Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1951

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1951

I have listened with great attention to the speech made by my friend, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. We are all, I am sure, very grateful to him for the resume which he has given us of the negotiations conducted by Mr. Graham since the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, and we shall all doubtless wish to study the conclusions which he has drawn.

Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan has also, if I may say so, dealt most effectively with the allegations made by the representative of the Soviet Union in his intervention on 17 January with which, as the Council will recollect, I also dealt at the time. I do most sincerely hope that these extraordinary red herrings will not continue to be drawn across the trail and that the Council will return to the atmosphere of objectivity which, until the USSR representative made his last intervention, had always, I think I am right in saying, characterised its consideration of the Kashmir problem.

The representative of India will presumably, at some stage in our discussion, wish to comment on the views expressed by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and to put forward the views of the Government of India on the points immediately at issue. In the belief that both parties will seek, so far as possible, to avoid controversy-which I know is the intention 1 have asked the President's permission to speak before the representative of India, in the hope that by putting before the Council certain proposals-constructive as we believe-we may be able to confine our discussion to a quite brief examination of the steps likely to carry this problem further forward towards a solution. In our long and painful consideration of the Kashmir question, we have as it were inched our way slowly forward, one step at a time. Now, however, seems to be the time to take one final step.

We have now had time to give proper study to Mr. Graham's second report and to the text of the important and helpful oral statement which he made to the Council on 17 January 1952. The United Kingdom Government had hoped, of course, that Mr. Graham, during the further period of six weeks in which he continued his negotiations with the two parties here in Paris, would succeed in resolving the outstanding points of difference between them. We had hoped that with the points of difference so clearly defined, the way would be found to reach agreement on them. I shall not, therefore, conceal the fact that the United Kingdom Government was deeply disappointed when Mr. Graham's second report showed that on the two basic points-the points which go to the very root of this problem of arranging a plebiscite în Kashmir-the differences between the Governments of India and Pakistan seem to be almost as wide as ever. As we know, Mr. Graham defined these two points in his oral statement as follows: first, the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation; and secondly, the fixing of the definite time when the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.

Agreement between the parties must clearly be reached under these two heads before we can hope to go forward to the plebiscite and to the final goal to which both the parties have pledged themselves: namely, a decision by the people of Kashmir whether the accession of their State should be to India or to Pakistan. How such agreement can best be brought about is, I submit, the matter which requires our immediate attention.

I do not wish to suggest to the Council that because these basic differences continue no progress has been made during Mr. Graham's tenure of office as United Nations Representative. On the contrary, I believe that there has been significant progress and that we are all greatly indebted to Mr. Graham for clearing a good deal of the ground towards a final settlement of the dispute In the first place, it has been a considerable gain, in our, view for Mr. Grahanı to formulate the main points on which agreement between the two Governments is required, in the form of his twelve-point proposal. This has introduced clarity into the consideration of the dispute and has disposed of a number of uncertainties and ambiguities which tended to cloud the earlier negotiations. Also, we must by no means overlook the importance of the eight points in Mr. Graham's proposals to which the two Governments have expressed their agreement.

It is because of the success which Mr. Graham has had in carrying his negotiations forward that the Government of the United Kingdom now believes that they should pay a further visit to the sub-continent to make one final attempt to bring about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference which I mentioned earlier. After all, we must admit that the circumstances for Mr. Graham's last round of negotiations were perhaps not entirely propitious. The Government of India was already preoccupied with the arrangements for its general election, which as we all know, on account of both the size of the country and the great extension of the franchise, has presented many difficult problems. The United Kingdom Government therefore hopes that, now that the Indian elections are, as I believe, virtually over, and now that both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are ready-and we believe indeed anxious-to give their full attention to the task of working out an agreement on outstanding points continued negotiations by Mr. Graham will be fully justified.

Another reason which has moved us to suggest continued negotiation by the United Nations Representative is that, by going to the sub-continent, he might be able to arrange for representatives from both sides, able to speak for their Governments, to meet together under his chairmanship to discuss how best to resolve the differences at present preventing demilitarisation, the plebiscite and the final settlement of the dispute, Indeed, he might find the situation such that it would be possible for the two Prime Ministers themselves to met under his chairmanship. That might happen. I express this hope, because we think that such joint discussion offers the best hope of speedy progress. Of course, Mr. Graham would have to decide himself when the moment was appropriate for them, and we would not wish in any way to limit his discretion. But, should he decide that joint discussions were desirable, we trust that he would find the two parties ready to fall in with his proposals for bringing them about.

