what could result from the good offices of the United Nations but confirmation of the truth-if the truth exists-that all is well in Jammu and Kashmir? If anything, therefore, the plebiscite should establish the facts in this dispute definitely and beyond all doubt.
It is my Government's desire to see this dispute resolved in the United Nations way-that is, with peace as the sole objective, peace based on agreement between the parties, agreement arrived at without interference from this or that ideological camp. It is this kind of interference which we must guard against at all times and, obviously, it cannot come from the United Nations, which has neither imperialistic nor colonial designs. Under United Nations auspices, the goal of peace is beyond muddling, and I submit that it is under such auspices that the principal parties to this dispute can reach a durable goal. settlement and, at the same time, avoid seeing the State of Jammu and Kashmir converted into a battleground for antagonistic ideologies.
118. Text of the Speech made by Mr. Barco (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957
As we feared, the representative of the Soviet Union has again abused the veto power to prevent the Security Council from helping to resolve an international dispute in which the Soviet Union, presumably, has no direct interest. The Soviet representative's implication that the Security Council would be violating the Charter by authorising its President to bear in mind the proposal by one of the parties for a United Nations force to in demilitarization cannot be substantiated by anything that has been said or done here. The action of the Soviet Union can have only one purpose, to perpetuate international conflict and dissension between two of Asia's great countries. The Soviet Union takes a weighty responsibility upon itself. It has blocked measures by the United Nations to help to assure peaceful conditions in the area and friendly relations between the two States. The Security Council has considered the Kashmir problem on many occasions since 1947.
Many Members of the United Nations have served on the Council when this issue was before us. In every instance, and regardless of the membership of the Council, it has overwhelmingly approved measures to bring about a free expression of the will of the Kashmir people through an impartial plebiscite. That opinion, and those resolutions, remain valid and represent the continued sense of the Council. The resolution adopted by the Council on 24 January 1957 [S/3779], and the nine votes which our joint draft resolution has just received make this clear.
In spite of the Soviet veto, the United States hopes for progress in resolving the dispute. We believe that the parties will themselves not wish to end these discussions on the negative note of the Soviet veto. We urge them to refrain from any measures which might have the effect of increasing tension in the area. We believe that the Security Council should consider immediate action to repair the damage caused by the Soviet veto of the four-Power draft resolution. Such action would accord with its continuing responsibility to assist the parties to move towards a solution of this serious problem.
The United States, together with the delegations of Australia and the United Kingdom, therefore submitted a new draft resolution which we believe would provide for helpful action in the present circumstances. This draft resolution has just been handed to the President, and I should like to read it out to the Security Council:
"The Security Council,
"Recalling its resolution of 24 January 1957, its previous. resolutions and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on the India-Pakistan question,
"1. Requests the President security Council, the representative of Sweden, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; to visit the sub-continent for this purpose; and to report to the Security Council not later than 15 April 1957;
"2. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan. to cooperate with him in the performance of these functions;
"3. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to render such assistance as he may request [S/3792 and Corr. 1]."
This draft resolution bases itself solidly upon the long and virtually unanimous attitude of the Security Council, as expressed in its resolutions, and upon the obligations accepted by the parties under the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It would authorise the President of the Council to discuss with India and Pakistan any proposals which have been or which may be put forward and which he thinks could help to resolve the dispute, having regard to these resolutions. In his examination of means to solve the dispute, the President would necessarily devote considerable attention to demilitarisation, which is the point at which progress towards a plebiscite has broken down.
The draft resolution vetoed by the Soviet Union offered, in our opinion, the best opportunity for progress. We hope, however, that this new draft resolution will still permit the Council to take constructive action, and we urge the Council to adopt it quickly.
Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): We deeply regret the Soviet Union veto of the four-Power draft resolution, the first veto ever cast in the long history of the Kashmir dispute. We must see what action the Council can now usefully take with a view to making progress toward a settlement. The United Kingdom still ardently desires to see progress made. It is with these considerations in mind that the United Kingdom delegation gladly joins in sponsoring the new draft resolution which has been read out by the representative of the United States.
Under this revised draft resolution, the President of the Security Council would still be enabled to visit India and Pakistan, and he would be enabled to discuss any proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions. He could hardly fail to discuss, amongst others, the problem of demilitarisation preparatory to a free and impartial plebiscite, which has been so much in the centre of our discussion here and on which I explained the attitude of the United Kingdom this morning [772nd meeting, paras, 161 and 152].
It is my hope that this revised draft resolution will commend itself to the Council, because I am sure that the President's mission, even in its present more generalised terms, will make a great contribution to the achievement of a settlement. We have faith not only in his mission, but also in the sincere desire of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan to reach a peaceful settlement.