15021957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957.
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957.
The Australian delegation has joined the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Cuba in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document S/3787 because we believe it presents the right decision for the Security Council to take at the present stage of our consideration of the situation in Kashmir.
We have heard important statements by the representatives of Pakistan and India, and I should like to express the appreciation of the Australian delegation to Mr. Firoz Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon for the pains they have taken to present their respective cases so fully and clearly to the Council. I feel sure that from these statements, together with the earlier important reports of Sir Owen Dixon and Mr. Frank Graham, we have all gained a better understanding of the difficulties and the opposing points of view and interpretations of events that have stood in the way of a mutually acceptable settlement of this problem.
It might be possible for the Council to proceed here and now to a detailed examination of and an exchange of views upon the positions adopted by the parties in this discussion before the Council and to endeavour to pronounce some sort of judgement upon the many points of controversy. But I would not consider such a procedure to be wise at the present time, for I doubt whether it would bring us closer to a solution of the problem. On the other hand, the devoted and painstaking efforts of Mr. Graham did reduce the divergences between the positions of the parties, even if they did not produce a final agreement.
Surely after this lapse of three years, the path wisdom is to continue to explore the possibilities of ref ching agreement on practical steps forward. The recognized goal of the Council has been to be guided by the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Without attempting at this stage to pronounce itself any further on the constitutional procedures that have been followed or challenged in the past, the Council may well continue to put its faith in the method of popular consultation by plebiscite, which, provided the necessary conditions are established to facilitate a free expression of the people's will, is of all methods, the most democratic one.
The Council has all along attached great importance to the adoption of appropriate measures of demilitarisation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a necessary step towards the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is well known that negotiations on detailed practical measures to bring about such demilitarisation have not in the past been successful. This is the most immediate problem to which, in our view, the Security Council should bend its present efforts.
The draft resolution refers to the proposal of the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force (761st meeting, para. 112) to facilitate agreement on effective arrangements for demilitarisation. The idea is perhaps not a new one, but it gains in interest and importance from the recent experience of the United Nations in the establishment and operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. Without drawing any parallel between the situation that led to the General Assembly's decision to establish Force and the problem of securing appropriate measures of demilitarisation of Kashmir as a preliminary step towards holding a free and impartial plebiscite, it would seem to us very difficult for anybody to deny that the use of such a force, in so far as it might contrib towards demilitarisation, would, in the words. of the draft resolution "deserve consideration". It is the hope of the Australian delegation that this proposal will receive full and sympathetic consideration by the Council and the parties.
We recognize, however, that precipitating action by the Council at this moment might not produce the results that the Council desires. The Australian delegation appreciates the difficulty that could confront the Indian Government if it were requested to a plebiscite, including possible arrangements for an international force, on the eve or in the midst of the forthcoming national elections, which will naturally make great calls upon the time and attention of ministers and officials. Moreover, we have heard from both parties something of the changes and developments that have taken place on both sides of the cease-fire line since the suspension of hostilities, and there can be little doubt that the Council would wish for more. information regarding actual present-day conditions and the prospects of working out some agreed measures.
In these circumstances, it seems to us that the Council could be greatly assisted if its President, who has long experience and a profound knowledge of both India and Pakistan, were to undertake the mission proposed in the draft resolution.
The Council will note that it would be the task of our President under this draft resolution to examine, with the two Governments concerned, "proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation or to the establishment of other conditions for progress towards [a] settlement"-having regard, of course, of course, to the past resolutions of the Council, to the statements that we have heard from the parties, and to the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force in this connexion.
We would hope that, when the President has completed his investigations and discussions with the Governments concerned, the Council will find it possible to proceed, in an atmosphere of harmony and cooperation, with the elaboration of concrete measures that will win acceptance from all parties concerned and pave the way to a just and peaceful settlement of this painful problem.
I trust that the Council will adopt the draft resolution now before the Council, and I feel sure that the Governments of India and Pakistan will afford our respected President every possible assistance in this supremely important mission.
