21021951 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 532 held on 21 February, 1951
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 532 held on 21 February, 1951
In speaking of the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council today by the United Kingdom and the United States, I wish, at the outset, to call the attention of the Council to the statement made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report submitted to the President of the Council on 151 September last. I think that this statement, which so well indicates Sir Owen's attitude in his negotiations, should be borne in mind by the Council today. He said :
"It was obvious to me that in my attempt to settle the dispute it must be governed by the course that had been taken by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and agreed upon by the parties. It might be true that the chances of such a course proving successful were much reduced by the failure of the parties over so long a period of time, notwithstanding the assistance of the Commission, to agree upon any practical measures in pursuance of that course for the solution of the problem. But the terms of the agreed resolution of 5 January 1949 were specific in appointing a free and impartial plebiscite as the means by which the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided. What was wanting was agreement upon the matters, including demilitarisation, which were preliminary to even the commencement of the necessary arrangements for the taking of a poll of the inhabitants."
Sir Owen's statement, in my opinion, sets the tone for our deliberations on the Kashmir question. It is the foundation for the resolution submitted today for the Council's consideration.
The item before us opens up for the Security Council the continuance of its function of bringing about, by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of an international dispute. I believe it is clear that the Council can effectively do this and that, in this case, it has proceeded on the basis that it is the agreement of the parties on which a lasting political settlement must be built.
A very important affirmative element in this case, which has been singularly lacking in others immediately concerning us, is the fact that the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India have indicated in the clearest terms that there exists on the part of both governments the will to settle the Kashmir case peacefully and to examine solutions carefully. Also, the area of disagreement has been narrowed. Thus the Security Council comes to this case with this affirmative attitude of the parties, and I think all would agree that the Council can best exercise its function by narrowing further the area of disagreement. That is the premise on which the draft resolution before the Council is based. There are two main questions which my government believes are the primary business of the Council in its continued consideration of the Kashmir problem. The first is an action, which has been described by the representative of the United Kingdom, which the authorities in the Indian-controlled The second is the area of Kashmir are undertaking in order to determine the future shape and affiliation of the State. The first issue is the matter of bringing about a final solution of the case in accordance with principle of peaceful settlement. is presented in the preamble of the draft resolution and the second is dealt with in the operative paragraphs.
The members of the Security Council were advised, through a letter addressed to the President of the Council by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan on 14 December 1950, of a resolution of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. Sir Gladwyn Jebb has also made reference to this: This Conference met in the area of the State under the general control of the Indian Government. This resolution was proposed on 27 October 1950; it was adopted on 28 October, the following day; and it was reportedly fully . endorsed by the Prime Minister of India.
The resolution proposed the convening of a constituent assembly to determine the future form of government of the government of the entire State, including the areas under Pakistan control, and to determine the question of the State's affiliation. More recent Press reports from Kashmir and India have described how the implementation of this revolution has begun According to these report, electoral rolls in Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir are expected to be completed by March of this year, and elections may be held in June or July Although the Pakistan-held parts of Kashmir would not participate in the vote, the decisions of the Constituent Assembly will be held applicable to all parts of the State including the Pakistan-controlled areas. It is our impression that the proclamation which ordered the carrying into effect of these steps implementing the 28 October Kashmir National Conference resolution was approved by the Government of India. When the Governments of India and Pakistan accepted in writing the principles formulated in the 5 January 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, both governments agreed that the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices I emphasise "free and impartial" as well as "United Nations auspices" because it seems clear that these phrases support each other in a guarantee to the world and to each party that the plebiscite would be so fair that objective and dispassionate observers could not criticise it in any way. Equally important to the idea of a free and impartial plebiscite is the guarantee to the Government of India and Pakistan that each will have its interest protected by a plebiscite under United Nations auspices, so that the outcome will not be held unfair and the result of coercion or intimidation.
The United States Government firmly believes that there can be no real and lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is not acceptable to both parties. Any attempt to decide the issue without the consent of both parties would only leave a constant and explosive irritant in the relations between. these two governments, an irritant which would effectively prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia. Our friendship for the Governments and peoples of Pakistan and India has led us always to stand ready to extend whatever aid and service we can in contributing to their friendly and peaceful relationship The Prime Minister of India on 2 November 1947, in a radio broadcast, stated that the future. of Kashmir should be settled by a referendum held under international auspices, such as the United Nations. peated this pledge in Press statements as late as 0 September 1950 and 16 January 1951.
Moreover, in the light of the commitment of the Government of India, as expressed in its acceptance of the 5 January. 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, it is clear that such plebiscite can be held only under United Nations auspices, if it is to provide the guarantees of fairness and impartiality expressed in the Commission's resolution. My government is in full agreement with the view expressed by the United Kingdom representative that the action proposal by the Kashmir National Conference would not bring about such a fair and impartial plebiscite. The draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom
and the United States at this meeting proposes that a declaration to this effect be adopted by the Security Council We also share the view of the representative of the United Kingdom that the Council cannot accept or approve of a plebiscite conducted without the approval or supervision of the Council or its representatives. Our friendship for the Governments. and peoples of India and Pakistan should not deter us from expressing ourselves on this point. I was impressed by the sober anxiety which Sir Gladwyn Jebb voiced on this matter, and with him I believe that if the Security Council hears an explanation we shall find ourselves reassured that what is intended does not prejudice the parties' prior commitments. I should like in particular to associate myself with the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, from which I quote: "no reference to the wishes of the people of Kashmir regarding the future accession of the State made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the United Nations can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this Council".
