10101952 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Frank P. Graham (United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in the Security Council Meeting No. 605 held on 10 October 1952
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Frank P. Graham (United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in the Security Council Meeting No. 605 held on 10 October 1952
As a supplement to the report to the Security Council dated 16 September 1952 [S/2783 and Corr. 1], the United Nations Representative makes this personal summary statement, This statement should be considered in connection with all other previous reports to the Council and debates in the Security Council on the Kashmir question. This statement will set forth:
(1) The obstacles we have found in the way of the Governments of India and Pakistan hindering an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation:
(2) The twelve proposals made to overcome these obstacles;
(3) The progress made by the parties in the acceptance of these proposals;
(4) The revival of the difference over the meaning of "local forces";
(5) The several proposals made regarding the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office;
(6) The several proposals made by the United Nations Representative regarding the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation;
(7) An agreement on ten and part of another of the twelve proposals; and
(8) Suggested alternative approaches to the one main remaining difference regarding the issue of number and character of forces.
Obstacles Found in the way of an Agreement on Demilitarization When we arrived on the sub-continent on 30 June 1951 we found the atmosphere heavily charged with the following factors:
(1) Allegations about the violations of the cease-fire line;
(2) Headlines about troop movements and counter troop movements close to the border of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
(3) Discussions and fears concerning the role of the Constituent Assembly to be convened at Srinagar; and
(4) Threats of war and rumours of war.
In the course of many consultations with the two Governments, the United Nations Representative found additional differences regarding :
(5) The timing and amount of the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces in relation to the withdrawals of the Indian forces;
(6) The time required for a programme of demilitarisation;
(7) The number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation;
(8) A possible danger to the cease-fire line incident to possible fears which might arise out of a heavy preponderance of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line in the process of demilitarisation;
(9) The timing and coordination of appropriate with endrawals, reductions, disarming and disbanding of forces, as the case may be, on the two sides of the cease-fire line;
(10) The timing of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office;
(11) The meaning of the phrase "final disposal' in the 5 January 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in relation to location or reduction of forces, and more lately;
(12) The meaning of the phrase "local authorities" in the 5 January 1949 resolution. The twelve proposals made by the United Nations Representative for overcoming the obstacles in the way of demilitarisation.
To overcome the first four of the twelve obstacles enumerated above, the United Nations Representative directed his first four proposals to decreasing the high tension between the two countries. Representatives of the Government of India indicated that no agreement in demilitarisation was possible because of the threats of war. The representatives of the Government of Pakistan said that the delays in demilitarisation as a condition for a free and impartial plebiscite caused unrest and talk of war among the people of Pakistan. Thus we found that delays in demilitarisation caused talk of war and at the same time talk of war caused delays in an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation.
The United Nations Representative therefore asked the two Governments for the following commitments :The Governments of India and Pakistan
Proposal 1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir,
Proposal 2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, organisations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;
Proposal 3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949; Proposal 4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.
The fifth obstacle was the question of the Azad Kashmir forces in relation to part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and principles 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution. The resolution of 13 August 1948 made no reference to the Azad Kashmir forces". Part II of this resolution had the following provisions :
"A
"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
"2. The Government of Pakistan will use in best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of lighting.
"3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
"B
"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 here of have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was reported by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
"2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
"3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed."
The 5 January 1949 resolution provided, regarding the Azad Kashmir forces and the Indian and State armed forces, principles 4 (a) and (b) as follows: "4 (a) After implementation of parts I and II of the
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful
conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
"(b) As regards the territory referred to in A, 2 of part II of the resolution of the 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."
The Government of India maintained that, in accepting the 13 August 1948 resolution on 20 August 1948, they were unaware of the large number and fighting efficiency of the Azad Kashmir forces. They maintain that if they had been so aware they would have insisted on the disarming and disbanding of these forces provided for in part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution.
In this matter the Government of Pakistan maintained that they stood on the resolution as written and accepted.
The United Nations Commission, as the author of these two resolutions, held that the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces was not contemplated that under the 13 August 1948 resolution. However, the Commission assured the Government of India that it was contemplated that "large scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces" would be undertaken promptly in the implementation of the 5 January 1949 resolution.
The dead-lock over this issue was an obstacle to an agreement on demilitarisation during the mediation of the Commission in 1949, of General Me Naughton later in 1949, of Sir Owen Dixon in 1950, and confronted us early in our negotiations in the summer of 1951.
