Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15th February 1957
Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15th February 1957
In my previous statement to the Security Council [765th meeting, paras. 2 to 19], I confined myself very largely to one aspect of the Kashmir problem, the question of the action taken by the Constituent Assembly in Srinagar. I did, however, emphasise with what deep concern and anxiety the United Kingdom views any differences between countries in the Commonwealth with which we have such a long and friendly. connections.
Before I turn to the matters of substance raised by the representatives of India and Pakistan in their statements before the Council, I should like to emphasise once more that the only concern of my Government, as I am sure it is of all of us, and it has been so throughout the long and interactable history. of this case, is to achieve a peaceful and just solution acceptable to both sides. It has been encouraging, therefore, to find that in spite of acute disagreement on many important points, a considerable area of agreement is apparent from the statements we have heard from the representatives of India and Pakistan. Neither denies that a solution of the problem is urgent. Both emphasise the fundamental role of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15] in any solution, and in particular stressed the point that the next step must be demilitarisation in Kashmir, for until this is achieved, no subsequent step is possible.
When the Security Council first considered this question in 1948, it preferred to look to the future rather than to the past; it looked forward to a settlement of the problem. With this aim before us, the Security Council set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and the Commission examined the facts. Then, having taken all the causes of the conflict into account, it produced these two resolutions which, as both parties agree, are basic. The Commission concluded that after a cease-fire had been achieved, the main obstacle to a settlement, which it believed could be reached, was the problem of demilitarisation.
The representative of India has stressed the fact that a long time has gone by without any effective progress being made towards solving the Kashmir problem, but many efforts have been made. General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon made notable contributions. Since March 1951, with great skill and persistence, Mr. Graham has persisted in his endeavours. During a period of two years, he produced five reports, each narrowing the field of difference between the two parties. Mr. Graham sought agreement on twelve proposals to achieve demilitarisation, and by his labours he reached agreement on all but two of them. He then was reluctantly obliged to conclude there was no room left to continue his efforts.
Direct discussions between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan began in June 1953, and these, together with the progress made on demilitarisation by the efforts of Mr. Graham, gives grounds for hope that a solution might well be reached in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. These direct negotiations came to an end because of the difference of view between the two Prime Ministers on the effect on the situation of certain extraneous events. In these circumstances, since there seems no further prospect of progress by direct negotiations, the Government of Pakistan has felt obliged to come back to the Security Council and, in all the circumstances, my Government recognizes that it was the only course open to them.
It is now for the Security Council to attempt to find ways of making progress towards a settlement. As the Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said in the House of Commons on 20 December 1956: "Her Majesty's Government has always hoped that this dispute would be settled by agreement between the two countries. That is still their hope." I am, of course, not overlooking the dangers inherent in the situation, dangers which Mr. Firoz Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon have so vividly described. That is indeed one of the factors the Security Council cannot overlook. But it is not an argument for doing nothing-rather the reverse.
We are fully aware of the dangers of a false step and we must and shall, in considering our action, have clearly before us the imperative necessity of averting bloodshed and strife in the sub-continent. It is with a sense of our deep responsibility that my delegation and those delegations which are associated. with us have forward the draft resolution which was tabled yesterday, and which is before the Council [S/3787].
We feel justified in requesting Mr. Jarring, our President, to undertake the task proposed in the draft resolution, onerous and difficult though it undeniably must be, because of the considerable area of agreement apparent in the statements of the parties. We think for this reason that there is hope of progress towards a settlement of this dispute in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
The representative of India contended at length that the next step is simply for Pakistan to withdraw its troops. This is, of course, the case which India has argued before the Security Council fully in the past. Pakistan for its part has set out a different case, There is, I think, no need for me to refer to it in detail, for it is fully set out in Sir Mohammed Zafrullah. Khan's statement of 8 February 1950 at the 464th meeting of the Security Council and also in the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan themselves.
It was to find common ground between the two cases. put forward that Mr. Graham proposed, and both sides agreed, that the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the two resolutions of the Commission should be effected as a single continuous process.
What then has held up progress towards demilitarisation over the years? It has been, on the one hand, the contention of the Government of India that the "Azad" Kashmir forces constitute a link with the Pakistan Army and would be a threat to the security of the State. On the other hand, it has been because the Government of Pakistan was convinced that if 21,000 Indian and State armed forces are allowed to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line as against only 6,000 "Azad" Kashmir forces, the security of the "Azad" Kashmir area would be put in serious jeopardy. In fact, as it seems to us, the root cause of the breakdown on both sides has been fear of the dangers which might arise from the forces of the other side.
