Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 537 held on 22 March, 1951
When I last spoke in the Security Council concerning the India-Pakistan question, on 21 February [532nd meeting]. I said that the United States Government believes the Council should exercise its responsibility to narrow further the area of disagreement between the parties. We think this responsibility can best be performed by affecting the demilitarisation of Kashmir in order that a plebiscite can be held under United Nations auspices. The joint draft resolution, introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States, proposed to deal with the principal issues arising in this area of disagreement by establishing machinery which we believed would capitalize on the experience of the past two years of repeated attempts to carry out the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
The United States, in acting with the Government of the United Kingdom to offer this draft resolution last month, did not believe that the machinery provided by the resolution which we put forward then was the only means of helping the parties advance towards a settlement of this dispute. However, we thought it was a reasonable proposal and, like any suggested device for helping solve a complex issue, it was always open to revision designed to improve the suggestion we made while retaining the essential minimum necessary, in our view, to help advance the dispute toward a reasonable solution. acceptable to both parties. That was the basis upon which we, along with the United Kingdom, submitted our draft resolution.
Since then the Governments of both Pakistan and India have voiced objections to the draft resolution as submitted. The Government of Pakistan indicated, through its distinguished spokesman, that it would prefer a resolution by which the Security Council would order the United Nations representative to carry out the provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which I have mentioned; which would give the Council's representative the power to remove or disband all the military forces, and to exercise effective supervision over State authorities in assuring a fair and free plebiscite; and which would also give to the representative the power to arbitrate all points of difference between the parties arising from implementation of these two resolutions.
On its part, the Government of India, through Sir Benegal Rau, declared that it was wholly unable to accept the draft resolution, because it conceived the resolution, in many respects, to go beyond the terms of the 13 August 1948 and. 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission. The representative of India particularly mentioned the reference in the draft resolution to Sir Owen Dixon's demilitarisation proposals, and the possibility that United Nations troops might be used to facilitate demilitarisation and the holding of a plebiscite.
In accordance with our concept that the joint draft resolution submitted on 21 February last might be improved by revision as long as the objective remained of providing machinery to help the parties advance toward a reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the dispute-we have joined with the United Kingdom in sponsoring revisions of that draft resolution of 21 February. These revisions, as has been so ably pointed out by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, take into account objections made by both parties, the most important of these being the insistence by the Governments of both India and Pakistan on holding firm to the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The revised text is, in my opinion, the irreducible minimum in this case if the Council is to provide machinery which will in fact aid the parties to carry out their commitments, as Members of the United Nations, to settle their disputes by peaceful means.
These amendments have four principal effects, which I should like now briefly to outline. In the first place, the United Nations representative would now be charged with the duty of effecting demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the two United Nations Commission resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. This does not mean that we believe the United Nations representative should disregard the efforts of more than two years by General Mc Naughton and by Sir Owen Dixon in attempting to carry out these two resolutions. This experience surely forms a part of the record of the Security Council and neither can nor should be ignored.
In this connection, we believe that both parties should be led, by virtue of their attitude as expressed here toward the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission, to give the United Nations representative their detailed plans for carrying out these resolutions. We are most pleased to note the reaffirmation by the representative of India of his Government's firm adherence to these two resolutions, and his statement that they contain adequate provisions for a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. We cannot, however, agree with Sir Benegal Rau's emphasis that the Government of India cannot make what he described as further "concessions''. That is not a matter of making concessions, but of giving effect to a commitment. The responsibility of the Government of India and of the Government of Pakistan, under their international commitment in accepting these two resolutions, is to co-operate in settling the question of accession to India or Pakistan by a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. The United Nations Commission's resolutions provide merely a framework which remains to be filled in; these resolutions do not set forth a complete plan for accomplishing demilitarisation and a plebiscite. The parties will have to develop and consider with the United Nations representative the details which fill out the framework in implementing their commitment-details over which the Governments of India and Pakistan have unhappily disagreed for more than two years. We feel that neither party can stop short, merely reaffirm the two resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, and say that it cannot make further "concessions'', thereby blocking further progress.
The partie, moreover, are committed to permit the people of Kashmir to decide the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan. That commitment is not, as the distinguished representative of India has said, and I quote the words he used in the Security Council, "to give the people the right to decide whether they would remain in India or not''. To phrase the plebiscite question in this form would be to disregard the binding agreement accepted by both parties. The Security Council has from the beginning held that the issue of accession is one which is to be settled by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and both parties, in the language of their own commitments, have accepted this view. I am confident, therefore, that Sir Benegal Rau did not have and did not intend to suggest a contrary interpretation.
I emphasise this, now, to make clear the position of the United States Government in this vital matter. It is a position which rests upon the belief that the most fruitful approach which the Security Council can take this stage is to provide. the parties with machinery for the solution of this dispute.
The second of the four principal effects of the amendments is the complete elimination of paragraph 4 of the original draft. This change results from the thesis that the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions should be set forth clearly as the basis upon which the United Nations representative is to effect demilitarisation. The suggestions offered in paragraph 4 of the original draft were intended merely to provide helpful guide-posts to the United Nations representative in his efforts to work out a reasonable and mutually satisfactory solution of the Kashmir dispute. However, in view of the objections of both parties to these provisions, they have been deleted from the text.
Thirdly, if the United Nations representative has not affected demilitarisation or, at least, at least, obtained agreement of the parties to a plan for effective demilitarisation, he is to report to the Council, within three months from the date of his arrival on the subcontinent, those points of difference between the parties, in regard to both interpretation and execution of the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions, which he considers must be resolved in order to enable demilitarisation to be carried out. This formulation by the Council's representative of these essential points of difference is important, not only in focusing the attention the Security Council on the principal issues between the parties, but also because of the revised paragraph 6 and its arbitration proposal.