Regarding this problem the Commission itself, in its third interim report [S/1430], had observed (paragraph 250). "The conclusion to be drawn from the experience of The Governments of India and Pakistan Agree that the demilitarisation shall be carried out on such a way that at the end of the period referred to a paragraph 6 above the situation will be:
(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line
(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;
(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State; and
(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.
(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:
(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been carried out,
(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in (b) (i) above will have been carried out.
so that at the end of the period referred to in proposal 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the ceasefire line to be filled in by the two Governments as a precise basis for resolving the difference on the crucial issue.
Proposal 8
The Governments of India and Pakistan
Agree that the demilitarisation shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above.
Proposal 9
The Governments of India and Pakistan
Agree that representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments, assisted by their military advisers, will meet under the auspices of the United Nations, to draw up a programme of demilitarisation in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above.
Next to proposal 7, proposal 10 was the most crucial of the twelve proposals. Proposal 10 provided for the fixing of a definite time and manner for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator as follows:
Proposal 10
The Governments of India and Pakistan
Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarisation period referred to in paragraph 6 above.
To make clear that, in connecting part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and "the large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces" and "the further reduction of the Indian forces" to constitute part of a continuous process of demilitarisation, the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator remained with regard "to final disposal" of the remaining forces, proposal provided as follows:
Proposal 11
The Governments of India and Pakistan
Agree that the completion of the programme of demilitarisation referred to in paragraph 9 above will be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in sub paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution.
The Government of India contends that both under the two United Nations resolutions read together and according to the understandings with the Commission, the term 'final disposal' in sub-paragraph 4 (a) means only disposition. This is evident from the fact that the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 speaks of minimum forces required to assist the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order, which the Commission itself has interpreted to include adequate defence. The Government of India considers that it can never be contemplated that as a result of any subsequent reduction, forces should be reduced to below the minimum. The Commission has never used the term 'reduction' or 'withdrawal' of Indian forces with reference to sub-paragraph 4 (a); it has, on the other hand, always insisted that sub-paragraph 4 (b) contemplated disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces and other armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line. This distinction was made by the Commission with reference to a difficulty of its own creation by giving an assurance to the Pakistan Government, without the knowledge of the Government of India, that it did not contemplate the disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces at the stages of part II of the 13 August 1948 and resolution. Moreover, once it is accepted in principle that demilitarisation contemplated under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single continuous process, no interference with the strength of forces in the State is possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore, if the element of reduction or withdrawal of forces at the plebiscite stage, according to the Pakistan Government's interpretation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 is, brought on to the demilitarisation must be deemed to have exhausted itself and the United Nations Representative and the plebiscite Administrator can at that stage deal only with the question of disposition".
The Government of Pakistan contends "that the term 'final disposal of forces' was used by the UNCIP both in sub paragraph 4 (a) of its resolution of 5 January 1949 with respect to Indian and State armed forces, and in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the same resolution in respect of the Azad Kashmir forces. It could only mean the same thing in both cases. The Vice Chairman of the Commission informed the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 25 December 1948 that the object of paragraph 4 of the Commission's draft proposals on 11 December 1948 (which subsequently become the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949) as "to ensure a large-scale reduction and disarmament, the exact scope of which will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the authorities concerned". (See memorandum appended to annex 5 to the second report UNCIP [S/1196].
The term 'final disposal' therefore covers reduction by withdrawal or disbandment as well as location or stationing of the armed forces concerned. If it is contended that 'final disposal' means only the location or stationing of forces, then there is by same token, no provision in the UNCIP resolutions for the reduction or disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces either".
To prevent a later dead-lock over differences regarding an agreed programme of demilitarisation proposal 12 provided as follows:
Proposal 12
The Governments of India and Pakistan
Agree that any differences regarding the programme of demilitarisation contemplated in paragraph above will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, the United Nations Representative, whose decision to be final.
It is the view of the Government of Pakistan that paragraph 12 of the truce proposals enables the United Nations Representative to determine final points of experience relating to technical details concerning the real implementation of the agreed demilitarisation programme. This is not enough. Sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the Security Council's resolution of 14 March 1950 [S/1461] authorised the United Nations Representative to interpret the agreements reached by the parties' demilitarisation. There should be a similar provision in the truce agreement. The experience of the last four years underlines the necessity for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of resolving dead-locks that might arise".
