21021951 Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 532 held on 21 February, 1951

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 532 held on 21 February, 1951

The India-Pakistan question has now been before the Council for more than three years, and I am sure that I shall be expressing the feelings of the two governments and of members of the Council when I say how deeply we all regret that it has not yet been possible to settle it. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has from the outest attached the greatest importance to a solution of the differences between two fellow members of the Commonwealth, not only because of the special ties which the United Kingdom has with each of the them, but also because of the supreme importance of securing the peaceful evolution of those Asian nations whose emergence to full statehood was one of the principal and, indeed, one of the most encouraging results of the Second World War. Further, developments in Asia during the ten months since this question was last debated by the Council have clearly demonstrated the urgent need for removing the obstacle to co-operation and mutual assistance. between the Government of India and Pakistan. Never was it more necessary, indeed, than it now is for two great peace loving States to give practical evidence that the issues which divide them, great and troubling though they are, are still capable of adjustment in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organisation to which both belong. Never was it more important, too, for all members of the Security Council, and, indeed, for all Members of the United Nations, to give every possible help and assistance to both sides in reaching such an adjustment. We know only too well how intractable this kind of question is: none of us, I am sure, wishes to assume any superior moral position in regard to it. We are all of us fallible and mortal. None of us wishes, unless absolutely forced to do so, to take sides. But as members of the Council, we cannot simply sit back and admit failure. However bleak the outlook, we must go on trying to secure a settlement, and try we will.

The aspect of the dispute between India and Pakistan. with which we are at present particularly concerned is, of course, that which relates to the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It will be recalled that, on 14 March 1950, the Council adopted a resolution [S/1469] which called on the two governments to prepare a programme for the demilitarisation of the State based on proposals formulated by General McNaughton as President of the Council some months previously [S/1453). The resolution also appointed a United Nations representative for India and Pakistan to assist them in this task and to place before them any suggestions which, in his opinion, were likely to contribute to a solution of the dispute. Members will have read with great interest the report subsequently submitted by Sir Owen Dinxo who, in his capacity as United Nations representative, spent a number of months in the sub-continent in negotiation with the two governments and in examination of the problem in the State itself.

I think I shall be speaking for the Council as a whole in expressing my warm admiration for the great ability and energy with which Sir Owen discharged his mission, and for the lucid and comprehensive report which he has submitted to us. Sir Owen has made the fullest use of the terms of reference which the Council gave him and has, by formulating and discussing with the parties a whole range of proposals for settling the dispute, thrown a great deal of new light on the problem, and provided the Council with much valuable material for its consideration of what the next step towards a solution should be. The document is indeed a most masterful analysis, and I should like to draw the Council's attention to the remarks which I made as President at our 503rd meeting. and to repeat my government's appreciation for Sir Owen's most valuable services and its regret that his duties as a Judge of the High Court of Australia should make it necessary for him to relinquish his appointment as United Nations Representative. I am sure that members of the Council will wish to associate themselves with this.

On only one major recommendation did my government differ from Sir Owen Dixon. Sir Owen in fact concluded that in all the circumstances it would be best henceforward to leave the problem of the disposal of Jammu and Kashmir to the parties themselves to settle, the Security Council holding itself aloof, unless indeed hostilities should unfortunately recur. Sir Owen Dixon is a wise man and there will undoubtedly be some who would accept this advice. Certainly, if adopted, it would place my country in a less immediately embarrassing and invidious position But after full reflection His Majesty's Government could not agree that it should now, as it were, wash its hands of the problem. The reasons for

this conclusion I shall now shortly state. The history of the negotiations for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute is a long one, and I do not intend to take up time in recapitulating it. The three reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and Sir Owen Dixon's report, which I have just mentioned, contain a full and clear exposition of it. It is important, however, that we should keep constant in mind certain fundamental considerations. Complex as are the detailed issues raised during the course of the negotiations with the two governments, these fundamental considerations are really quite simple. The first of course is that both governments are agreed that the future disposition of the State, which is the question of accession and here I quote from the letter dated 27 October 1947 from the Governor-General of India to the Maharaja of Kashmir "should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State". In his opening statement to the Council on 15 January 1948, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a Minister of the Government of India and its representative, in presenting its original complaint to the Council, elaborate the statement of the Governor-General's letter in the following terms [227th meeting]:

