Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 471 held on 12 April, 1950
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 471 held on 12 April, 1950
The United States wishes to encourage its fellow Members of the United Nations, India and Pakistan to continue to make these substantial gains in the direction of the settlement of an extremely complicated situation. It has never been necessary for the Security Council to consider the question of blame, guilt, or anything of that kind. It has had enough to do in considering the facts, the complexity of which was the natural outgrowth of a situation having many ramifications and a long and ancient history.
I think that, as representative of the United States, I could do no better at this moment of progress than briefly to refer to what these great Members of the United Nations have already accomplished and to the promise which this holds for the future. I should like to bring out the high points in the comparatively brief consideration which the Security Council has given to this matter. I should also like to touch upon the matters which remain to be considered and acted upon by the two representatives of the Security Council: first, by the person whom we have appointed today and whose distinguished character gives us every cause for expressing gratitude at his willingness to assume the burdens of this great task; and, then after he has carried cut that task and reported to the Security Council, by Admiral Nimitz, who will have to go forward with his part in the programme as supervisor of the plebiscite in which fair opportunity is to be given to the people of Kashmir and Jammu to make their own decision as to accession.
This, briefly, is the story as we see it, and we think it represents a notable achievement by two great countries. which were suddenly confronted with the necessity of solving these problems that grew out of the great change from a colonial status to one of independence.
It was in January 1948 that this matter was brought before the Security Council. On the 17th of that month, the Security Council adopted a resolution [S/651] submitted by the representative of Belgium which called upon the parties ``to take all measures...to improve the situation...." The United Kingdom delegation suggested that the President of the Security Council meet with the representatives of the parties to explore the grounds for settlement; and, still in that same month, on 20 January 1948, a three-member Commission was created by the Security Council [S/654] to proceed to the spot, investigate and report.
On 13 August 1948, by virtue of a resolution [S/1100, paragraph 75] adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP] the Security Council Commission to which I have just referred, a cease-fire was ordered and a truce agreement proposed, reaffirming the wish of both parties that the future status of the State be determined in accordance with the will of the people.
On 23 December 1948-I am skipping many of the details of this history, because it is necessary on this occasion to bring only the high points into the record-India accepted, by letter [S/1196 annex 4], the proposals made by UNCIP; and, on 25 December, Pakistan did likewise [S/1196 annex 5]. India and Pakistan agreed, then, to order a cease-fire, which became effective, at midnight, one minute before 1 January 1949.
On 5 January 1949, UNCIP adopted another resolution [S/1196, paragraph 15] supplementing part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, providing for a plebiscite to be carried out by a plebiscite administrator to be nominated by the Secretary-General and to be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
Very shortly thereafter, on 24 March, to be exact, Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy, was designated Plebiscite Administrator, and the Commission of the Security Council was notified by the Secretary-General of this designation.
These were important and logical steps toward a peaceful solution of a situation. had become so dangerous that both parties told the Security Council that its continuance threatened to bring about an international conflagration.
On 15 April, UNCIP presented to both parties truce terms which were deemed to represent a fair compromise. Those terms included, first, the drawing of a cease-fire line, secondly, the withdrawal of troops, and, thirdly, general provisions.
On 26 August, the parties not having been able to agree to all the particulars of UNCIP's proposals, another idea was tried out a proposal [S/1430 Add.1, annex 35] providing for arbitration on the differences existing between the parties concerning all questions raised by them regarding the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948.
I have referred to two resolutions: one 13 August 1948 and the other of 5 January 1949. They are basic resolutions, and I have called attention to them because they are concerned. with what we are doing today and constitute the basis of our action, as I shall point out.
The proposal for arbitration was rejected. The net gain up to this point, then, before the resolution which was adopted on 14 March 1950 and to which the representative of Ecuador has referred, was the cessation hostilities, the adoption of a line of truce, an agreement for a plebiscite, and recognition by both India and Pakistan that Admiral Nimitz was satisfactory as a supervisor and overseer of the plebiscite. That is where we stood on 14 March 1950, when
the Security Council adopted the joint resolution introduced by Cuba, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, which replaced UNCIP by a single representative and called upon the parties "to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution"-that would bring it to next August-"a programme of demilitarisation on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal [S/1453] or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed."
I shall not take the time of the Security Council to review the McNaughton proposal, but I refer to it in order to have this record connected up logically.
There is one paragraph in the resolution of 14 March 1950 that I ask leave to read; it is not long and I regard it as important enough to be made a part of any remarks. It reads:
"Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesman-like action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations. Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 for a cease-fire, for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially implementing these resolutions by" and this is the record of achievement:
"1. The cessation lities effected 1 January 1949, "2. The establishment of a cease-fire line on 27 July 1949 and "3. The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be Plebiscite Administrator."
What is there left immediately before us? We find that the greatest difficulty, and one which provoked the idea of arbitration, was the demilitarisation of the country, which is deemed to be necessary, and which is considered by the Security Council to be necessary, in order that the plebiscite may be held in an orderly way and uninfluenced by the presence of the armed forces of either party to this controversy. Consequently, the immediate question still to be decided, and the question with regard to which this very distinguished representative will participate, assist, afford guidance and report to the Security Council from time to time is that of demilitarisation.
I should like to say, in conclusion, that the United States wishes to strengthen the arm of the representative of the Security Council as far as it is proper and appropriate for a member of the Security Council and a Member of the United Nations to do so. It is our judgement that this great representative should have the strong support of the Security Council at all times in his very difficult task. In saying this we cast no aspersions whatsoever upon the parties. Their problem is exceedingly difficult, as we know. We are not trying to enforce something by punishment, coercion or anything of that kind. What we are trying to do is to use that finest of instrumentalities in all disputes, pacific settlement, and the offer of a very distinguished and able person to aid in bringing the parties together.