It is the view of the Government of India that "the reference in paragraph 12 of Mr. Graham's letter is not to differences arising in the process of drawing up a programme of demilitarisation but only to differences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. On this understanding the answer to the question is in the affirmative".
In line with his policy maintained from the outset of his mission that any assurance given to the parties could only be given by the United Nations Representative on the written record with the equal knowledge of both Governments, the United Nations Representative gave the assurance that he was not seeking to arbitrate matters of substance and would confine his decisions to those matters of technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. III. Progress in the Acceptance of the Twelve Proposals.
At the conclusion of our consultations with the two Governments on the sub-continent we were able, in our report to the Security Council of 15 October 1951 [S/2375], to report agreement on the first four of the twelve proposals.
At the conclusion in December of the negotiations in Paris, we reported to the Security Council on 18 December 1951 [S/2448] additional agreements on proposals 8, 9, 11 and
12.
The suggestion made by the United Nations Representative that the Plebiscite Administrator designate be now associated with him not for negotiations but for consultation regarding the prospective joint responsibilities of the Representative and the Administrator and to make studies, was not considered advisable by the two Governments. This suggestion was therefore not carried out.
The United Nations Representative considered that it would facilitate the preparation for the plebiscite to have the Plebiscite Administrator designate make studies as soon as possible regarding the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite. Your representative has the view that these studies by the Plebiscite Administrator are basic to the consideration of the whole complex problem of the plebiscite. Since such studies as are necessary could best be made on the ground and since both Governments consider it inadvisable for him to be consulted in an official capacity before his induction, it is my view that is important that he be induced as soon as possible and therefore it is important. that an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation be agreed upon as soon as possible so that he can get on with his studies on the ground.
In the negotiations at the United Nations Headquarters early in the summer of 1952 the military advisers of the two Governments, under the chairmanship of the United Nations military advisers, made precise their differing definitions of the word "bulk" and the words "State armed forces" as used in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and the estimated number of their own armed forces as they existed at the time of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.
There remained outstanding four of the twelve proposals upon which agreement had not been reached including the two most basic of all the twelve proposals: first, the time of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator; and secondly, the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation.
In view of the continuing dead-lock of the United Nations. Representatives made definite suggestions regarding the two most basic differences in revised proposals presented on 16 July, 2 September and 4 September 1952. On 2 September and 4 September 1952 he transferred the substance of the original proposal 9 to provisional clause at the end of the twelve proposals, that clause to read as follows:
Provisional clause. This agreement shall enter into effect when the two Governments of India and Pakistan have approved a programme of demilitarisation in conformity with paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, the draft of such programme to be drawn up in meetings between the representatives of the Governments of India and of Pakistan assisted by their military advisers under the auspices of the United Nations. The first meeting shall take place within two weeks after the signature of the above agreement.
In the revised versions of 2 September and 4 September 1952 the new proposal 9 was made as follows: 2 September
Revised proposal 9
The Governments of India and of Pakistan
Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. The local authorities shall undertake the fulfilment of such duties as are necessary for the observance within that territory of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. (That is, the cease-fire agreement).
4 September
Further revised proposal 9
The Governments of India and of Pakistan
Agree that, pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the suited Nations. Revival of the difference over the meaning of "Local Authorities"
The difference over the means of local authorities" confronted the first United Nations Commission in the summer of 1948 and persisted during the mediation of General McNaughton and during the mediation of Sir Owen Dixon.
The Government of India contends that the State of Jammu is a legal entity, that the sovereignty of India is based on the Instrument of Accession constitutionally executed, and that there can be no de jure or de facto recognition of the Azad Kashmir Government.
The Government of India holds "that the administration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities under the same resolution only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature. of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with civil armed forces' '.
The Government of Pakistan holds that
"Paragraph 3 of section A of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 provided that 'pending' a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission". "In its letter dated 3 September 1948, the Commission defined the 'evacuated territory' to mean, 'those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command (first report of UNCIP, paragraph 90). As a result of the demarcation of the cease-fire line all territories situated on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be regarded as 'evacuated territory."
"The United Nations Commission told the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that by the term 'local authorities' it meant the Azad Kashmir Government, though the Commission could not accord de jure recognition to a revolutionary authority such as the Azad Kashmir Government. The Commission also gave the assurance that no official of the Government of India, or of the Maharaja's Government, would be permitted to enter the evacuated territory. (See summary record of the meeting held by UNCIP on 31 August 1948)."