When I spoke in the Council earlier on this subject (765th meeting, para. 24], I referred to the close and cordial ties that Australia enjoys with both India and Pakistan, and I expressed the deep anxiety of the Australian people in regard to the continued friction between our friends over the Kashmir question, which we have always hoped could be resolved by peaceful negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan. It is not necessary, I know, for me to repeat this. Our neighbours and friends in India and Pakistan will, I hope, recognize that, in putting forward this draft resolution in association with the other sponsors, we in Australia are moved solely by a spirit of the warmest goodwill toward them and by our deep concern for the interests of the people of Kashmir.
Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) First of all, I would like to say that I thoroughly approve of the idea of having only simultaneous interpretation today. I realise, of course, that today's step is only being adopted as an exceptional measure, for otherwise the Council would have been faced with the prospect of having two statements in Spanish which, with the two consecutive interpretations to follow, would have tripled the time the Council would have had to spend in listening to them. It is because of that problem, in fact, that I have occasionally taken the liberty in the past of speaking in one of the two working languages so as to save the Council a threefold loss of time in hearing what I have to say. Unfortunately, the press in the Spanish speaking countries- possibly in ignorance of the Council's rules of procedure - has been highly offended at my not speaking in Spanish: in ignorance of the rules of procedure, I repeat, for it should really have been offended at my failure to speak in Basque. As Mr. de Lequerica explained so convincingly in the General Assembly Basque is one of the most ancient of languages - for Basque is a language, not a dialect and it happens to be the one spoken by Mr. de Lequerica's forebears and my own.
[Mr. Urrutia then spoke a few words in Basque]
The translation of what I have just said -I am afraid I must give it myself-is that I am sorry I am not able to address the Council in Basque. Today, in any case, we shall only have simultaneous interpretation; however, I reserve my right in the future to abstain from Spanish and to speak in French or English in order to save the Council's time, and also to speak Basque on occasion so as to ensure that language is not denied the rights admittedly accorded under rule 44 of the rules of procedure.
It is an excellent idea to ask the President of the Security Council to undertake in concert with the Governments of India and Pakistan to study proposals that might help to solve the problem of Kashmir, and my delegation wholeheartedly sup. ports it; but I would like to refer briefly to the difficulties we encountered in the past so as to avoid their recurrence in the future.
When the Security Council appointed the Commission which went to India and Kashmir in 1948, it committed without design the same error we are about to commit with the present draft resolution: the Commission's sole terms of reference being to negotiate within the framework of the resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] which one of the parties-India, in this case had denounced before the Commission left New York. Thus on its arrival in India the Commission found itself in the following rather absurd position: it was acting in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, in other words, it was engaged. in the conciliation procedure, and was required, in doing so, to keep strictly to a resolution that had already been denounced by one of the parties. Despite this completely illogical situation, the Commission scored an unexpected success by getting the Indian Government to agree, subject to certain conditions, that the question of Kashmir's future should be submitted to decision by its inhabitants by means of a plebiscite. This agreement was not reached through the 1948 resolution, however, but through direct negotiations which were not provided for in the resolution and which I think ought to be stressed, since I consider the debate of the past few days to have revealed a rather grave misunderstanding of the question.
I would like to point out, in the first place, that the situation which the Commission found on its arrival in Pakistan was this: Pakistan had rejected any solution that did not involve explicit provisions concerning the plebiscite. India, for its part, refused even to consider the idea of a plebiscite until hostilities ceased and the Pakistani forces were withdrawn. The Commission managed to bring about agreement on the cease fire and the truce as a bridge between those two positions. What was arrived at, therefore, was a compromise solution whereby it was possible to elicit an offer from India to submit the final disposition of Kashmir to a plebiscite. Two points have to be made clear, however: first, the Commission accepted the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a fact and avoided entering into a discussion of the legality or illegality of the act of accession, which meant that it recognized the de facto sovereignty of India. Secondly, the Commission never recognized the legality of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir. These points must be stressed in order to appreciate why the Commission ordered the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani forces but only requested India to withdraw part of its forces, while permitting it-and even giving it special rights to maintain internal order and take charge of external defence. For the same reasons the Commission, when the idea of a plebiscite was discussed, was the first, to recognize that Pakistan had no right to take part in drawing up the rules and regulations for the plebiscite, except. in an advisory capacity, whereas India was recognized as having the right to be consulted. It was also agreed in principle that the Pakistani forces would be withdrawn, completely and definitively, whereas the withdrawal of the Indian forces was subject to consultations with the Commission.
