24011957. Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

 

The Kashmir question is in a way unique among the questions which have come before the Security Council. Usually, questions of this kind concern, on the one side, a country in Asia or Africa and, on the other side, some European country. Here is a dispute between two Asian countries.

 

When India asked that the Kashmir question be put on the agenda of the Security Council at the beginning of 1948, I was in my own country. My Government instructed me to return to the Headquarters of the United Nations immediately and to do my utmost to promote a peaceful settlement of this question. My Government did that not because it made any difference to China whether Kashmir acceded to India or to Pakistan. My Government had a special reason for its active interest in this question.

 

We in China felt that, at the end of the Second World War, there emerged in fact a new Asia-in other words, for the first time in our history, the possibility of a community of Asian nations. Of course, in the old centuries, there were many Asian nations but, because of the lack of means of communication, there was little of a community. In the nineteenth century the sense of a community grew, but it was not a community of independent nations. It was only at the end of the Second World War that we in Asia faced the reality of the possibility of a community of nations. My Government fondly hoped that we in Asia might even do better than the European nations had done in the past. In China we did not know too much about European history, but even school children knew something about Alsace-Lorraine The Chinese newspapers, at the beginning of 948, frequently expressed the hope that Kashmir might not become an Asian Alsace-Lorraine to poison. this new hopeful community of Asian nations. It was from that angle that my Government instructed me to return to my post as soon as possible and to do active duty in the settlement. of this problem.

 

When I joined the debate I found that the interest in promoting a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem was general. I have never seen the members of the Security Council sharing the burdens of discussion and proposal so equally as on this Kashmir question. Every delegation was working actively. towards a peaceful solution. During the month of January 1948, the Council was presided over by Mr. van Langenhove, the representative of Belgium. In addition to presiding over this body, he was in daily consultation with the delegations of Pakistan and India and tried, through private conversations, to bring before the Council some solution that would be agreed upon. In February General MeNaughton of Canada did the same thing. In March it was my turn to preside and I tried to do something. Then, of course, there was the representative of Colombia, whom I remember very well, Mr. Lopez, who, I was told, had once been the President of his country. He did his level best to contribute towards a peaceful solution. Then, as I recall, there was Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. Everybody worked hard on this,

 

Now I should like to recall another feature of the Security Council of that time. I think I can honestly say that no question has ever been considered by members of this Council in such an objective, unprejudiced, unbiased way as this Kashmir question. Ordinarily, in the United Nations, we know that delegation A might be pro-X and anti-Y. In the Kashmir debate, in spite of many private and public discussions, we were all puzzled as to who was for A and against B and who was against A and for B. Especially do I remember Mr. Noel Baker. I have never seen a man watch his words in public and in private so carefully as Mr. Noel-Baker watched his in this matter. This objective of the Council of that time would, I think, be manifest to anybody who would read the records of the Council of 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

 

I should like to call the attention of this Council to another feature: At that time there was no SEATO; there was no Baghdad Pact; and Pakistan, I think, did not have a single military ally. Whether, at the present time, the military alliances and friendships of Pakistan could influence the members of the Council or not, I could not presume to judge, but that kind of prejudice certainly did not exist in the Council in 1948, 1949 or 1950.

 

Since this debate is in fact the renewal of the debate of that period, I thought that this brief report of the atmosphere of that time might be useful to my colleagues today.

 

The representative of India repeated both yesterday and today that the question before the Council is not a territorial dispute. He says it is the aggression of Pakistan against India. The letter in which India asked the Security Council to put this question on the agenda contains this word "aggression", and I quote the particular phrase in which it is used:

 

"The Government of India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India." [S/1100, annex 28, para, 1.]

 

Assistance in that phrase meant, of course, a complaint of military assistance to "Azad" Kashmir and to tribesmen, and, in the course of the presentation of the Indian case by Mr. Ayyangar, that charge was repeated a number of times, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, representative of Pakistan at that time, made a counter-charge of acts of aggression by India against Pakistan. So we faced these rival charges : aggression by Pakistan against India; aggression by India against Pakistan.

