Text of the speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council meeting No. 607 held on 5 December 1952.
Text of the speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council meeting No. 607 held on 5 December 1952.
This controversy is now quite familiar to us all but no less a problem for that reason. As members of the United States have attempted in their draft resolution [S/2839] to put forward the elements for a settlement. I should like briefly to review the role of the Security Council and of the parties, as my Government sees it, in attempting to resolve this controversy When one considers that it has been before the Security Council for nearly five years, we can conclude, unless past efforts of the Security Council are largely discounted, that the solution will not come simply.
It seems to me that the principles on which we are trying to proceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter obligations are these.In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement.
Secondly, the Security Council will, we feel, always welcome any agreement which the parties themselves can reach on any basis which will settle the dispute, provided of course that basis is consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Thirdly, we feel that it is the role of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach agreement. In this case the Security Council has made available the services of Mr. Frank Graham as the United Nations Representative.
Fourthly, we believe that agreement most frequently is reached step by step through negotiation and that negotiation involves an element of compromise.
Finally, we believe that the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and to the parties its views on the positions he has taken. With the permission of the President, I should like now to examine the draft resolution [S/2839] before the Council in the light of these principles.
The draft resolution recalls the basic agreements which the parties have reached thus far, the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1942. These resolutions provided that the question of the accession of Kashmir would be decided through a free. and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. We shall be concerned here with the principles those resolutions set out, which would form the basis for a truce agreement. The United Nations Representative has demonstrated that he is well aware of them He has set them out in his first report (S/2375), circulated on 15 October 1951.
The draft resolution before the Council goes on to recall the three resolutions of the Security Council during the period when Mr. Graham has been acting. Then it endorses the general principles which he has formulated and on all but two of which an agreement has not been reached between the parties. The draft resolution goes on to note that a plan of demilitarisation is not now in existence because agreement has not been reached on one issue. As the United Nations Representative has narrowed the difference down to this one issue, we feel that it is quite appropriate for the Security Council to examine the ways in which the United Nations Representative and the parties have approached this issue. As a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions. my Government's examination of this process and our reflection on Mr. Graham's views have led us to arrive at and agree with the United Kingdom Government on the document now before you.
After sixteen months of effort, of wise effort, Mr. Graham is reporting that he has narrowed the problem down to the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line. He has put before the Security Council methods, either of which might, in his view, help the parties to settle this issue: either the establishment of the number and character of forces to remain on either side of the cease-fire line; or the determination of these numbers as a result of studying criteria or principles. This means that the parties would consider why any troops are involved, what they are needed for, and in view of their mission, how many are needed The draft resolution, in its operative paragraph, encourages the parties to negotiate for the purpose of reaching agreement on a specific number of forces within certain bracketed ranges suggested to them by the United Nations Representative. The draft resolution also urges the parties to negotiate, bearing in mind the principles or criteria which would lead to a decision on what the precise numbers should be. Presumably, we venture to think the United Nations Representative suggested some bracketed ranges of figures as a result of his own study of these principles or criteria which he later put before the parties.
The United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, reported to the Security Council, on 10 October 1952 [605 meeting). that the parties had been able to agree some points of his twelve point programme and that the differences between them on the twelve-point programme had been narrowed down to one main point on which the whole plan depended.
Mr. Graham describes this-and I use his own words as "the issue of the number and character of forces to remain on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation. In his third report to the Security Council [S/2611 and Cor. 11, on 22 April 1952. Mr. Graham recommended that his own negotiations with the parties be continued with a view to "resolving the remaining differences on the twelve proposals with special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation".
Mr. Graham has, from time to time, put before the Security Council various proposals which he has suggested to the parties during his sixteen months of devoted efforts. Mr. Graham left open, in the form of blank spaces to be inserted by the parties, the number of forces on which they would agree. On another occasion Mr. Graham suggested that the numbers be arrived at by relating them to the proportion of force as they existed at the time of the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities. Again, more recently, he suggested on 16 July of this [S/2783, annex 3], certain bracketed numbers within which he recommended that the parties seek a specific figure. After that he arrived at the point of suggesting, on 2 September of this year [S/2783, annex 7], that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there should be an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan troops having been withdrawn, and large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces having taken place, while on the Indian side of the cease-fire line there should be an Indian army of 18,000, including the State armed forces. Mr. Graham also came forward with the suggestion that it might be helpful to the parties to consider the principles or criteria for arriving at figures, and this he suggested on 4 September 1952 [S/2783, annex 8].