Once this legal position had been made clear, and solely because the Commission had been able to clear it up and had recognized India's de facto sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, it was able to obtain India's agreement to a further point that India would agree-even if it were proved or disproved that Kashmir belonged legally to India that a plebiscite would be held provided certain conditions had been met, and that if the plebiscite showed that the people of Kashmir wished to leave India and enter and form part of Pakistan, India would bow to that decision.
But then as we see, there is a complete difference between what was said and what Was agreed upon. The Chairman of the Commission, during these discussions, was the representative of Colombia, and therefore I felt it was my duty to examine the records. And of course I found, first of all, that when the Commission, was asked whether it wanted to enter into a discussion on the legality of India's sovereignty over Kashmir, the Commission said it would prefer not to do so; second, that when Mr. Nehru asked Mr. Lozano whether the offer to hold a plebiscite would, in the Commission's view, entail an unconditional commitment if the first and second parts of the resolution of 13 August 1948 were not carried out, Mr. Lozana replied very definitely, "No". It is very clear that there would be no commitment on India's part until after the first and second parts of the August revolution have been complied with.
Thus what really took place was a negotiation. On 13 August 1948 the Commission adopted a resolution that resolution was then a foundation, a declaration of principles, to which the agreement of both parties was then sought. India accepted the resolution in a letter dated 20 December 1948 which the Prime Minister of India sent to Mr. Korbel [S/1100, para, 78], and later in a communication dated 23 December 1948 addressed to Mr. Lozano [S/1196, annex 4], which made it very clear that the Commission's August resolution was being accepted, but on condition that the first and second parts would have to be complied with before the plebiscite could be held.
From statements made in the past few days by the Prime Minister of India, I have the impression that he misinterpreted the Security Council's resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779]. In India that resolution was interpreted as one that changed the terms of the agreement reached by that Commission in 1948. That is not my interpretation. What we said on 24 January was that we had to reaffirm the general principle that Kashmir's fate must be settled by means of a plebiscite, but naturally within the conditions stipulated in 1948, which meant that the first and second parts of the resolution had to be complied with first. At no time have we said that we wished to change those bases: they still stand. What the Security Council discussed on 24 January was something different, namely, whether as a result of the incorporation of the State of Kashmir by India those bases would be changed; and we decided that it would not. Why? Because the Commission never discussed the question of sovereignty; we in the Security Council never discussed the legal problem. We are not asking India to tell us that it is prepared to submit the legal problem of sovereignty to the Council for decision or to a plebiscite; what we are asking India is that, in accordance with the offer it made to us in 1948-even if Kashmir is legally a part of India it should agree to a plebiscite, and that if the majority of the people of Kashmir wish to cease being Indian and become. part of Pakistan, India should agree. This is apparent from the letters of 20 August and 23 December 1948, which were confirmed by the Commission's January 1969 resolution.
In my opinion, the success of the Commission's work lay in the fact that it obtained an explicit offer from India in this direction. I think it is a very serious matter to make step backwards, because the Commission's success was precisely due to the fact that it decided to avoid the legal aspect of the right of sovereignty and instead, I repeat, to obtain India's offer to renounce any future right of sovereignty over Kashmir if the people should request this in the plebiscite.