 

I hope that members of this Council today will take the time to read the records of those years. No member of the Council ever gave serious consideration to either charge, the charge of India or the charge of Pakistan. There never was a proposal made dealing specifically with aggression. In fact, there was no systematic or serious consideration of that charge and of the counter-charge of aggression. The members of the Council, without consultation, all came to the same conclusion, that the charge of aggression should be by-passed. That charge was never taken up, never sifted, never even given serious consideration; I believe it was very wise of the Council to by-pass that charge.

 

Now it is said that this is not a dispute with regard to territory. However, I cannot understand why anybody should say that this is not a dispute with regard to territory. The basic question is whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should become a part of India or a part of Pakistan. That is what is in dispute. Is that not a dispute with regard to territory ?

 

This dispute has another peculiar feature. From the very beginning, the Council began with an agreement between two parties. In fact, before the two parties directly concerned ever appeared before the Council, the two parties agreed that the plebiscite should be the answer. What did the Council do ? The Council tried to build a solution on this prior agreement that the two parties had before they came to this Council. So the idea of a plebiscite was not imposed by the Council on the two parties.

 

In their public statements the statesmen of both countries, India and Pakistan, have stated that they would be willing to let the wishes of the people of Kashmir decide the future of that State. In this Council, in his very first statement in January 1948, the representative of India, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, had this to say:

 

"The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-a-vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, with a right to claim admission as a Member of the United Nations-all this we have recognized to be a matter for unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir, after normal life is restored to them." [227th meeting, p. 29.]

 

This feature of the discussions is rather rare. We here have known cases when weeks and months of debate have failed to find any element of agreement, but in connection with the Kashmir dispute we began with a major agreement that the final decision as to the future of Kashmir should be left to the people of Kashmir.

 

In spite of that good start, we have not had much success. The problem of a plebiscite was bogged down under the conditions for a plebiscite. The Council has spent many hours trying to solve that problem. Our Commission and our representatives sent to India and Pakistan have spent many weeks trying to solve that problem.

 

What the Council and the Commission and the representatives tried to do was this. If we could secure agreement between the two parties with regard to some particular condition, we were happy, and we put that down on paper immediately as a condition to which both parties agreed. But when we met with some point on which the two parties fell apart we were all patient to listen to the viewpoints of both and in all fairness we tried to draw a middle line and reach a compromise which we knew that neither party would entirely like but which we thought might be fair enough so that both parties would, after all, accept it.

 

That has not occurred. It is not necessary-and I would not presume to try-to assign blame and responsibility in regard to these conditions. However, I should like to say that a plebiscite was not only agreed on before the two parties came to this Council; it was the unanimous belief of the members of the Council that a plebiscite was the solution.

 

Furthermore, what is a plebiscite? A plebiscite, in terms of the Charter, would mean the self-determination of a people. Self determination is expressed through a plebiscite. I would say that all Members of the United Nations, by becoming Members, by subscribing to the Charter, would have to accept the principle of plebiscite. If we accept a plebiscite we mcan, of course, a fair and impartial plebiscite. In regard to this point, that a plebiscite must be fair and impartial, I remember very well a sentence that Mr. Noel-Baker said to the Council during that period. He told us that the plebiscite not only must be fair and impartial in reality but it must be fair and impartial even in appearance. This fairness and impartiality could sway the passions of peoples. It could decide the question. of peace or war.

 

If we honestly and seriously believe that the future of Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite, I believe both parties should not be too meticulous about conditions. The setting of conditions should not be allowed to obstruct the main purpose, that is, to allow the people of Kashmir to have the right of self-determination.

 

We were told this morning that much has changed. Indeed, some things have changed, but as I listened to the two opening speeches in this debate, I confess, I did not see much change. I was afraid that the representatives from other parts of the world might say that, after all, the old European belief about the unchanging East was accurate. Certain things have changed, but the basic features of the problem have not changed. I believe the principle of a solution should not change and can not change.

 

The draft resolution before the Council is a simple and modest one. It really re-affirms the stand that the Council has taken in regard to this dispute, and therefore my delegation will support it.