Text of the Speech made by Sir Terence Shone (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 469 held on 8 March 1950

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Terence Shone (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 469 held on 8 March 1950

I have been deputed by my three follow-sponsors of the joint draft resolution now before the Council to make a short statement on behalf of all four of us with a view to clarifying certain points on which we have been given to understand there may be some doubt.

We have been asked to explain in greater detail the intentions which we had in mind in including in paragraph 1 of the operative part of our joint resolution the words "on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal".

The sponsors believe that the general approach adopted by General McNaughton was right and they consider that, in the existing situation and in the light of the information which has been made available to them, the suggestions contained in paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposals [S/1453] are not only entirely fair and reasonable, but also best calculated to facilitate the early settlement of the dispute. It would seem to be unsuitable for the Council to do more than to recommend these suggestions in general terms to the parties. and to the United Nations representative. In working out a programme of demilitarisation, it would be expected that due consideration would be taken of the opinion of the Council and that the programme would follow broadly the lines indicated. by General McNaughton. The United Nations representative would, no doubt, be guided also by the statements made at Lake Success by members of the Security Council. Subject to this, the United Nations representative would, of course, have a certain amount of discretion to adjust this course in the light of any fresh considerations which might arise.

The sponsors of the joint draft resolution believe that it provides a practical procedure for moving forward toward the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute by building on the essentials of agreement already reached between India and Pakistan. In putting forward the draft resolution they did not intend that the Council itself should engage in a mediatory effort or negotiation with the parties on the details of the application of the underlying principles. In the view of the sponsors, that is a task which can best be performed by the United Nations representative in direct negotiation with the parties. The sponsors believe that a reasonable programme of demilitarisation can best proceed on the basis of the principles set forth in paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal. One of these principles is that the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line should be reduced by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the cease-fire line. A second is that the armed forces should be reduced in this manner to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order. They should be reduced to a level sufficiently low, and should be so placed, as not to inhibit the free expression of public opinion in a plebiscite. It follows that the programme of demilitarisation should be dealt with as a whole and accomplished within a single period, leaving only the minimum of forces for final disposal under the resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196 paragraph 15] of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan; that it should embrace all the areas of the State, including the northern area, and that it should be so designed as to reduce to the minimum the possibility of any recrudescence of fighting or disturbances.

As to the question of the temporary administration of the northern area, the co sponsors believe it to be a corollary of the maintenance of the cease-fire line that the military and civilian authorities on their respective sides of the cease-fire line must be able to cooperate with each other. The sponsors have therefore assumed, as General McNaughton appeared to assume in paragraph 2 of his proposals, that there could be no question of making any change in the civil administration in the northern area. The sponsors are fortified in this view by the apparent belief of the Commission that any such change would involve the risk of an extension of military activity. If the United Nations representative should find the assumption I have mentioned unwarranted, this draft resolution would not preclude him from suggesting other appropriate and equitable arrangements.

It has been asked whether the provision in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the joint draft resolution that the United Nations representatives should interpret demilitarisation agreements, is intended to refer only to future agreements. We confirm that this is the intention.

In regard to sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the joint draft resolution, we have been asked to define more exactly the extent of the United Nations representative's authority to may suggestions under this sub-paragraph. It will be observed that the wording of the sub-paragraph gives the representative a very wide discretion or regard to the kind of suggestions he is empowered to make to the Governments of India and Pakistan or to the Security Council. It should be borne in mind, however, that the sub-paragraph must be read in its context. Through this joint draft resolution the Security Council would, among other matters, commend the parties for reaching agreement on the goal of a free and impartial plebiscite and express its opinion that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be based on the agreement on fundamental principles already reached..

When subparagraph 2 (b) is read in this context, it should be clear enough that the Council would expect any suggestions which the representative might make to be compatible with the agreed objective. Only if he should find, after investigation on the spot, that the agreed objective was impracticable, would he be expected to make suggestions at variance with this objective. The mandate is made as extensive as it is in order to ensure that the representative will be duly empowered to make appropriate suggestions in all contingencies, even such as would today be considered highly improbable.

It has also been asked whether the power of the Plebiscite Administrator in regard to the final disposal of armed forces after the demilitarisation period would be affected by the present joint draft resolution. The sponsors wish to say that, under subparagraph 2 (d), it is anticipated that the Plebiscite Administrator would assume the functions assigned to him "under agreements made between the parties". Therefore, the powers which it was agreed, under the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949, that the Plebiscite Administrator should assume, would not be prejudiced by the present joint draft resolution.

We have also been invited to clarify our intentions in regard to paragraph 5 of the joint draft resolution. It is our intention that the United Nations representative should be in a position to exercise his powers immediately upon his appointment by the Security Council, and that the Commission should remain in existence for a short period in order to ensure continuity. During this period the United Nations representative and the Commission would be equipped with identical powers, but it is not anticipated that circumstances would arise in within the Commission would need to exercise its powers.