Now let us see what steps the Commission took to obtain this offer so as not to obscure what we have achieved. In the first place, in order to obtain this offer, the Commission had to enter into negotiations that lasted over half a year. The resolution was approved by the Commission in August, but it was not until December that India's acceptance was obtained and then it was a conditional acceptance. The acceptance is very clear. It says: first there has to be a ceasefire, then a truce, and when those two stages have been completed, the plebiscite will be held. There was more: the Commission had succeeded in obtaining agreement that once the truce agreement had been signed, and during that truce, a new agreement should be reached in order to synchronise-I use that word because there was a great deal of discussion about it and it was finally adopted-the withdrawal of forces and enable the plebiscite to be held. Unfortunately, the atmosphere of confidence that had been achieved was lost owing to a series of errors and incidents which it is advisable to recall so that they will not recur.
The first was the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator. As it is now nine years ago, I think it is worth-while to explain what happened. In the Commission the Colombian delegation urged that the Plebiscite Administrator should be a neutral, that being the only way to induce India to abide by the offer which had been obtained with such difficulty. Unfortunately, other delegations had explicit instructions to urge that the Plebiscite Administrator should be a United States citizen. My delegation suggested, in private conversations also, that we should accept the Indian Government's suggestion that the President of the International Red Cross should be appointed Plebiscite Administrator. If at that time, we had accepted the Plebiscite Administrator proposed by India, the President of the International Red Cross, the plebiscite would already have been held. Instead of that, Admiral Nimitz waited nine years in new York for an opportunity to organise the plebiscite. But these errors are delicate matters, because an apparent diplomatic victory, obtained at a certain time, served propaganda purposes, but in reality undid all the work the Commission had accomplished.
In view of that situation, the members of the Commission and particularly the representative of my country, realised that their mission had been completed, for as the Chairman of the Commission summed it up in a statement that I consider excellent :
"The Security Council's resolutions are static, but the situation is dynamic." The Commission had provided. for an arrangement, system or procedure that was to be carried out in six weeks or three months at the most. Advantage should have been taken of the favourable atmosphere of the climate that had been brought about in Indía: Mr. Nehru's acceptance, and the confidence with which the Commission had inspired him to accomplish all this in three months. But instead, we began to be asked for clarifications, which bogged us down for a year and a half. Then, of course, the Commission had nothing further to do.
The dissolution of the Commission was requested, and its functions were temporarily assumed by the President of the Council, General Mc Naughton (Canada). In the meantime, Admiral Nimitz. of course, was still in New York. General Mc did not find any solution, and then the first mediator was appointed, Sir Owen Dixon (Australia). After a four-week visit, he gave up his mission, and then Mr. Graham was appointed; as you know, he has travelled to India more than twelve times and has submitted a number of reports with which all of us in the Security Council are familiar.
In deciding to ask our President to make a new effort at mediation, I think I should point out that the essence of Mr. Graham's final effort was to try to reach an agreement on demilitarisation in one stage only: a truce with some of the provisions of the resolution of 5 January 1949. That might be the solution, but in any case it is different from that agreed upon in 1948 by the Commission and Mr. Nehru. There was even a moment when Mr. Graham obtained agreement. You will remember that at one time he proposed that the forces of India should be limited to 18,000 men and those of Pakistan to 6,000. India insisted on 21,000, and because Pakistan would not agree to the additional 3,000 men at that time, Mr. Graham's effort came to naught and, once again, we took a step backwards.
In the light of these observations, I feel that we should not tie the hands of the President of the Council, because if we do so, we shall encounter all the difficulties that the Commission encountered in 1948 and those that later caused the failure of the efforts of General Me Naughton and Mr. Graham.
The operative part of the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States is excellent. But on the other hand, I would object to the preamble. Strictly speaking, there is also a point in the operative part that I think should be changed, namely: should we set a time limit for the President of the Council. General Me Naughton's visit lasted four weeks and nothing was accomplished. I believe it would be very difficult for the President of the Council to achieve anything in four or five weeks. Let us give him latitude, because we must bear this in mind : later it will be practically impossible for us in the Council to achieve in New York what the President cannot effect on his visit. Thus let us give him all the necessary time and latitude. Whatever he may accomplish, it will be the only concrete step we can depend on in the forthcoming discussions.