"I would invite the attention of the members of the Security Council to the high-principled statement characteristic of the Government of India under its present leadership. In accepting the accession they refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and informed the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by a plebiscite as soon as peace had been restored. They have subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable to the plebiscite being conducted if necessary under international auspices. It was clear to my government-as indeed it was clear to everybody else-that peace in Kashmir could never be restored or maintained without the support of the people. On the question of accession, the Government of India has always enunciated the policy that in the cases of dispute the people of the State concerned should make the decision."

He went on to say: "We desire only to see peace restored in Kashmir and to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left free to decide in an orderly and peaceful manner the future of their State." This fundamental principle, then, has been accepted by both governments and endorsed by the Security Council from the earliest stages of the dispute. The difficulties which we have encountered have all concerned the translation of that principle into a detailed scheme to give effect to it. However, even on matters of detail there has been a substantial measure of agreement between the two parties. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which was constituted by the Council in January 1948 [S/6541, prepared two resolutions which the two governments both accepted. These resolutions dated 13 August 1948 [S/1100] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196], have since been regarded by the Council as providing the basis on which the settlement of the dispute should be sought and it is, therefore, worthwhile to consider for a moment what their main provisions are.

The Commission, when it arrived in the sub-continent in July 1948, was faced with new and serious developments in the situation by the entry of Pakistan military forces into the western part of Kashmir and the existence of hostilities. between the Indian and Pakistan armies. Its first concern, therefore, was to bring about a cease-fire and to provide for the orderly withdrawal of military forces on both sides of the cease-fire line to enable preparations for a United Nations plebiscite to begin. The resolution of 13 August 1948 concentrates on these two objectives. As a result of the Commission's skill and perseverance and of the wise statesmanship shown by the leaders of the two governments, a cease-fire was proclaimed to have effect from 1 January 1949, and agreement was shortly afterwards reached for the appointment of a United Nations observer force to democrats the cease-fire line and prevent incidents between the forces on both sides. That serious incidents have been avoided is a tribute to the two governments and their military commanders, and also to the United Nations observers who are still performing their duties with admirable judgement and efficiency. I should like at this point to pay tribute to Brigadier Angle, Canadian head of the observer forces in Kashmir, who was killed in an Aeroplan accident in the sub-continent on 17 July last year, and to his two United States colleagues who died with him. All who came into contact with his work in this capacity had the highest regard for him.

Unfortunately, the Commission for India and Pakistan was not able to follow up its success in obtaining a cease-fire with a solution of the next problem, namely, that of demilitarisation. It did, however, produce its second resolution, that of 5 January 1949, which provided for the appointment of a United Nations Plebiscite Administrator and defined in some detail the form which United Nations supervision over the plebiscite should take. The acceptance by the parties of these resolutions therefore has provided a wide area of agreement, and in spite of the difficulty which General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon subsequently met in settling the matters of detail that have so far prevented these two resolutions from being put into full effect, my government is not without hope that a further determined effort by the Council, with the assistance of the two governments, will discover a way of resolving them and of effecting a settlement of the whole Kashmir problem.

I do not feel, indeed, that I can emphasise too much the fact that both governments have agreed on the essential elements of a settlement and that all that is now required is goodwill on both sides to resolve outstanding points of detail. Given the far-reaching benefits which a settlement would bring and the all too obvious dangers of the continuance of the dispute, not only to the two countries themselves, but to all those other countries elsewhere in the world which value human liberty and the democratic way of life, I trust I am not being too sanguine in expressing the hope that a final settlement of the dispute can now quickly be achieved,

This at any rate is the spirit in which my government has approached this problem. Since Sir Owen Dixon's report was received by the Council, my government has devoted much thought and effort in consultation with the two parties towards overcoming the deadlock and opening the way to its solution. During the recent meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London there were, as the Council knows, a number of informal and private discussions between various the Prime Ministers about Kashmir, and certain new proposals for facilitating a settlement were brought forward and examined. In addition my government has been in constant touch with the United States Government, which has, as the Council knows, played a leading part in seeking a settlement of the question since it was first referred to the Council three years ago.

