Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957

Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957

The Council has before it a series of amendments to the joint draft resolution (S/3787) proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union (S/3789), and it also has before it amendments proposed by the delegation of Colombia (S/3791/Rev. 1).

As regards the latter, I appreciate the sincere desire of the representative of Colombia, shown in his speeches, to be of assistance in suggesting amendments which he has put forward in the hope that they might prove acceptable to both parties. I would only say that these amendments make certain references and omit certain points, with the result that the balance of the original draft is upset. I therefore hope that he will find it possible not to press his amendments.

The Soviet Union amendments have to be read in the light of the Soviet Union representative's statement at the 770th meeting of the Security Council. The amendments by themselves give the appearance of being an attempt to find a compromise. However, the speech of the Soviet Union suggests either that the Soviet Union delegation is ignorant of the facts about Kashmir or that it is making an attempt to create mistrust and exacerbate existing misunderstanding in the sub-continent.

What does he say? He asserts bluntly that:

"The Soviet Union's view, and its basic premise, is that the Kashmir question has in actual fact already been www settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves." MA [770th meeting, para. 135.]

What does he mean ? And then Mr. Sobolev says:

"We must not forget that the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir now, meets with the objections of one of the parties: that it has in fact been rejected by that party." [Ibid, para. 138.]

But it is clear from the speeches of the representative of India that he has not at any stage rejected on behalf of the Government of India the idea of a plebiscite. He referred to the conditions which have to be met before it is possible to have a plebiscite. He has talked about the difficulties in the way of a plebiscite, but he has not suggested that he rejects the idea of a plebiscite. If, however, it is the Soviet Union view that the question of Kashmir has already been settled by the people of Kashmir itself and that the idea of a plebiscite at the present time has been rejected by one of the parties, what then is the purpose of the representative of the Soviet Union in suggesting that the interested parties could use this time, that is to say, the present time, for making new efforts to settle existing differences by means of direct negotiations? Negotiations about what? If, to accept Mr. Sobolev's contention, the question of Kashmir has already been settled and one party rejects the idea of a plebiscite, how-on what basis-could such discussions take place? With what sincerity does he propose that the President of the Security Council should go out into the field to consider, together with the Government of India and Pakistan, the existing situation in Kashmir as well as possible methods of settling existing differences? Yet, despite the strange illogicality in the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union, he did at least agree to that. It is possible to attribute the words of his speech to innocence or ignorance rather than to anything else. I hope, therefore, that he will not make himself responsible for preventing such a visit by our President from taking place.

I said that the Soviet Union amendments give the appearance of being an attempt to find a compromise; but in my view the effect of those amendments is to emasculate the draft resolution to such an extent that the resulting proposal would not be likely to make a contribution to the settlement of the Kashmir problem. I think I can best explain my reasons-and I shall do it as shortly as can-by pointing out the significance of the points in the four Power draft resolutions which the Soviet proposal seeks to eliminate or amend.

The proposal of the Soviet Union would omit the whole of the preamble except for one paragraph which would be amended, a paragraph to which I shall come later.

Now what does our draft resolution say? In the first preambular paragraph it recalls the Security Council resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779], its previous resolutions and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In doing this, it is true that it thereby recalls certain parts of the previous which have only a historical interest. But by recalling all the resolutions, the present draft is designed to avoid arguments about the different weight to be given to previous resolutions. This, I should have thought, would be reassuring to both parties.

It is true that the four-Power draft resolution makes a specific reference to the resolution of 24 January. But after all, that resolution is a preliminary resolution which says that the Security Council "decides to continue its consideration of the dispute"; it is a resolution passed at the present series of meetings, and it would be anomalous to omit a reference to it.

I was asked to say why the resolution of 24 January 1957 had greater significance than that of 17 January 1948. My answer is that it has no greater significance. In fact, I drew attention to the resolution of 17 January 1948 in my intervention at the 768th meeting, by reading out the relevant part of it [768th meeting, para. 17].

Then an amendment is proposed to the clause "Having taken into consideration the statements of the representative of the Governments of India and Pakistan". I find it difficult to understand why. My Government is deeply concerned to find a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, and I can assure the representative of the Soviet Union that the statements made here have received the closest consideration not only by my delegation, but by my Government too.

Another effect of the Soviet Union amendment is to eliminate the word "dispute" in the draft resolution. I am puzzled that there should be any objection to this word. Not only has it been used in many Security Council resolutions, but it was used in the joint communique issued to the Press in New Delhi on 20 August 1953.

The Soviet Union proposal would eliminate from the draft resolution the clauses referring to "demilitarisation". I am glad of this opportunity important word. to clarify the meeting we attach to this Demilitarisation in this context means simply. the process or procedures for withdrawing troops as laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. I repeat, as laid down in these resolutions. Demilitarisation in our view is an essential process, to which Pakistan and India both agreed, as the way to the settlement of the problem. It is, moreover, an essential step on which both parties have laid the greatest stress.

Next, the Soviet Union proposal would remove the last preambular paragraph. Certain words in it were criticised, but this paragraph must be read as a whole. This paragraph is an expression of belief, and the sole belief expressed is that the use of a temporary United Nations force would deserve consideration in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation envisaged in the resolutions-not just demilitarisation, but demilitarisation as envisaged in. the resolutions and towards the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The belief is expressed in the conditional tense. The belief is that the use of such a force would deserve consideration in so far as "it might contribute".

Now, I am aware of the strong feelings about the idea of a United Nations force. Nothing that has been said on this subject, however, appears very relevant to the paragraph in the draft resolution as it is actually drafted, or to provide a reason for the rejection of the draft resolution. It is surely in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Charter that the Security Council should tell the parties that it believes that this idea might, conditionally, deserve consideration. Is not the idea worth examining calmly with the President of the Security Council as progress? a possible way of achieving I assert again that this draft resolution, in our view, in present circumstances, is in the true interest of both parties.

I would here repeat-and I trust my words will go out beyond the confines of this Council that we approach this question in the simple spirit of wishing to see a just and fair solution. We stand ready, as we have throughout the last nine years, to consider our attitude to Kashmir on the merits, and on the merits alone, of the cases put forward by the parties, and in examining the cases put forward we are deeply conscious of the vital necessity of making a positive contribution towards peaceful progress in the subcontinent. My Government's attitude is based on no other considerations whatsoever.

In conclusion, I repeat that the draft resolution before us prejudices no position. In the view of my Government it is a balanced draft. In our eyes it has virtue in that it bridges the Indian election period, without halting all the attempts to find a solution during that period.

The time must come soon when the Security Council. must face its arduous task again. I trust and hope that it will be in a position to do so with further information about the attitudes of the two Governments before it, which will enable it to consider carefully and wisely its next step.

I therefore appeal once more to both Governments to consider the draft resolution before us, not for what is imputed to it, not for what has been read into it, but for what it is.