30011952 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Von Balluseck (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1952
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Von Balluseck (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1952
On 17 January 1952 we listened to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan present to us his second report, set forth in document S/2448. It will be remembered that the Security Council, in the resolution [S/2392] it adopted on 10 November 1951 by 9 votes in favour and 2 abstentions of demilitarisation which the one of which was the Soviet Union-noted with approval the basis for a United Nations Representative put forward to the Prime programme Ministers of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951 [S/2375) annex 21. The Council further noted with gratification the declared agreement of the two parties to four points contained in Mr. Graham's proposals, and it instructed the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain further agreement of this parties and, not later than six weeks after the resolution came into effect, to give the Council a report and statement of his views concerning the problem confided to him.
We have now been able to acquaint ourselves with Mr. Graham's second report and with his own views concerning the problem confided to him. From this report I note with satisfaction that Mr. Graham has reached agreement on four more points of the proposals submitted by him to the parties, so that we may now take it that the parties have no objections to proposals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8, 9, 11 and 12 of that plan.
In my intervention during the Council's meeting of 10 November 1951 [566th meeting], I stated that, notwithstanding the fact that the then remaining points of difference were of major importance, inasmuch as they were concerned with the actual implementation of the principles for demilitarisation, it nevertheless looked as though Mr. Graham had been able to narrow down the conflict to a reduced number of points at issue. I considered that in itself a matter of considerable merit and of definite improvement compared to what the situation had been before Mr. Graham went to work on his mission.
I also said that I trusted the parties would realise that, under the circumstances, they bore an increased responsibility for overcoming the final of obstacles that were still obstructing the way towards a solution, now that the gap seemed to have become less wide.
Mr. Graham himself came to the conclusion that, although he did not underestimate the remaining difficulties, "the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement between the two Governments is not excluded". On the basis of that confidence My Government was able to agree to the recommendation of Mr. Graham to allow him to continue the negotiations with the two parties in order to obtain a further meeting of minds. Since in his second report, as I recalled just now, Mr. Graham was able to point to agreement on four more of his original proposals, the points at issue, which remain for the moment, are those contained in proposals 5, 6, and 10. I realise that these last four proposals are the most basic ones, and we also agree with Mr. Graham that agreement on those four proposals is most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarisation he rightly wants to envisage as an integrated whole.
The Security Council would perhaps now be entitled to consider whether, in the face of these continuing disagreements on certain basic points which must be resolved to enable demilitarisation to be carried out, paragraph 6 of the resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 1] should not at this time be implemented. It seems to me that as long as there is a reasonable chance of further agreement through negotiation-and I am not yet prepared to give up all hope of this-we should give priority to the method of negotiation over the method of arbitration. On the other hand, the patience shown so far by the Security Council should not be misconstrued as lightning in any way the moral and political responsibilities of the parties themselves for the fulfilment of their definite commitments regarding the creation of fair conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.
These four remaining points are concerned with the implementation of the demilitarisation plan as a single continuous process which is to be completed, in the view of Mr. Graham, on 15 July 1952, unless the parties can agree and decide upon another date. They also concern the moment for formal appointment to office of the Plebiscite Administrator, and we now know that, in Mr. Graham's opinion, this appointment should not occur later than the final day of the demilitarisation period, that is to say, 15 July 1952.
The final point at issue concerns the armed forces which will remain on each side of the cease-fire line on 15 July 1952
Mr. Graham has suggested a scheme for withdrawal, reduction, disbandment and disarmament of the various groups of armed forces on both sides, as a result of which on 15 July 1952 "there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949"-that is to say, the moment when the cease-fire agreement came into force Since then we have been acquainted with the tentative plan for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir based on the original proposals of Mr. Graham and worked out in more detail by General Jacob L. Devers, Military Adviser to Mr. Graham. This tentative plan was, I believe, turned over as a suggestion to both parties, or at least released so that both parties could take cognizance of it. It follows the lines of Mr. Graham's original proposal but it has made an effort to fill in certain figures in proposal 7 of the Graham plan where the United Nations Representative refers to the lowest From the figures possible number of troops on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarisation period suggested by General Devers I gather that the total numbers of armed forces remaining on each side of the cease-fire line would then present a ratio of about 5 on the Pakistan side to 7 on the Indian side. At the same time General Devers has suggested a more detailed scheme for a reduction in stages of armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line on the basis of the general ideas outlined by Mr. Graham and for which he has endeavoured to calculate exact figures and periods.