I think it is fair to conclude that in coming forward with these proposals, Mr. Graham had taken the advice of his military adviser, and that the numbers he has suggested are not guesses arising from some sense of political expediency. Rather, it is fair to view them as carefully considered. suggestions of the United Nations Representative, bearing in mind the basic agreement of the parties heretofore reached in the form of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Mr. Graham has emphasised over and over again the importance of these agreements, the way in which they present problems which will exist for both parties at the end of the period of demilitarisation. In his most recent statement Mr. Graham tells us that there is an agreement between the parties that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein. who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn, and that the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the state. There is also an agreement that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn. He has suggested the various methods. I have outlined for assisting the parties what forces shall remain.
Having considered the United Nations Representatives carefully formulated suggestions on this question, and recognizing the considerable thought and effort that must have gone into arriving at them, the United Kingdom and the United States Governments, together, have put forward the draft resolution urging the parties to negotiate. We have urged them to negotiate to arrive not at a number which we suggest but the number within the range which Mr. Graham himself Suggested on 16 July of this year. It was on the basis of these ranges of figures, the Security Council would recall that Mr. Graham reported the willingness of the parties to go to Geneva during the year and to negotiate. We therefore have arrived at these suggestions of the United Nations Representative as a considered judgement of his, which we support and urge the parties to use in seeking agreement between themselves.
As the United Kingdom representative has pointed out [606th meeting], the Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, occupying as they do a special position, could not be computed in arriving at figures within the range on which the parties urged in our draft resolution to negotiate.
The ranges of numbers contained in the draft resolution were taken from the 16 July 1952 proposals of the United Nations Representative, on to go to Geneva and negotiate, which the parties had agreed.
Thus, the co-sponsors, the United States and the United Kingdom are relying upon a suggestion of the mediator, and for that reason the draft resolution, document S/2839, reads in part as follows:
"...this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952 (annex 3 of S/2783)..
The Security Council will notice that the draft resolution urges the parties to negotiate "bearing in mind" the principles or criteria which the United Nations Representative suggested on 4 September of this year. The co-sponsors feel they are worthy of careful attention.
These principles, as they relate to the point we are discussing, are contained in annex 8 to the United Nations Representative's fourth report (S/2783). Paragraph 7 reads as follows:
"Agree that the demilitarisation shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be. "(a) On the Pakistan side of the case-fire line:
"(t) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn; "(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;
"(ili) Large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite;
"(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:
"(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;
(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and state armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."
It will be recalled that the parties had agreed that ; 44 the demilitarisation shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above" (S/2783, annex 8, para. 8).
The parties had agreed to a revised version of the ninth principle, which is firmly based on the two United Nations Commission resolutions, that:
"pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations (S/2783, annex 8, para. 9).
I have taken the liberty of reading these principles or criteria because, in the nature of things, they must be the considerations which have led the United Nations Representative to arrive at the concrete figures he has suggested to the parties, including the range of figures concerning we are urging the parties to negotiate. It will be noted that Mr. Graham has suggested as one principles here, as on previous occasions, that the large scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum forces required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. We have accepted what we conclude to be the United Nations Representative that the forces and that is what he calls them which remain on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be those Azad Kashmir forces which remain after large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. We have also accepted the view of Mr. Graham that on the Indian side of these cease-fire lines the forces should be Indian army forces and State armed forces.
The resolution of 13 August 1948 of the United Nations. The Commission for India and Pakistan provides in part :
"Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission" (Part II, para, A. 3)" For the word "Commission" we may read "the United Nations" because that Commission, the United commission for India and Pakistan, is no longer in existence.
Thus it was one of the United Nations Representive's first problems, and one which is still before us, to reduce this principle to the factual situation which would exist at the end of the period of demilitarisation. Originally he proposed - but lacking agreement of the parties did not pursue this proposal after December 1951-that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the force should consist of civil armed forces. He has since consistently suggested, if we read his language correctly, that these forces should be Azad Kashmir forces. After dropping his original proposal in December 1951, he suggested that the United Nations surveillance be affected by removing the Azad Kashmir forces from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command, and by having them offered by neutral and local officers as I have stated, under the surveillance of the United Nations.
He finally suggested that the remaining Azad Kashmir force should be the minimum number necessary for the maintenance of law and order, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Thus, it is fair to say that the United Nations Representative considers that some Azad Kashmir forces would remain. The co-sponsors agree with this position.
The United Nations Representative has specified what the function of these remaining Azad Kashmir forces would be. He has described it as "the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite".
As the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan states in the part which I have just read, these forces would be in territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops and administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Considering then what the functions of these remaining Azad Kashmir forces would be as Mr. Graham has stated them - operating in an area evacuated by Pakistan troops, I think it is clear that they would be separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command. This position was apparently acceptable to the Government of Pakistan when it indicated to Mr. Graham that it was prepared to accept, subject to certain observations not here relevant, his proposals of 16 July 1952. The draft resolution takes into account the conclusion which United Nations Representative had previously reached.
