Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo lin (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo lin (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957
Before proceeding to the main point of this intervention, I feel bound to take note of a report in which it was made to appear that this Council treated the subject of the last resolution adopted by the Council [S/3779] in a casual manner and that the resolution in question was filed even before the representative of India had finished his presentation of the case for his Government.
I feel it my duty, as President of this Council at that time, to state here and now that there was absolutely nothing casual in the manner in which the Council proceeded in connection with the draft resolution before it. In the afternoon of 23 January 1957, the representative of India announced [163rd meeting, para. 79] that he had decided to change the order of his presentation of his Government's case in order to give, that same afternoon, his Government's views on the action of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. As we recall it, he was obliged to make that change in order to accommodate those members of this Council who were very much concerned about the implications of the reported action of the Constituent Assembly. The draft resolution was submitted only after the representative of India had finished his presentation of his Government's case on that particular subject. On the following day the Council thoroughly debated the issue and forthwith adopted the resolution [765th meeting]. But this was after every member of the Council had expressed the views of his delegation with deliberation, and a perusal of the statements made that morning will show the care and the thorough study which each of them gave to this delicate and difficult problem.
Before leaving this subject I am also bound to dispel the misconception that considerations stemming from certain military groups and alliances had any influence on the decision. taken by the member Governments as reflected in the vote of 10 in favour of the resolution, none against, and 1 abstention.
Although the representative of India has dealt with the question of aggression anew, I do not think that the Council is called upon to make any finding as to whether there has been aggression and by whom it was committed. It should be recalled that the charge and counter-charge of aggression ceased to be relevant the moment both sides agreed to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
The first aide-memoire of the meeting between representatives of the Commission and the Prime Minister of India of 20 December 1948 quoted the Prime Minister of India as saying that his Government had accepted the Commission's resolution of 13 August "in spite of the presence of Pakistani troops in Jammu and Kashmir and the offensive action of Pakistani troops" [S/1196, annex 4, aide-memoire 1, para. 2]. The Commission, therefore, must have taken this into account when it addressed itself to the correction of the situation as reported to it by both parties.
In his last intervention, the representative of India stated that India has not asked for anybody to be branded an aggressor [767th meeting, para 235]. For this reason I see no point in taking up the matter further. Clearly, what each side has the right to insist on is that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir be remedied, that is, according to the terms of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission. But this is precisely the crux of the matter, because both parties have failed to agree on what constitutes a proper implementation of those resolutions.
In the course of his impressive and scholarly argument on the reasons why there has been no progress in the settlement of the India-Pakistan question, the able and worthy representative of India dwelt at length on the changes in the situation which have occurred since the Security Council was first seized of the question nine years ago. The Council heard an ex-position on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Examples were sited of plebiscites that had been decreed by the defunct League of Nations and which were not carried out after a lapse of many years. Then it was recalled that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had stated: "The situation. in the State of Jammu and Kashmir has changed; the resolutions remain unchanged." Finally, the Council was admonished that it should not be like Rip Van Winkle and ignore the nine years that have passed. The obvious conclusion which can be drawn from the argument is that it would be realistic if the applicable resolutions were changed in order to meet the changed situation.
If we examine the various resolutions that have been approved by the Security Council on this question, including the resolutions of the United Nations Commission which have been endorsed by the Council, we find one vital principle which underlies the solution recommended and that is that the wishes of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be ascertained. The principle involved is that of self-determination, It is a time-honoured principle which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. But the Charter did not create it; the Charter merely recognized a principle affirmed and reaffirmed countless times since the American and the French Revolutions. We can go even further back in history to trace the origins of this principle but suffice it for me to say that the principle is as valid today for the United Nations as when the founding fathers first incorporated it into the Charter twelve years ago and it will certainly remain valid for a long, long time to come.
Certainly the principle of self-determination has its limitations. In the particular case before us, I incline to the view that the partition of British India between the Dominions of India and Pakistan did not give independence to the Princely States but merely gave them the option to accede either to India or to Pakistan. As far as the Security Council is concerned, it took the view-reiterated time and again in resolution after resolution that the principle of self-determination properly applied to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir merely meant the right of people to be consulted as to whether they decided to accede to India or to Pakistan.
The will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, according. The resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which have been accepted by both India and Pakistan, are to be ascertained by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The other provisions of the resolutions mentioned are clearly. subordinated to that end. The provisions relating to the cease-fire and the truce arrangements are aimed simply at the creation of conditions to enable the free and orderly attainment of the prime objective. Whatever changes may have occurred in the situation since the resolutions of the Security Council were passed, it is submitted that the principle underlying those resolutions cannot be changed because it is unchangeable. If the resolutions have to be modified in the light of changed circumstances, it is submitted that the modification may consist in the alteration of the procedures but not of the principle or objective sought to be realised, namely, the free and untrammelled expression of the will of the people by means of a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations. This was what was meant by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan when it stated that the situation had changed but the resolutions. remained unchanged. The Commission found that the resolutions were no longer adequate to solve the changed situation, not because there was anything wrong with the principle underlying those resolutions but because “Governments were strict in adhering to the letter of those clauses which met their position".