"As regards the term 'surveillance', the UNCIP said that it meant neither supervision nor control. The Chairman of the Commission explained that all the commission had wanted was to find a definition for something which would release the Commission from taking too heavy responsibilities on its shoulders. The word "surveillance" was chosen as the mildest expression for something which would not imply spontaneous control or interference with the local authorities unless the truce is violated'. (See summary record of the meeting held by UNCIP on 2 September 1948). The Commission also agreed that its surveillance would not extend to Gilgit.
"The Pakistan delegation took note of the United Nations Representative's statement on 2 September 1952 that he understood the term local authorities' to mean the person there who exercise effective authority' and that as regards surveillance' over the local authorities the United Nations Representative would seek to exercise it through the appointment of civil and military observes". In Geneva the representatives of the two Governments agreed on a revised proposal 9 to read as follows:
Revised proposal 9
The Governments of India and of Pakistan
Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the process of demilitarisation mentioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line. The several alternative proposals made by the United Nations
Representative for negotiations regarding the induction of the plebiscite Administrator into office In the original twelve proposals of 11 September 1950 the United Nations representative proposed on sub-continent. that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office not later than the last day of the ninety day period of demilitarisation.
The Government of Pakistan agreed.
The Government of India then "doubted whether during the period of ninety days the firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully would have replaced in Pakistan the spirit and temper of war prevailing at the present time" (that is, at that time). The Government of India considered "that the proposal concerning the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator should be committed from the twelve proposals and be included in proposals having to do specifically with the holding of the plebiscite".
The United Nations Representative proposed in Paris in December 1951 that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office on 15 July 1952.
The Government of Pakistan agreed. The Government of India held that if agreement could
be reached on the number and character of forces to be left on each side at the end of the period of demilitarisation; the other remaining differences (which included the timing of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator) could be settled without difficulty. In New York, the United Nations Representative suggested on 16 July 1952, for consideration in the conference proposed to be held in Geneva, that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office not later than the final day of the demilitarisation period (ninety days) referred to in proposal 6.
The view of the Government of India is "that the Plebiscite Administrator can properly function only after (1) the process of demilitarisation is completed and the United Nations representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been resorted and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarisation provided that it is completed according to plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator would, as regards the forces remaining in the State after demilitarisation is fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition".
It is the view of the Government of Pakistan "that second in importance only to the question of demilitarisation is the date by which the Plebiscite Administrator will be inducted into office. Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be inducted into office as soon as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan Army and bulk of the Indian Army have been withdrawn. The United Nations Representative's proposal that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later than the last day of the demilitarisation programme represents a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as a part of the twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations Representative." The several alternative proposals made by the United Nations Representative regarding the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation.
In the original twelve proposals of 11 September 1951 the United Nations representative suggested in proposal 7 "that at the end of the period (90 days) referred to in paragraph 6
above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of...".
The position of India was as follows: "As regards the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in the terms of paragraphs 6 and 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000, organised, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIP in term C of the memorandum transmitted to the UNCIP under cover of a letter dated 13 April 1949 by the Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs of India; that is, the forces (of 4,000) should consist of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force should be commanded by United Nations officers or 'locals' and not by Pakistan officers."
The Government of Pakistan felt that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease fire line at the end of the demilitarisation programme envisaged in paragraph 7". The Pakistan Government however, expressed the view that some slight difference in the strength of description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached, so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line were of the order indicated above" In effect, proposal 7, as it stood, did not provide the basis for an agreement.
In the Paris sessions of December 1951, the Government of India emphasised that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarisation under this plan were over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 September.
This proposed remainder of 21,000 was estimated by India to be a reduction of over 30 per cent of the Indian and State armed forces present in the State at the time of the ceasefire on 1 January 1949.
The Government of Pakistan maintained its position that a force of no more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the cease-fire line. The Pakistan Government was, however, prepared to agree that "so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength of description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached".
The disparity between the number and character of forces proposed by the parties continued to be wide. The United Nations Representative revised the relevant part of proposal 7 to read as follows: "so that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion of the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949."
This revised proposal also did not provide the basis for an agreement.
In New York the United Nations Representative, in his revised proposals of 16 July 1952 (S/2783, annex 3], suggested for the consideration of the two Governments, in a conference proposed to be held in Geneva, brackets of numbers in proposal 7 as follows:
(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fine line : (i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not
normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;
(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;
(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be an armed force of. [the the United Nations representative suggests, as a basis for discussion, figures ranging from 3,000 to 6,000];
(iv) The remaining Azad Kashmir forces will have been separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command and will be offered by neutral and local officers under the surveillance of the United Nations.