This is precisely why, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, the idea of a small temporary United Nations force is worth further examination with the two Governments. There would be no intention of setting aside any of the processes or procedures for demilitarisation set out in the resolutions of the Commission. Indeed the intention is to enable the demilitarisation procedure set out in those resolutions to be put into effect. We therefore see the proposal for such a force as a method of easing the way towards carrying out demilitarisation in accordance with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions.
The draft resolution now before the Council takes nothing away from the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It recalls all the resolutions. It also takes into consideration the statements of both parties. Obviously, after the long and detailed speeches made in the Security Council, the President of the Council must, in undertaking such a mission, have them very much in mind. That again, however, does not in any way detract from the force of the resolutions. Indeed, if I have understood the representatives of India and Pakistan correctly, both claim that their positions are based on the two United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions to which I have referred Nothing which has been said has detracted or can detract, from the force of those resolutions or those of the Security Council itself.
I need not, I am sure, emphasise the importance of making some positive step forward. The draft resolution before the Security Council is designed to help towards such a result. This, of course, requires the cooperation of both parties. I have noted the statement of the representative of India that India would never be found wanting in the methods of exploitation of the problem [767th meeting, para. 239]. For his part, the representative of Pakistan has put forward an idea which, in its present form, is new: the proposal that a United Nations force might be temporarily introduced into Kashmir to break the long jam over demilitarisation [761st meeting, para. 112]. The Council is entitled to take note of this proposal. But the Council is, of course, most anxious to do nothing that might in any way appear to detract from its previous resolutions and those of the Commission, and the draft resolution, therefore, in taking note of the proposal of Pakistan, makes it quite clear that the use of the temporary force could only be considered within the framework of resolutions in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission and towards the pacific settlement of the dispute.
I now pass for a moment to the request which, under the draft resolution, we are making to the President. We ask him to examine, with the Governments of India and Pakistan, proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation or to the establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute. The President is asked to examine them having regard to all the resolutions and, in his examination, to bear in mind the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force.
As regards other conditions for progress towards the settlement, perhaps I should indicate what we have in mind in including this in the draft.
First and foremost, we were deeply aware of the imperative need for a decrease in tension in the subcontinent. The first resolution which the Security Council adopted on this problem on 17 January 1948 contains the following provision :
"Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation."
On many occasions since then the need for peaceful cooperation between the two countries has been stressed as essential for progress towards the settlement of the Kashmir problem. This, them, is one condition for progress which indeed should be examined-the need for a decrease in tension -and there are doubtless other matters. I think, for instance, of clarification of the position of the Plebiscite Administrator, which the President may think would repay examination with the two Governments. But all this examination is governed by the phrase "having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan". That point is fundamental.
The Council, if it should decide to adopt this draft resolution, would not be ignoring the very real difficulties which would face the Indian Government during the coming elections in India and the period during the coming elections in India and the period of the electoral campaign which is now beginning - the real difficulties which might arise if Kashmir were the subject of debate here during the next two or three weeks. We in the United Kingdom watched with admiration and respect the conduct of the first general elections held in India in 1952. We realised the immense toil and effort involved and we know that, although this time the experience gained will make the task casies, it is still, as Mr. Menon has pointed out to this Council, a truly gigantic task. We have no desire to add to the complexities and complications of this task. The draft resolution, therefore, provides for a procedure which, we trust, will enable progress to be made, but not through the medium of public debate, during the next few weeks. Yet, the need to make progress is pressing, and for that reason the draft resolution proposes a definite time limit within which the President should report to the Security Council; for the Council cannot fail to take up its task again at the earliest possible moment.
Finally, I should like to point out that the President would go to undertake this task, as I am sure he will agree, not as the representative of any country and not reflecting the views of any country; he would go with all the authority of the Council, making available to the parties his wisdom, his impartial judgement and his high-minded endeavour, as a contribution towards the solution of this problem which has so long troubled the world. We look not to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute alone, we look to a settlement of all the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan.
We in the United Kingdom, because of our close ties of history and sentiment with the two countries and our association with them within the Common-wealth, fervently desire to see progress towards a better understanding between the two countries. This desire is shared by the peoples of all our three countries. The division of the sub-continent into two fully independent States inevitably created a host of problems, many of them of the most difficult kind. It is surely proof of great statesmanship and understanding, both in India and in Pakistan, that so many of these problems were settled amicably at the time or have been settled amicably since. We in my country like to think that we made a contribution to that end, without partiality of any kind or anything but a desire to be of the greatest possible assistance. But, inevitably, some problems remain. The difficulty over Kashmir is one of the greatest of them and it does arouse very deep feelings on either side. Both sides recognize that it has to be solved in the interests of full friendship and co-operation between the two sister nations. The task of the Security Council is, therefore, onerous and responsible. The accomplishment of that task demands all its patience, all its impartial effort, all its tolerance and understanding.