Sir Owen Dixon, the first United Nations Representative, saw that the difficulty that had to be surmounted in bringing about conditions in which preparations for taking a plebiscite might go forward was the inability of India and Pakistan to agree on those conditions. He deplored the fact that the implementation of the resolutions was made dependent on the agreement of the parties but in the end he had to conclude that: "It is perhaps best that the initiative should now pass back to the parties" [S/1791, para. 104].
Mr. Frank P. Graham, the incumbent United Nations Representative who, in our opinion, has done an excellent job, did not succeed in getting the parties to agree on the remaining issue of demilitarisation and, like Sir Owen Dixon, had to fall back on the hope that the leadership of over 400 million people with the goodwill and assistance of the United Nations, may "join in negotiating and reporting an agreement" [S/2967, para. 57].
My Government cannot but reiterate the hope that, given the continued tolerance and goodwill which have not been wanting in the relations between the Governments of India and Pakistan, they may finally agree not only in their own interests but in the interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Each party contends that if a free and impartial plebiscite is held, it will certainly go in its favour, which is all the more reason why the parties should demonstrate their determination to agree on the antecedent conditions which would make possible the holding of such a plebiscite.
It is undeniable that the longer the present situation is allowed to continue, the greater is the danger of its further deterioration. Certainly it would favour the side which holds under its control the greater portion of the territory and population of the disputed State. It is to be assumed that each party would use all legitimate means to convert to its side the population under its control which must be amenable to its rule. In the circumstances, each party would have a better chance of succeeding in this endeavour the longer it is allowed to exercise its powers of persuasion to the exclusion of the other. The danger, indeed, is that certain conditions may be created on each side of the cease-fire line as to render difficult a charge from the status quo.
The proposal by the representative of Pakistan for the introduction of a United Nations force [761st meeting, para. 112] to exercise police functions in the areas to be vacated by the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line is a proposal that merits consideration. It is not a novel idea, for in another setting the General Assembly has approved the introduction of a United Nations police force into areas vacated by belligerent armies in order to promote conditions which might lead to progress in securing a peaceful settlement of a particularly difficult and complex problem.
I will permit myself now to turn to the draft resolution tabled by the delegations of Australia, Cuba, the United States and the United Kingdom [S/3787]. I can say for my Government that we will find no difficulty in going along with the proponents of the plan envisaged in the draft resolution. And I venture to add that should the Council adopt the plan, as I have reason to believe it will, it would go a long way towards a final settlement of the present dispute.
I wish first of all to commend the idea of sending to the subcontinent of India the President of the Security Council for a first-hand investigation of the conditions there as they relate to the dispute. In our opinion, such a distinguished personality as the President of the Security Council cannot fail in his mission to appreciate the arguments of the disputants in this issue in the light of the facts as they actually exist and as he will actually find them. Mr. Jarring is a diplomat of vast experience. We know for one thing that he is familiar with the Indian sub-continent as a result of his diplomatic assignments there. He should, for this reason, be in a position to meet the principal parties on the spot, weigh their views in the light of the actual circumstances in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and bring us abundant evidence upon which further to proceed in our deliberations.
The draft resolution before us meets all the requirements of the situation and, without departing from the sound and practical course therefore followed by this organ of the United Nations, opens the way realistically to a settlement which, if the parties are minded to coexist in peace, should be final and conclusive.
The proposal does not deviate from the course we have followed. It recognizes the absolute necessity of demilitarising the disputed region as a condition precedent to any genuine plebiscite. None of us here will dispute the proposition that no plebiscite is possible in a setting of warlike appearances. The first and most important condition to a free election is that the people should be able to go to the polls without fear in their hearts. Any sign of coercion would make the true expression of the people's will impossible. Those of us who have been used to the democratic way of life will readily admit that any plebiscite worth its name must be conducted under conditions of absolute peace if it is to be regarded as valid and conclusive.
We can assume that one of the principal concerns of our President when he goes to the sub-continent is that the ground is properly laid for the untrammelled exercise of popular suffrage when the plan of a plebiscite, which is the Security Council's decision, is actually carried out.
Finally, the reference in the draft resolution to the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan that a United Nations Force be assigned to Jammu and Kashmir as a temporary means toward the achievement of demilitarisation is in line with my Government's views that the idea merits full consideration.My delegation, therefore, will vote in favour of the draft resolution.