Turning to the operative part of the draft resolution which we have introduced with the United Kingdom, it proposes the appointment of a United Nations representative to effect the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of demilitarisation proposals made previously by Sir Owen Dixon, with such modifications as the United Nations representative deems advisable; and to present to the parties and obtain their agreement on detailed principles for carrying out the plebiscite. In order to explain the reasons for this proposal, I think it advisable to review briefly the history of negotiations in this case.
The Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council on 1 January 1948, more than three years ago. Since then the Security Council has made three separate attempts to aid the parties in reaching a reasonable solution of the dispute. There have been a number of diplomatic approaches by the United Kingdom, and by the United States as well, supplementing these United Nations efforts. On 20 January 1948, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was established by the Security Council [S/654), and was able after extended negotiations to obtain agreement to a cease-fire and other principles under which a truce and plebiscite could be brought about.
Both parties agreed that the question of accession of the State to India or Pakistan should be decided by a State-wide plebiscite under United Nations auspices. This agreement between the parties was formalised in a resolution of 5 January 1949 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Commission was unable, however, to bring about demilitarisation and the holding of a plebiscite. In December 1949, the Security Council requested its President of that month, General McNaughton of Canada, to consult with the parties in order to help them find a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir dispute. General McNaughton reported on 3 February 1950 [S/1453] that he had not been successful; that while the Pakistan Government had accepted his proposals in substance, the Government of India did not agree on the same important issues concerning which the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had previously reported its inability to obtain Indian acceptance of the Commission's various proposals.
In view of General McNaughton's failure, the Council then decided on 14 March 1950 [470th meeting] to appoint a United Nations representative to take the place of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and to aid the parties to work out a demilitarisation programme, as well as to offer any suggestions which might contribute to the solution of the Kashmir dispute. Sir Owen Dixon was appointed United Nations representative on 12 April 1950 [471st weeting]. He spent from May until the end of August in investigation and negotiations on the sub-continent. Sir Owen presented various proposals to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan regarding the measures necessary to make I possible to hold a State-wide plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir.
Having been unsuccessful in obtaining the agreement of the Government of India to his demilitarisation proposals and his suggestions for conditions which, in his opinion, would assure a fair and impartial Statewide plebiscite, the United Nations representative then ascertained the reactions of the two Prime Ministers to various plans alternative to that of an overall plebiscite. While the Government of India appeared interested in certain of these suggestions, the Government of Pakistan contended that they contravened India's commitment to determine the future of the State as a whole by a Statewide plebiscite. Despite this apparent impasse, Sir Owen. continued his negotiations in August, and persuaded the Government of Pakistan to agree to discuss possible alternative settlements without abandoning their adherence to the principle of a State-wide plebiscite, provided that the Government of India would agree to accept a plan to be drafted by Sir Owen containing conditions for a fair and impartial plebiscite in the general area of the Vale of Kashmir. Sir Owen drew up such a plan, but it proved unacceptable to the Government of India. Consequently, Sir Owen left the sub-continent on 23 August, both Prime Ministers having agreed that there was nothing further he could do under his terms of reference.
Since Sir Owen filed the report with the Security Council in September, the Council has not met to consider the Kashmir dispute, However, in London in January of this year, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, as has already been mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, attempted, I understand, to make some progress toward a solution of this issue.
This recital of carnets but unavailing efforts to bring about a final solution of the Kashmir dispute may seem at first hearing to present a picture which offers little hope of eventual solution for this perplexing issue, so disruptive to the peace and security of the world. On the contrary, upon reflection, I think we may draw renewed faith that we can advance toward a final and lasting peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question. When the dispute was first laid before the Security Council in January 1948, an undeclared war was raging in Kashmir and threatening to spread beyond its borders. Thanks to the efforts of the Security Council and its representatives, the fighting was stopped. The parties exhibited a most cooperative attitude in agreeing to the cessation of hostilities, and themselves worked out the cease-fire line. Moreover, throughout the continuing negotiations, the Prime Ministers of both countries have steadily reiterated their earnest desire to settle by peaceful means this dispute as well as all other existing disagreements between them. In a statement on 30 September 1950, the Prime Minister of India affirmed that "India has always been prepared to agree for the duration of the plebiscite, and for a suitable period preceding it, to the appointment of United Nations representatives enjoying powers which would be sufficient to ensure that every national of Jammu and Kashmir casts his vote freely and without fear". On 16 January 1951, the Indian Premier declared that "India has repeatedly offered to work out with the United Nations reasonable safeguards to enable the people of Kashmir to express their will, and is always ready to do so".