(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line :
(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;
(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph
(b) (i) above will have been carried out: so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be an Indian Army force of [the United Nations Representative suggests, as a basis for discussion, figures ranging from 12,000 to 18,000].
These numbers did not include the Jammu and Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts.
The proposed brackets of numbers (12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side and 3,000 to 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line) not having provided the basis for an agreement, the United Nations Representative, in the further revised proposals on 2 September 1952 suggested for consideration by the representative of the two Governments an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side and an Indian and State Army of 18,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.
Since these two definite figures did not provide the basis for an agreement, the United Nations Representative then proposed on 4 September 1952 principles or criteria by which the number and character of forces could be determined, so that:
On the Pakistan side at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite; and On the Indian side there shall be the minimum number of Indian and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
Since this suggestion did not provide the basis for an agreement, the above principles or criteria were revised in other draft proposals on which agreement was not reached. The position of the Government of India regarding the character and number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line was summarised in Geneva as follows [S/2783, annex 5]:
"1. Character and quantum of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line: "(I) The position of the Government of India as regards its own forces is as follows:
"(a) According to paragraph 4 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the Government of India must have the minimum forces required to assist the local authorities, i.e.. the Jammu and and Kashmir Government, on the India side of the cease-fire line in the maintenance of law and order; this term, according to the Commission, includes adequate defence.
"(b) Under subparagraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the disposal of India and State armed forces on our side has to be with due regard to security, which in its connotation has a wider significance than law and order.
"(c) The Government of India is constitutionally responsible for the defence of the Jammu and Kashmir State, which includes aid to the civil power.
"(d) Having regard to these commitments of internal and external security, the responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement and the fact that Pakistan would be free to locate its forces as it likes within its own borders, which for some length are common with the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir State and for a still greater length within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line and important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India considers that a minimum force of 28,000 is required.
"(e) However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture towards a settlement, it is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000, but it is impossible to reduce this absolute minimum figure of 21,000.
"(f) The Government of India will in no circumstances be prepared to include the Militia in these calculations. The Militia is a special armed police force which is under the administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government for its normal law and order responsibilities and is only temporarily, for the period of emergency, under the operational control of the Indian Army.
"(II) The position of the Government of India as regards. forces on the Pakistan side of the case-fire line is as follows:
"(a) The Azad Kashmir Forces and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts have been newly raised or greatly augmented during the period of Pakistan's aggression. This has been done in violation of the Commission's assurance that Pakistan would not be allowed to consolidate its position to the disadvantage of the State. They are administratively and/or operationally under the control and direction of the Pakistan High Command. For these reasons they are indistinguishable from the Pakistan regular troops and must be disbanded and disarmed. This is necessary not only to honour the assurances given but also to restore peaceful and normal conditions in, and to facilitate the return of the refugees to, this area.
"(b) The administration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities, under the same resolution, only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature. of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation to the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force.
"(c) The Government of India considers that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side considering the pre aggression strength of similar forces policing this area. However, they are prepared to consider an appropriate increase to provide for the needs of the northern areas or should the United Nations Representative, under whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make out a case that this strength is inadequate.
"(d) Having regard to the functions these forces are to discharge and the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal proportion of Azad Kashmir and other elements. The Government of India would be prepared to agree to a suitable readjustment of the armed and unarmed portion of this force.
"(e) The civil armed force should be under neutral and local officers.
"2. Principles for the determination of forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line :
"The Government of India considers that the principles enumerated in sub-paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) of Mr. Graham's proposal of 4 September 1952, were conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCIP resolutions. As a basis for the evolutions of a suitable definition of functions. of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line they contained the germs of a settlement but despite several efforts to evolve a suitable draft in terms of the language used in the Commission's resolutions no understanding could be reached with the Pakistan Government. Since the evolution of such principles is basic to the question of the character and quantum of forces, the Government of India would point out that while the Commission's resolutions acknowledge its responsibilities in this respect in specific broad terms, the use of the term 'local authorities', the provision for the surveillance of the United Nations Commission, and the fact that these local authorities I have to carry on the mere administration of this area leave no doubt whatsoever that their law and order responsibilities are of a purely local character. The Government of India cannot accept any equation of its responsibilities with the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree to anything more than a local character to the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities. It would observe that constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India and it alone is entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. This is the only position consistent with the assurance given and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recognition to the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has since been embodied in the Constitution of India.