As a result of their careful examination of Sir Owen Dixon's report and of the discussions which they have held with the parties and with other governments, my government and the Government of the United States have prepared a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. This has been circulated as document S/2017. I wish to emphasise from the outset that the submission of this draft resolution is not intended in any way to prejudge the Council's deliberations or the views which the Indian and Pakistan representatives will no doubt put forward. It seemed to my government, however, that it might be helpful for the Council to have a draft before it as a basis for discussion, and that the most convenient way in which the United Kingdom and the United States Governments could put before the Council the results of their deliberations on this problem would be in the form of such a draft resolution.

I now turn to the actual terms of this draft resolution. I should perhaps first emphasise that although it takes into full account many discussions which my delegation has had with both parties, it has not in any sense been prepared in consultation with them, still less agreed with them. Indeed I fear that it will be found to contain certain provisions with which one side or the other may not find itself entirely in sympathy. I would only urge them to give the most careful consideration to it and to accept it as constitution what we believe to be the only approach likely to resolve the differences which have been preventing the holding of the plebiscite that we are all so anxious to secure. Before I draw my colleagues' attention to the detailed provisions of the resolution, I must first refer to the letter of 14 December 1950 to the President of the Security Council from the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan [S/1942). Members will no doubt themselves have seen reports of what is called the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference'' resolution to which this letter refers, and will have wondered how far it could be reconciled with the agreement already enshrined in the two Kashmir Commission resolutions which, as I have already mentioned, provide of course for settlement of the future accession of the State by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. I feel bound to say on behalf of my delegation that for our part we find it difficult to reconcile the Kashmir National Conference resolution with this agreed form of settlement and my government has felt some anxiety lest the Kashmir State authorities should embark on some kind of independent action which would be a challenge as we felt to the authority of the Security Council and of the United Nations. However, I feel sure that when we hear, as we shortly. shall, the explanation which my colleague, the representative from India, will no doubt give us, we shall be reassured that there is no intention on the part either of his government or of the Kashmir State Government to adopt measures which would in any way prejudice the agreements already reached and the commitments already entered into by the Governments of India and Pakistan, or which would conflict with the measures already adopted by the Security Council.

Therefore, I shall not dwell on the third and fifth paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resolution submitted by my United States colleague and myself. These paragraphs, read with the statement which I hope Sir Benegal Rau will eventually make, will, I am sure, be a reassurance to the Pakistan Foreign Minister and will place on record quite categorically that no reference to the people of Kashmir regarding the future accession of the State made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the United Nations can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this Council.

The final paragraph of the preamble points to the two immediate and major differences requiring solution, namely, as we all know, demilitarisation of the State and the degree of United Nations supervision over the conduct of the plebiscite. Study of Sir Owen Dixon's report will show in detail the reasons why he was unable to resolve the differences between the parties on these two points. Our draft resolution does not itself seek to define a solution for them.

In paragraph 4, however, it sets out four elements which we hope may contribute towards a solution. We sincerely believe that the possibility that a neutral force might be made available to safeguard the security of the State during the plebiscite period should, if there is a minimum of goodwill of both sides, overcome many of the difficulties which have so far stood in the way of demilitarisation. I hope that the representatives of the two parties will be able to give the Council assurances that such a neutral force would not be rejected by their governments if the United Nations representative should decide that it offers the only solution to the problem of demilitarisation. Whatever difficulties may have been felt by either of the parties in the past, I hope that there will now be a ready acceptance of the principle that the best guarantee of a fair expression of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandment of the military forces of all interested parties and their replacement by United Nations forces which can have no interest to sway the vote either way. As a principle this seems to us at least to be so axiomatic that we can hardly believe that it will not be accepted by the Council and by those immediately concerned. For if it is not accepted, it can only mean that the contestant denies the whole concept of settlement by plebiscite, which after all has already been accepted without reservation. Can anyone in fact maintain that the two classic examples of successful plebiscites in recent years the Saar and Upper Silesia-could have been successfully conducted without the presence of a neutral force, neutral, that is to say, as between the two contending parties? I suggest that it cannot.