Likewise, Prime Minister Liaqut Ali Khan of Pakistan, in a statement to the Pakistan Parliament on 5 October 1950, said, "We want to live on the friendliest terms possible with India. We want to settle all our disputes peacefully". In the published correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries the Prime Minister of Pakistan is quoted in a letter dated 27 November 1950, as saying to Mr. Nehru, "I have also declared over and over again that Pakistan wants peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question." He added, "I agree with you that it is our common misfortune that this correspondence seems to have produced no positive result. Despite my deep disappointment, I assure you that I still believe that it is in the highest degree essential that our two governments should settle all disputes by peaceful methods. I am convinced, and I am never tired of saying so, that a war between India and Pakistan would be an unmet gated disaster for both countries and I assure you that I shall continue to work for peace".
The United States Government believes that the quoted utterances of the Prime Ministers of these two great countries indicate most clearly not only that there exists on the part of both governments the will to settle the Kashmir dispute peaceably and to examine solutions carefully, but also that the area of disagreement has been narrowed. The Security Council can best exercise its functions to narrow further this area of disagreement by effecting demilitarisation of Kashmir as a prerequisite to conducting a plebiscite. The previous negotiations in this dispute have pointed up the area of disagreement as involving, primarily first, the procedure for and the extent of demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to holding a plebiscite; and secondly, the degree of control it would be necessary to exercise over the functions of government in the State in order to ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite. The draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States proposes to deal with these two principal issues.
It provides for the appointment of a United Nations representative to succeed to the post resigned by Sir Owen Dixon, but with amplified and strengthened terms of reference. The United Nations representative would have two principal tasks. He would affect the demilitarisation of the State on the basis of the demilitarisation proposals which had previously been presented by Sir Owen Dixon, with such modifications as he himself deems advisable. He would present to the parties, and obtain their agreement on, a detailed plan for carrying out a plebiscite in the State in order to give effect to their solemn commitment that the future of the State is to be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices. The resolution of 14 March 1950 placed the burden of preparing and executing the demilitarisation programme upon the parties themselves, assisted by the United Nations representative. There was no reference in that resolution to the working out of a detailed plebiscite plan. The present draft resolution proposes that the United Nations representative, after consultation with the two governments in regard to their differences, himself affected the demilitarisation of the State and assumed the initiative in presenting to the two governments and obtaining their agreement to a detailed plan for the plebiscite.
The United Nations representative is authorised to take into account four considerations which, although they are definitely not exclusive of any others, we regard as important suggestions by the Security Council of possibilities which might well be considered when the United Nations representative frames his proposals to the Governments of India and Pakistan. My United Kingdom colleague has described these possibilities in some detail, and I shall merely cite them without extensive analysis of their content.
First is the report of Sir Owen which describes his most careful and objective attempt to present proposals which would meet the principal objections of the parties to both demilitarisation and the general form of a plebiscite. As the most recent attempt by a Security Council representative to help the parties in settling this dispute, it contains valuable information which undoubtedly will aid the new United Nations representative.
Secondly, there is the possibility that, for purposes of maintaining order and guaranteeing the State from external aggression during the period of demilitarisation and the holding of the plebiscite, forces might be provided from States Members of the United Nations or raised locally.
Thirdly, there is the possibility that, although a Statewide plebiscite would decide the accession of Kashmir on the basis of majority vote, the losing party might, subsequent to the plebiscite, be assigned those local areas in which such party had obtained the overwhelming majority local vote. The qualification to this suggestion is, of course, that due account must be taken of geographic and economic considerations which would vitally affect both sides.
Fourthly, there is the possibility that, while affirming the principle that there must be United Nations supervision over the functions of government in the State during the demilitarisation and plebiscite periods, it may be appropriate to have different degrees of such supervision for different areas of the State.
The draft resolution has one more major provision designed to strengthen the hand of the United Nations representative in his negotiations, and to aid the parties to reach a full and lasting settlement of this complex problem. This provision calls upon the parties to accept arbitration upon the points of difference remaining unresolved despite the efforts of the United Nations representative. The United Kingdom, as was made clear by Sir Gladwyn Jebbs's statement this afternoon, and the United States believe it necessary that still another Charter device for peaceful settlement should be provided whereby unresolved issues can be settled objectively. In this way the parties and the United Nations representative may be assured that the Security Council is firmly resolved that all possible means for peaceful settlement to bring about a full solution of the Kashmir dispute should be offered to the parties. I believe that it is the duty of the Council to call to the attention of both governments their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to seek a solution by all manner of peaceful means, including arbitration.
These are the essential elements of the draft resolution which the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Security Council today for discussion. I know that the members of the Council and the parties will want to study the terms of the draft resolution with great care.
In concluding my remarks, I wish to emphasize my deep concern that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to this draft resolution. The situation on the sub-continent, in which the Kashmir dispute provides a constant irritant, prejudicing friendly relations between the parties and injuring their economic well-being, demands that the Security Council press forward suggestions which it believes may help the parties towards a reasonable and acceptable determination of this dispute. I sincerely believe that this draft resolution offers good possibilities for successfully channeling the Council's activities in the direction of practical aid to the parties. The time and the situation demand this aid, and require that it be given without thought of criticizing either of the parties or attempting to sit in judgement upon them.