He also indicates that the role of the Indian army forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line would call for a minimum number of Indian forces remaining to ensure the maintenance of law and order and the observance of the cease fire agreement and with due regard for the security of the State. This is entirely consistent with the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948. Paragraph B (3).
It may well be that the United Nations Representatives. assistance will help the parties in approaching these problems. Therefore, the operative paragraph of this resolution attempts to organise and put before the Security Council and the parties. Some of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative on the one issue which all are agreed is at the root of the problem. From what I have said I hope it is clear that the co-sponsors, like the United Nations Representative, have attempted to build on the United Nations Commission resolutions and at each stage to narrow rather than to broaden the areas in which agreement is thus far lacking. As the representative of the United Kingdom has observed, we hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to reopen questions already agreed on under these resolutions.
We have attempted to put before the parties some of the wisdom and some of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative and to urge them to negotiate to attempt to reach a solution. We have asked them to provide the Security Council with their own account, in their own words, of where these negotiations lead them. We have done this because we see in this case an element of urgency. It is a case which, as Mr. Graham stated to the Security Council on 10 October [605th meeting], should not be allowed to drift lest the parties and the organised society of nations should find themselves in a position of greater danger.
In the areas of agreement thus far reached, the United Nations Representative, by formulating his proposals and by his negotiations, has, in the view of my Government, assisted the parties. The draft resolution does not in any way impair or limit Mr. Graham's authority under the previous Security Council resolutions, and we expect and hope that he will continue to exercise his functions under them. Therefore, the draft resolution not only expresses the gratitude of the Security Council to him but requests him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan. It also endorses the principles on which he has sought to bring about agreement.
In conclusion, I return to the general principles with which I began my statement. This draft resolution offers to the parties an opportunity to arrive, by their negotiations, at a statement of the final issue now standing in the way of the demilitarisation of the State and the planning for a plebiscite, including the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.
The settlement itself, when it comes, will be the result of free agreement by the parties themselves. The Security Council and the United Nations Representative can simply assist the parties in reaching agreement.
The United States Government would welcome the agreement of the parties on any just basis which would settle this dispute. The road we have suggested reflects much thought and much negotiation. The United Nations Representative recognizes that there may be more than one road to settlement. He has told the Security Council in his fourth report that when he invited the parties to negotiate at Geneva he made it clear to them that he would at all times welcome suggestions from either Government directed towards the settlement of the main differences on the twelve proposals, the general implementation of the United Nations Commission resolutions and the solution of the dispute. The representative of the United Kingdom stated to the Council on 6 November [606th meeting] that his Government had in no sense closed its mind to the possibility of a settlement of the problem on lines different from those which we have considered in the Security Council up to now.
Of course, the numbers of troops which we have urged the parties to negotiate on, and the criteria which we have urged them to bear in mind, are not now agreed on by them. If such an agreement had, happily, been reached, there would be no occasion for this or any other draft resolution except, perhaps, an expression of gratification for a solution reached. Negotiation must, in the nature of things, involve the element of give and-take and the possibility of compromise. We have attempted to restate in the draft resolution an appreciation of the views of the United Nations Representative about how such compromise might be brought about.
The United States takes seriously the view of Mr. Graham that there is danger to us all in allowing this case to drift. As the representative of the United Kingdom put it, we cannot leave it to settle itself.
All Members of the United Nations have an interest in seeing this dispute settled peacefully. The United States, for its part, feels that it has more than an interest in the matter : it has the most earnest desire to see the two great States of the subcontinent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity.
These two nations have much more in common than the fact that they are neighbours. Whole areas of understanding between them should and, we believe, will exist once this dispute has been settled. Leadership and statesmanship by the Governments of India and Pakistan can bring about that result which we devoutly seek.
I have no words to match the eloquence of Mr. Graham, and I take the liberty of concluding with a quotation from the statement he made in the Security Council a year ago [570th meeting, paras, 66 and 70]:
"The opportunity in time and place is for the leadership on the subcontinent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the human liberty of 400 million human beings, to help prevent the destruction of human freedom and the self-destruction of civilization by setting challenging examples of demilitarisation, self-determination, reconciliation and reconstruction in a fearful and broken world.
"The subcontinent is the place for a timely example of demilitarisation and of self-determination. Now is the time for the dedicated leadership of two great people to rise to the call of their spiritual heritage, the responsibility of their power and the opportunity for their greatness to give in a dark world challenging examples and fresh hopes the peoples in the unresting adventure of the human spirit, through the United Nations, in the long pilgrimage towards a freer and fairer world, in answer to the prayers of the people for peace and freedom on God's good earth."