As I have said the resolution does not itself set out a detailed solution, but instructs the United Nations representative in consultation with the parties to effect the demilitarisation of the State and to present detailed plans for carrying out the plebiscite. The Council will, I hope, agree that the United Nations representative should be given some assurance that on outstanding points of difficulty a means of obtaining an authoritative decision will be available to him. It is for this reason that provision has been made in paragraph 7 for reference of any such points to an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators appointed by the International Court of Justice.

The Council will, of course, be aware of a previous occasion when the Government of India was unable to accept the Kashmir Commission's proposal for arbitration on such points. My government has, of course, given anxious thought to the considerations which prompted the Government of India to reject this previous proposal. But the hope is that, in view of the repeated failure to resolve these differences on points of detail and of the fact that the general principle of settlement by plebiscite has already been fully accepted by both governments, they will now feel able to accept arbitration on any points of difference which the United Nations representative, after further consultation with them, is unable to resolve.

I do not wish to weary the Council with too much detail at this stage. My colleagues will no doubt wish for time to examine the draft resolution I-and I am sure my United States colleague also will be very ready to elucidate any points in our proposals which may be put forward in later meetings of the Council. I should, however, draw the Council's attention to the provisions of sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 4 of the draft resolution since this deals with a principle which has not hitherto been incorporated in any formal resolution. It is one, however, which members of the Council have, I am sure, long had in mind. Whichever party the majority vote in the plebiscite may favour, there seem certain to be some areas with an overwhelming proportion of inhabitants in favour of the party with a minority of votes throughout the State. Where, after careful consideration of geographical and economic factors, it seems that any of those areas should be separated from the State as a whole and included in the territory of whichever of the two parties loses the plebiscite, the intention of this sub-paragraph is that such adjustment should be made. There are several points which need emphasis. The first is that no adjustment should be made which would result in the formation of an enclave. Then it is our intention that no area should be taken out of the State if by so doing the economic interest of the State as a whole or of the territory to which it acceded under the plebiscite would be materially damaged or threatened. It will be seen of course that this proposal does not in any way affect the principle that the future of the State as a whole will be decided by the majority of all the inhabitants of the State eligible to vote. Any adjustments that may be made in accordance with this sub-paragraph would be subsequent to the determination of the accession of the State as a whole and would be designed purely to avoid the incorporation in the territory of whichever of the two parties won the plebiscite of areas which contained an overwhelming number of inhabitants opposed to such incorporation. We have not attempted to work out the details of this new provision. This in our view could suitably be left until agreement has been reached on the immediate problems which are still preventing the plebiscite from being held. We should hope that the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the two parties, would be able to prepare a detailed plan acceptable to both governments to give effect to the principles expressed in the sub-paragraph.

Such are the main features of the draft resolution now. before the Security Council. It is, I can assure the members. of the Council, the fruit of the most mature consideration not only by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government but by certain other governments as well. It is submitted in all earnestness and good faith and, I should add, in a spirit of hope and not of despair. When one considers. that any attempt to settle this vexed question by force would be so immeasurably more disastrous to both sides than any possible solution in accordance with the means now suggested; when one further reflects that even a continuance of the present tension, with all its economic and political effects, would also be far more damaging to both sides than any possible disadvantages which the decision of the people of Jammu and Kashmir could produce; and when finally one contemplates the condition of the world in which this at one time fratricidal struggle is now being conducted, then one can scarcely believe that an agreed solution is impossible of achievement by reasonable human beings. It is in this mood that we present our resolution to the Security Council and to the representatives of the two great nations concerned, not seeking to impose, but only anxious to serve.