It is scarcely necessary, I suppose, for me to say that the United Kingdom Government is fully aware of the urgent need for a settlement of this dispute and for some early and tangible proof that the Security Council and its representative, Mr. Graham, are carrying matters forward towards a settlement. I would therefore suggest that if the procedure which I have just put before the Council is adopted, Mr. Graham should report back to the Council on the results of his further negotiations by the end of March. I think it is most important and I am sure that Mr. Graham himself would agree-to set some limit

in this way for any further round of negotiations. There is no need to speak of terms of reference, I think, for the negotiations which I have suggested. In a long series of resolutions, the Council has already clearly defined the path along which a settlement has to be approached. The two parties, by their acceptance of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, are themselves pledged to a programme for achieving a settlement. Mr. Graham himself, by the twelve-point proposals which he has submitted to the parties in furtherance of the principles contained in the resolution of 30 March 1951, has already set the course which he will follow.

Throughout his negotiations, Mr. Graham has clearly been guided by two main principles, with which the United Kingdom Government-and, I have no doubt, the government of most other members of the Security Council-is in complete agreement. The first is that, in order that the plebiscite shall be demonstrably fair and free from any external pressure, the number of troops on both sides of the cease fire line should be reduced to the absolute minimum compatible with the need to preserve law and order and internal security, and that both parties should cooperate to this end in a spirit of mutual trust and good will. The second is that once the process of demilitarisation and preparation for a plebiscite has started, the momentum should be maintained until the whole operation is completed.

The twelve proposals which Mr. Graham put to the two parties last September, and has since been discussing with them, are firmly based on these two principles and we feel satisfied that they are on the right lines. As I have already said, agreement has been progress in defining more closely the other four. In our view the object of the new discussions between the parties should be to build on these proposals of Mr. Graham's to consolidate the progress already made, and to tackle the outstanding points of difference on the basis of the two principles to which I have referred in a resolute effort to reach agreement on them.

In paragraph 32 of his second report, Mr. Graham has expressed views on the four outstanding points of difference. We have no doubt that these views, coming from such a source, will be taken fully into account by the two parties. We also greatly hope that, with the object of setting themselves a target, the parties will, as suggested by Mr. Graham, aim at 15 July 1952 as the date by which the process of demilitarisation should be completed and the Plebiscite Administrator inducted.

As I see the position, Mr. Graham can now return to the sub-continent in pursuance of the existing mandate, no new resolution being necessary. May I refresh the memory of the Council by reading paragraph 2 of the Council's resolution of 14 March 1950. [S/1461]. That part reads as follows;

"The Security Council...

"2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate : "(a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarisation referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarisation;

"(b) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

"(c) To exercise all of the power and responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission by reason of existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 ;

"(d) To arrange at the appropriate state of demilitarisation for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator of the functions assigned to the later under agreements made between the parties;

"(e) To report to the Security Council as he may consider necessary, submitting has conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make."

Mr. Graham, of course, in succeeding Sir Owen Dixon to this appointment under the resolution of 30 March 1951, has inherited all the powers and responsibilities of the office of United Nations Representative and, as we see it, he is therefore fully entitled to return to the sub-continent if he believes it desirable and if the Council does not disagree. To sum up, I earnestly hope that my colleagues in the Council will feel able to concur in our view that Mr. Graham should, as part of his continuing function as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, make a further visit to the sub-continent to continue his negotiations with the two Governments and that he should report the result of these negotiations to the Council by the end of March 1952.

If this is the general sense of the Council, I hope that the representatives of India and Pakistan will agree that these further negotiations should be undertaken and that they will be able to offer the full cooperation of their Governments to Mr. Graham in bringing them to a successful conclusion. Clearly less controversy between the parties in the Council at this. stage, the greater will be Mr. Graham's chances of finding a readiness in the sub-continent to conclude the settlement which we have all so long and earnestly awaited. May I therefore appeal to our colleagues from India and Pakistan to hammer out their differences round the conference table with Mr. Graham rather than at the Security Council table.

This time we must all hope that the hammering out process will produce agreement rather than new lacerations. We must all try to show the world that the United Nations' way, long and arduous though it be, is the right way to solve our mutual conflicts. We must all, by our help and our encouragement, do our best to preserve faith in our democratic institutions. I think that it is the privilege of India and Pakistan to be able to point the way to the happier world community of the future.