10111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Von Balluseck (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November 1951

10111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Von Balluseck (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November 1951

The very serious issue before us, which has endangered the relations between two great nations of the Asiatic sub continent for almost four years, has not yet found a just and reasonable solution acceptable to the parties. As a result of this absence of agreement it has remained impossible for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination, although this right is not contested by the parties. On the contrary, the right of self-determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been clearly and formally recognized and accepted by all concerned. The lack of agreement therefore does not concern this right of self-determination. It concerns the ways and means and procedures to establish the conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation.

When I spoke about this problem before the Council on 29 March 1951, I contended that the issue should, in the last analysis, be decided by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir themselves, and not the rulers heretofore placed over them, and that no prearranged political organisation in any part of the State concerned, and set up under the auspices of authorities which had already made their, choice should interfere with their complete freedom of choice.

For that reason my Government welcomed the paragraphs in the preamble of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 30 March 1951 to the effect that the convening of a Construction Assembly for the purpose of determining "the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir" could not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with principle of determination through the democratic methods of a free and impartial plebiscite set up under the auspices of the United Nations. In this respect I associate myself entirely with what was said just now on this aspect of the matter by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

We have now before us a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America based on the recommendations of the report of Mr. Frank P. Graham. It should be recalled that Mr. Graham and his very capable assistants arrived on the sub-continent on 30 June 1951. We know that he and his staff have done their utmost to conform to the terms of reference which required him to report to the Security Council within three months of the date of his arrival on the sub-continent.

It was our firm hope that the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan would, at the end of this term, be able to announce complete agreement between the parties, and it is a matter of deep regret to us that this has not been possible and that a further extension of time for negotiations seems to be inevitable. We know full well that the matter. under consideration is not an easy one. We know that although the parties have agreed on the necessity for a fair plebiscite, and even on the principles for demilitarisation, which must establish just conditions for such a plebiscite, there has been and still is disagreement as regards the interpretation of these principles. This difference of interpretation has made it impossible so far to formulate a truce agreement, and in the absence of such a truce agreement, implementation of the demilitarisation remains impossible.

It is in our opinion, one of the great merits of Mr. Graham's report, that he has analysed the question of demilitarisation in a very clear and concise manner. He has put before us a number of proposals which he placed before the parties, and he has told us on what points of these proposals these parties have agreed and also where they continue to differ. Fortunately these are numerous points where agreement was found possible. do not for a moment underestimate the importance of the fact that the parties were willing to reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and not to make warlike statements. It is also of great moral value that both parties reaffirmed their will to continue to observe the ceasefire agreement and to continue to accept the principles that the question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a true and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

In all these matters we found a reaffirmation of good intentions, and we earnestly hope that this is a step towards producing an atmosphere where the grave tensions between the two nations may gradually be lessened and ultimately disappear. But good intentions are not enough. The solution of the problem before us must be based on deeds-peace through deeds. In order to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir freely to exercise their right of self determination, we must solve the problem of demilitarisation and pave the way for the plebiscite administrator supervise the final choice.

Mr. Graham, in his report, has placed before us four points of difference on the proposals which he has submitted to the parties. These points are of major importance. They concern the actual implementation of the demilitarisation as an introduction to the plebiscite itself. principles for Nevertheless it looks as though the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan has been able to narrow down the conflict to those four points. That in itself is a matter of considerable merit. We hope that we shall be justified in saying that this constitutes an improvement compared with what the situation was before Mr. Graham went to work on his mission. We trust that the parties will realise that under the circumstances they bear an increased responsibility for overcoming the obstacles that are still obstructing the way towards solution, now that the gap seems to have become less wide.

Mr. Graham himself, according to his report, has come to the conclusion that "although he does not underestimate the difficulties, the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement between the two governments is not excluded,"

We fervently hope that the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan will prove to be right in his estimate On the basis of his confidence, my Government is willing to agree to the recommendation of Mr. Graham, where he suggests to the Security Council that he should be instructed to continue negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in order to obtain an agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Such negotiations, continues Mr. Graham in his report, should be carried out at the seat of the Security Council and instructions should be given to the United Nations representative to report to the Security Council within six weeks. I realise that in meeting the wishes of Mr. Graham, the Council would for the moment deviate from paragraph 6 of its own resolution of 30 March 1951.

In this draft resolution the parties to the conflict, in the event that their discussions with the United Nations representative fail to result in full agreement, are called upon to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the United Nations representative. However, as long as there is a reasonable chance that further negotiations may result in agreement, my Government is willing to keep this opportunity open during the period of six weeks suggested by Mr. Graham.

In the light of my foregoing remarks, my Government recognizes in a general way the draft resolution now before us. The adoption of the draft resolution would mean that the Council noted with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarisation such as Mr. Graham put forward to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. It would also mean that the United Nations representative would have an opportunity to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties and, finally, that the United Nations representative would be instructed to report to the Council on his efforts not later than six weeks after this resolution came into effect. This, in our opinion need not mean that the solution might not be reached within a shorter time. We would welcome a shorter time because every delay can only increase the risk of growing and explosive tension between the parties. As Mr. Graham has himself said before the Council [564th meeting), delays in demilitarisation cause talk of war. Talk of war causes delays in demilitarisation. We must break this vicious circle and the sooner we can do it, the better it will be.

Mr. Graham's own suggestion regarding further negotiations within a period of six weeks was that they should be carried out at the seat of the Security Council. I do not find the reflection of this suggestion in the draft resolution [S/2390] now before us. I sincerely hope that this does not mean that the period of six weeks will have to be spent in part in activities involving a great deal of travelling which would mean loss of valuable time, for once again my Government believes that we must indeed be conscious of the necessity to save time. By saving time, we avoid dangerous risks which, if not deterred,

might compromise the work of peaceful settlement that we are trying to achieve. In the sense of what I have already stated, my Government will support the joint draft resolution.