The position of the Government of Pakistan regarding the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the case of the case-fire line has been summarised as follows [S/2783, aenex 6]:
(1) Proposals of 16 July 1952 "Pakistan considers that after the processes outlined in
Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's truce proposals of 19 July 1952 have been carried out; there should remain on each side of the case-fire line only the minimum forces necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of the case-fire line. "
UNCIP resolutions contemplated the retention of some forces on both sides of the ceasefire line for the purposes specified above. The character of the forces must, obviously, be the same on both sides of the case-fire line.
"There is no warrant in the UNCIP resolutions for the appointment of 'neutral' officers in command of the reduced Azad Kashmir forces. This proposal is also inherently unworkable. There is no shortage of suitable local officers to command the reduced Azad Kashmir forces."
(2) Proposals of September 1952 "Pakistan considers that the United Nations Representatives proposal that at the end of the demilitarisation programme contemplated in paragraph 7 of the proposals there should remain an armed force of 18,000 (exclusive of 6,000 Militia) on the Indian side, and an armed force of 6,000 (exclusive of 3,500 Scouts) on the Pakistan side leaves too many soldiers in the State. Before partition, the Maharaja's Government managed with less than a quarter of the forces suggested by the United Nations Representative (8,000 as against 33,500).
"The ratio on the date of the cease-fire was 5 to 4 in India's favour according to the Government of Pakistan, and 7 to 5 according to General Jacob Devers, the Military Adviser to the United Nations Representative." (3) Proposals of September 1952
"Pakistan fully agreed with the United Nations Representative that every effort should be made at the Conference itself to agree on the number and character of forces which should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarisation programme. Failing this, the Conference should at least agree on the guiding principles for determining the number and character of forces.
"The Pakistan delegation felt that the words 'with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite' used in sub-para graph 7 (a) (iii) and the phrase 'with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite' used in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the draft proposals should be deleted. The object of this amendment was to avoid the recurrence in the Military Sub Committee of the political controversies which had held up progress in the main conference itself. If this amendment had been accepted, Pakistan would not have insisted on further reduction of forces under subparagraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, and would have been satisfied with the disposition of all remaining forces by United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the respective authorities, and with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
"Subject to the above observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 4 September 1952."
VII. Agreement on ten of the twelve revised proposals and partial agreement on another To quote from our report of 16 September 1952 [S/2783] submitted to the Security Council:
"The revised proposals of 4 September were agreed upon by the representatives of India and Pakistan to the following extent:
"(i) Proposals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (a) (i) and (ii), 7 (b) (i), 8, 9, 10, 12 and the provisional clause; with the redrafting of paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 as follows "5. Agree that the demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the United Nations resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single continuous process;
"6. Agree that this process of demilitarisation shall be completed during a period of ninety days, starting from the date on which the programme of demilitarisation referred to in paragraph 7 below is approved by the Governments of India and Pakistan, unless another period is decided upon by the two Governments; "9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the process of demilitarisation mentioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line.
(ii) Concerning paragraph 12, the representative of India accepted it with the understanding that the differences referred to by the United Nations Representative should be only on technical details referring to the actual implementation of the agreed programme.
"(iii) In regard to sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (iii) 7 (b) (i)" on which an agreement has not been reached "the remaining difference in position of the Representatives has been stated in paragraph 25.
"(iv) Paragraph 11 of the proposals was deleted, to be substituted with another one to be agreed upon by the two Representatives, connected with the definite wording of paragraph 7 and with the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator in accordance with sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP
resolution of 5 January 1949."
viii. Suggested alternative approaches to the remaining differences on the demilitarisation proposals
In seeking to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Security Council, namely, to aid the parties in reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation, the United Nations Representative proposed a twelve-point programme of demilitarisation as one step in the solution of a complex problem. He wishes to make clear to the members of the Council that the narrowing of the differences on the twelve point programme to one main point, upon which the whole plan depends, emphasises the depth of the difference on this point. As we have sought to remove many obstacles, surmount boulders and to narrow and more precisely to define the differences, the remaining difference on the issue of the number and character of forces is still deep. It is related to the differing conceptions of the two Governments, often set forth-and I cite the interim report of UNCIP (Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7, document S/1430/Rev.1, paras. 200-202) and the report of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to the Security Council (document S/2375 and Corr. 1, 15 October 1951, para. 35)-relating to first status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir secondly, the nature of the responsibilities of the appropriate authorities on each side of the cease-fire line after demilitarisation, and thirdly, the obligations of the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949 with the provision for a plebiscite.. Upon the acceptance of definite provisions for a plebiscite came the cessation of fighting. Under the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the consideration of the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite would proceed in part from the studies of the Plebiscite Administrator.