It is not my intention to pass a judgement on each suggestion. I believe that the members of this Council are hardly in a position to be able to judge the military situation and the military possibilities which prevail on the spot. However, these suggestions are from an authoritative source and are well worth our earnest consideration, as well as that of the parties concerned, and I submit that the material produced by Mr. Graham and his advisers might well form useful ground-work for further negotiations, this time perhaps on the very highest level.
I know that the parties hold divergent views on the security needs in and around the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Notwithstanding the acceptance by both parties of point 1 of Mr. Graham's original proposals in which the Governments of India and Pakistan reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures, and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir" notwithstanding those mutual assurances, there seem to linger uncomfortable feelings that such assurances are not sufficient in themselves. Two great States are facing each other across the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and in their considerations the needs of their own security seem to play a considerable part. But I submit that the issue before us should in the first place be determined by the need of self-determination of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir themselves.
I may recall in this connection that both parties stand committed to the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Those resolutions constitute a framework which must now be definitely filled in. Both parties have repeatedly accepted the principle that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, either to India or to Pakistan, shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations after the cease-fire and truce arrangements will have been carried out. Therefore the freely expressed wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must in the end prevail over the wishes and claims of the two bordering States.
It seems to me that it would be difficult to admit the right of either party for reasons of their own security to curtail the full freedom of choice by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand we must not for a moment underestimate the responsibility which the United Nations has undertaken in connection with the peaceful solution of this matter. Through the efforts of the United Nations both parties have accepted a basis for a solution. Through the efforts of the United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, both parties have reaffirmed their determination not to resort to force. For that reason a party which would break the solemn pledges would load upon itself a terrible guilt. There seems to be no reason to envisage such an eventuality for the moment. Therefore we should continue to place before every other consideration the conditions which must enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to express themselves, free from any kind of intimidation or pressure.
My country has no direct interest in this matter except that it wants to see a conflict, which might in the long run jeopardise peace in the sub-continent, solved in a just and equitable basis. We have no particular reason to be for or against an accession of Jammu and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan. Our only interest in this matter is one of principle, namely, that the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be respected and implemented. We are therefore willing and eager to explore every avenue that may lead to full agreement between the two parties to make that self-determination possible. Mr. Graham thus far has been able to secure agreement on eight points out of twelve. We would therefore consider it wise if he went on with his work for a further period of time to endeavour to bring the parties together on the remaining four points and we associate ourselves with what was said just now by the representative of the United Kingdom in this respect.
At the same time I think the United Nations, which has done so much to pave the way for a just and peaceful settlement of this question, is entitled to the greatest measure of constructive cooperation on the part of both India and Pakistan. It sometimes looks as though the balance in this essential cooperative spirit has not always been maintained. We sincerely hope that the parties will be ready to remove all obstacles in the path which must lead to a free plebiscite.
In conclusion, I wish to make a brief observation in connection with what was said during our meeting of 17 January 1952 by the representative of the Soviet Union. The USSR representative, in his statement, interpreted the intentions of the efforts which the Security Council has so far made to promote a solution of the Kashmir question in a manner which I fail to understand. I may recall that up to a few weeks ago the representative of the Soviet Union had taken very little part in the debates in the Security Council on this question. On the resolutions appointing Mr. Graham and approving his proposals, the representative of the Soviet Union abstained when the vote was taken. When Mr. Graham was appointed last year and when the USSR representative questioned the wisdom of filling this post by an American citizen, it was explained to him that every member of the Council had complete liberty to propose other candidates. The Soviet Union representative refrained from proposing any candidate and did not vote against the appointment. It is therefore a little surprising, to say the least of it, to find the USSR representative now accusing Mr. Graham and his assistants of being something like agents of the Pentagon. I do not propose to go further into this matter now, but merely wish to recall the conclusion the USSR representative in his speech on 17 January 1952 when he said that "the USSR Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves without outside interference" But I submit that this is exactly what we are trying to do and what we have been trying to do for years. The demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir is exactly meant to prevent partial and biassed outside interference with the free choice of the people of that territory. It is to that end precisely that my Government would like to see Mr. Graham continue his efforts