Paragraph 6, to which I now, turn, embodies the fourth principal change proposed in our revisions presented today. Although, as previously, the new draft calls upon both parties to accept arbitration upon such outstanding points of difference as may remain after concluding discussions with the United Nations representative, it is now altered to declare that arbitration should be accepted upon those points which may be reported to the Council by the United Nations representative. Furthermore, the arbitration proposal now provides: that the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators is to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties, instead of by the Court as a whole. This latter change, we think, is more in accordance with the international practice, and should serve also to expedite the arbitration process if resort to arbitration should become necessary.
The Government of the United States regards this arbitration proposal as one of the key elements of this draft resolution. The representative of India has not, as we understand it, rejected the concept of arbitration, but has said that under the guise of arbitration issues cannot be reopened which have already been closed by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and by the assurances given to India by the United Nations Commission.
I trust that, if it becomes necessary to give effect to this arbitration provision, the Government of India will find itself able to accept the arbitration provisions of this resolution. The commitment of both parties in this dispute is to settle the question of accession by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations supervision. It is also the parties commitment, under the Charter of the United Nations, to seek a solution by all manner of peaceful means of their own choice. When other peaceful means have been exhausted and interpretation must be made of the commitments entered into by both parties under the earlier resolutions of the Commission, then arbitration is logical in order to settle the issues preliminary to holding the actual plebiscite.
The members of the Security Council will note that the original draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States remains the same in one important respect: the language in the preamble concerning the Kashmir National Conference has not been changed. In my statement on 21 February in support of the draft resolution [532nd meeting). I expressed my Government's concern about the action which the authorities in the Indian controlled area of Kashmir are undertaking to determine the future shape and affiliation of the State of Kashmir. I wondered whether it might interfere with a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices in the entire state. I associated myself with the anxiety expressed by Sir Gladwyn Jebb in this regard, and hoped that, if the Security Council received an explanation, we would find ourselves reassured that the action of the Kashmir National Conference would not prejudice the prior commitments of the parties.
The representative of India, in advertising this problem in his statements, declared that, so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in the Council's way. He subsequently stated that, while the constituent assembly might, if it so desires, express an opinion on the question of accession, it could make no decision on the question. However, the representative of India also said that the Kashmir State Government is a unit of the Indian Federation, subject to federal jurisdiction in regard to defence, external affairs and communications, but completely autonomous in all other matters. Sir Benegal Rau emphasised the autonomous nature of the Kashmir Government, affirming that the State is entitled to frame its own constitution and to convene a constituent assembly for this purpose. In discussing the question of supervising the activities of the Kashmir State Government for purposes of a plebiscite, the representative of India emphasised that the authority of the Government of India over the Government of Kashmir is limited to certain subjects; outside that sphere it could only advise and could not impose any decision.
In addition to this careful statement of the Government of India's limited control over the Government of the State of Kashmir, a number of statements bearing directly on the problem before the Security Council have been made recently by ranking leaders of the Governments of India and Kashmir concerning the constituent assembly and its purpose. One such statement was made by Sheikh Abdullab as recently as 25 February, when he said that the constituent assembly would decide the question of accession of the State, as well as its form of government. The Government of the United States, therefore, believes the situation requires that the Security Council place on the record its attitude toward the constituent assembly and toward any attempts that the constituent assembly might make to determine the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir.
The United States believes that the Security Council can and should affirm what the parties have agreed upon-that final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made by the will of the people of Kashmir as expressed through a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices. We believe that it is important that the Security Council hold firm to the language in the preamble regarding this matter as a minimum statement of its attitude toward the proposed constituent assembly and toward the obligations of the Government of India in respect to this constituent assembly. The matter of the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an international question, a matter which this Council has had within its purview for more than three years. It clearly falls within the field of external affairs, and Sir Benegal Rau has told the Council that the external affairs of the Government of Kashmir are within the control of the Indian Government. The Security Council, therefore, should be entitled to assume that the Government of India will prevent the Government of Kashmir from taking action which would interfere with the responsibilities of this Council.
Members of the Security Council will note that paragraph 8 of the revised draft resolution calls upon the parties to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations, and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement. This language is similar to that used in previous Security Council resolutions in the course of this dispute. The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India have both condemned appeals to force to settle the Kashmir dispute, appeals which have been made by irresponsible and intemperate elements. Continued efforts by the parties to discourage such appeals to force will help ensure and maintain an atmosphere which is favourable to promoting further negotiations toward a peaceful settlement.
Let me close my remarks by repeating the hope of my Government that the Security Council will give serious and prompt consideration to the revised draft resolution. The proceedings before the Security Council since 21 February have indicated clearly the degree to which the Kashmir dispute continues to be an irritant, prejudicing friendly relations between the Governments of these two great Powers. and Pakistan. This dispute blocks the restoration of the India friendship and mutual esteem which is necessary for the peace and security of South Asia. I believe that the Security Council must assist the parties to reach a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution of this protracted dispute. The draft resolution, as we have revised it, offers a reasonable device to help the parties solve a complex issue. It is offered in the sincere belief that the present frame of mind of both parties requires that the Security Council aid them in attempting to advance toward a solution, rather than leave them their own devices. As I said last February, the time and the situation demand that the Council give the parties practical aid, and give this aid with the earnest hope that it may, in those old and meaningful words, "speak to their condition".