Towards reaching an agreement on the remaining difference on proposal 7, the United Nations Representative made his suggestion for alternative approaches either through the establishment of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation or through the declared policy that the number and character of such forces should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area and, accordingly, that principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representative of the government of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the provisional clause of the revised proposals.
The settlement of the Kashmir dispute involves the preservation of the existing cease-fire line, a proposed agreement on plebiscite demilitarisation, and certainly not less important, the requirements and conditions for holding the plebiscite. The peaceful settlement of the whole complex Kashmir problem is important for the State, for both nations, and for all nations.
To fail to solve the Kashmir problem rather than to bridge present differences is inconceivable as a practical policy in the face of a situation heavily charged with long accumulated high potentials. The peoples of the sub-continent have the opportunity to challenge the peoples of the world with their own adventurous programmes for both individual freedom and the general welfare, for both national security and world peace. For the peoples of the sub-continent to fail to solve peacefully the Kashmir problem and to drift or stumble into greatly increased danger rather than bridge the chasm which divides them would be a tragedy for the two nations and for the people of the world who look with hope to the humane leadership of two great peoples. Programmes now provide sustenance, freedom and hope for hundreds of millions of people might give way to violence. At this important and critical time in the history of the sub-continent, an agreement on Kashmir could be a great demonstration for peace by peace-minded leaders, whose position for peace would be reinforced by an agreement. In case of conflict and destruction, fear and hunger might stalk the villages, where most of the people live in the hopeful lands between the mountains and the seas. Violences and then tyranny might seek to feed on hunger and hatred while humane programmes were engulfed in the deep catastrophe.
The values of an early settlement of this dispute would, in my view, be tremendous for the 4 million people of the State, the 400 million people of the two nations involved, and the people of the world.
A settlement of this dispute would mean that status of the people of the State would be finally determined not by the sovereignty of princes but by the sovereignty of the people not by the might of arms but by the will of the people, not by bullets but by ballots, through the self determination of peoples by the democratic method of an impartial plebiscite conducted with due regard for the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.
A settlement of this dispute might help to settle the dispute over evacuee property. It might thus help bring adjustment of the claim of the hosts of refugees who, in their tragic trek and counter-trek from one country to the other, left behind their homes and their property and yet carried in their minds and hearts the horrors of mass slaughter. These adjustments in belated justice would assuage some of the pain of their losses and memories and contribute much to raising the morale and increasing the productive energies of millions of people in both nations.
Moreover, the settlement of the Kashmir dispute would contribute much to the relief of the fears and tensions over canals and rivers from which come the waters for the fields, and the hopes of food and opportunity for millions of people. A settled basis for the co-operative development of the natural resources of the rivers and their wide valleys would make more promptly and broadly possible the connecting of the engines of production, transportation and communication with nature's ceaseless cycle of mighty but unharnessed power between the sun and seas, between the mountains, the snows, the rains. and the rivers, between the clouds and the lands of the vast sub-continent.
Food and freedom, goods and equal opportunity, health and education, dynamic hope and the liberation of the human spirit for the good life of these great, free societies can thus become the way of life of the peoples of India and Pakistan with all the meaning to the peoples of the world herein involved.
The cooperation of India and Pakistan in the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the self-determination of the people of the State, and in the allocation of larger budgets for constructive programmes, might become one of the turning-points in the history of our times towards the cooperation of all nations for the larger self-determination of all peoples; towards universal disarmament and the harnessing of atomic power for the moral equivalent of war in the campaigns against poverty, illiteracy and disease; and towards the more effective coordination of the national programmes, the "Point Four" programme, the Colombo Plan and the United Nations technical assistance programme for advances in agriculture and industry, health and education, freedom and peace, for all people.
On the subcontinent of Asia there is juncture of the forces of strategic geography, historic peoples, high traditions, ancient religions, human leadership, fresh national freedom and democratic power of high potential currents of for peace or conflict, weal or woe, in the present world. May the prompt, fair and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the Governments of India and of Pakistan set the example, provide the leadership and point the way from fear and conflict to peace and hope for the peoples of the earth.