Now, with respect to the preamble, I find that there is one. part that is somewhere illogical. We cannot recall resolutions and introduce new elements. Either we should adhere to previous resolutions or we should introduce new elements. But to recall resolutions and to introduce new elements is to weaken our position, because the only concrete thing we have, the only international instrument or commitment we have, is India's offer to agree to a plebiscite if the first and second parts of the 1948 resolution are fulfilled, subject to the conditions laid down. If we depart from that, we should have to re-examine the whole situation. These new elements may be excellent, they may be the formula, just as the formula suggested by Mr. Graham might very well have been an excellent one. But while we are within the framework of Chapter VI, we must not forget that we are acting as mediators and that the parties must agree to the suggestions.
This is only human and obviously everyone knows that if a person is to act as mediator, the worst thing he can do is to say, before beginning the mediation : "This is my solution." No, if one is acting as a mediator, one should simply come with the foundations that have already been laid, which in my opinion are the agreements contained in the letters of 20 August and 23 December 1948. From then on we should study whatever solutions or suggestions are put forward by either Government.
The idea of United Nations troops seems to be an excellent one, but only if and when India accepts it first.
As is well known, we cannot impose the presence of such troops. There are other cases in which this problem has arisen. We must first obtain the consent of the parties concerned to the presence of the troops.
Here again, as in discussions previously, we find ourselves. in a difficult situation, at all events in so far as my country is concerned; for example, we have not wanted to accept the idea that the mere fact that it is desired to hold a plebiscite in a country necessarily obliges that country to hold the plebiscite and to discuss sovereignty. The Greeks wanted a plebiscite to be held in Cyprus, but we refused. Some Arab countries wanted to apply in the same way the principle of self determination in North Africa, but we did not agree. I believe the Australian representative will also agree with me that in New Guinea the principle was upheld in a different way. Thus it is rather difficult for delegations, like mine, that are attending all the debates to advocate one argument in the Security Council, and then go to the First Committee of the General Assembly and support a different argument, and to support another, even more delicate, in a further debate. Our way of thinking must be consistent. Just as we asked the representative of India, if he accepts the idea of self-determination as he has done in many debates apart from those on Kashmir, to reaffirm the offer made by the Prime Minister of India to submit the sovereignty of Kashmir to a plebiscite and also, if Kashmir belongs to India today, to agree to transfer that sovereignty if the people should so decide, so therefore, it seems to me, that we also must be logical, and that we cannot put down at once in a resolution a series of new elements on the presence of United. Nations troops without the countries having requested them, because tomorrow the same request will be made in connection with Cyprus, New Guinea and all the other problems that lie before us.
Thus the idea is excellent, but only if and when the President of the Council obtains the consent of the parties in advance, because according to Chapter VI, nothing can be done unless the parties agree beforehand. It is obvious that the President of the Council has listened to the statements by the representatives of Pakistan and India, and that he is well aware of the proposals that have been made and the suggestions that have been put forward here. Thus he can go to India, Kashmir and Pakistan to investigate and then return and report to us. But I do not think there is any reason to weight down the President of the Council with a series of new elements that were not in the 1948 proposal.
We voted for the resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779] precisely because we felt that India had to fulfil the commitments it undertook on 20 August and 23 December 1948. But for that very reason we could in no circumstances introduce new elements and say to India: "You must carry out your promise not under the conditions agreed upon, but under new conditions." That we could not ask.
Having made these remarks, I should like to ask the sponsors of the draft resolution whether it would not be preferable to leave the first paragraph as the entire preamble, to delete all the other paragraphs of the preamble and then continue with the operative part, which is excellent. If the sponsors do not wish to do this, I shall not submit an amendment, nor shall I cast a negative vote; I merely wish to make these remarks because I greatly fear that if we adopt the draft resolution in its present form, when the President of the Security Council returns on 15 April, we shall find ourselves in exactly the same position that we are in today.