24021950 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsia (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsia (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950
As I listened carefully to the most able and skilful. statements presented by the representatives of India and Pakistan, I became increasingly convinced of the complexity and seriousness of the dispute and with therefore to endorse the thoughtful conclusion of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in which it is stated [S/1430, paragraph 278] :
"The roots of the Kashmir dispute are deep; strong under-currents political, economic, religious-in both Dominions, have acted, and do act, against an easy and prompt solution of this outstanding. dispute between India and Pakistan.
My delegation is persuaded, as was the Commission, that both Governments are "keenly conscious of their duties and responsibilities as Members of the United Nations, and that both desire a final and peaceful solution of the Kashmir question."
It is therefore our earnest belief that both Governments will allow reason and moderation to prevail in their deliberations so that some peaceful solution of the existing difficulties may be found. Meantime the situation calls for patience, perseverance and statesmanship on the part of us all. For this season I do not propose to offer any comment on the broad and complex background of the relations between the two sister Dominions, and like the Commission, I shall confine my brief remarks to the specific problems arising out of the implementation of the agreement entered into by India and Pakistan under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It is of course a matter of regret that these specific problems have become veritable stumbling blocks to the implementation of the truce agreement. General Mc Naughton's proposals were not acceptable because of the same difficulties. I refer to the issues of the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces, the withdrawal of troops, and the defence and administration of the northern area. In this connection I wish to make a general observation by under-scoring the conclusion of the Commission when it says that the difficulty in disposing of these issues to the satisfaction of both Governments has been out of proportion to their real importance. It has been agreed by all parties concerned that a free and impartial plebiscite alone will give a final and peaceful solution to the Kashmir question, and that such a plebiscite should be held as soon as possible. If the method and objective are sincerely desired by both India and Pakistan, then none of these so called issues should have any real or permanent significance, for they are only important as preliminaries to a successful plebiscite.
Let me first take the issue of the Azad Kashmir forces. I think the Commission has rightly pointed out that the Azad forces have a strength which changes the military situation and, to that extent, makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange. The Commission admits with some regret that if it "had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and the Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the Azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with the question in Part II of the resolution of 13 August'' [S/1430, paragraph 225].
It is also significant to note the concluding paragraph of the Commission's analysis of the problem [S/1430, paragraph 226]:
"It cannot be said that either side has complied with the letter of part I, section B of the resolution, which prohibits any increase of military potential by either country in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir".
It is true that the 13 August resolution made no mention of the Azad forces or of how and when they should be disposed of. But what is the actual difference in point of view between India and Pakistan in this matter? On the one hand, we have 1949 [S/1430 Add. 1 annex 49] that the disposal of the armed the declaration by the Government of Pakistan of 30 May forces in the territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities, in accordance with sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. My delegation accepts this as an assurance that the Azad forces will be withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of, before the holding of the plebiscite. On the other hand, we have the memorandum of 18 May 1949 [S/1430/Add. 1, annex 48] in which the Government of India declares it to be "of the utmost importance........ [that] the discussions regarding the procedure and phasing of the disbandment and disarming should commence immediately after the truce is signed".
There seems, therefore, to be considerable agreement that the Azad forces should be disposed of and that this should be done before the holding of the plebiscite. If so, the issue. can be readily resolved if the two Governments are able to agree upon the precise moment when the withdrawal of the Azad forces should begin and how long a period of time should elapse between the withdrawal of the Azad forces and the holding of the plebiscite. Surely, this is not such a difficult task. matter to arrange, if there is present the necessary good will on both sides.
The withdrawal of forces is the second issue that has blocked agreement between the parties. It is indeed unfortunate that disagreement or misunderstanding would have arisen in connection with the withdrawal of forces from Kashmir. Pakistan holds that the withdrawal of its regular troops depends upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronisation of this with that of the bulk of the Indian troops; while India maintains that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.
The importance of this disagreement has been magnified because each side puts upon the manner of troop withdrawals a political interpretation, as if the settlement of the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan depended upon the method and timing of the withdrawal of their respective forces. Surely, both Governments are perfectly aware of the fact that proposals with regard to the withdrawal of forces are motivated primarily by considerations of ensuring peace and order to the regions concerned, and are entirely without prejudice to the ultimate question of accession. The Commission seems to have made the right approach to the problem when, on 15 April 1949. [S/1430) Add. 1, annex 17] in making proposals to the Governments of India and Pakistan on the implementation of part II of its resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission suggested a schedule, a time table of withdrawal. In the view of my delegation, this is still the right approach to the problem. There should be agreed upon between the two Governments a comprehensive schedule of withdrawal for both the Indian and Pakistan troops. Here, it is not a question of precedence, but of practicability.
Lastly, we have the issue of the defence and administration of the northern area. In this particular controversy the Commission has been placed in a very embarrassing position by the conflicting claims of India and Pakistan. The Commission has stated very clearly in paragraph 273 of its third interim report [S/1430] its reasons for refusing to accede to India's claim. The relevant passage reads
"The authority of the State Government had not only been challenged: by 1 January 1949, the authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government had been eliminated from the area. The entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities. In consequence the Commission could expect that the Government of India, taking into. considering the wholly temporary nature of the truce, would be willing to waive a claim which was to be decided shortly thereafter in the preparation of conditions for the holding of the plebiscite."
My delegation would make the same appeal to the Government of India. As in the question of troop withdrawal we are not prejudging the eventual ownership of the northern area. Let us hope the plebiscite will settle that. But at the present moment the Council's task is to prevent any renewal of hostilities and to prepare conditions for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.
It has been said that the Security Council is asking India to make concessions to Pakistan or asking Pakistan to make concessions to India. The Security Council is not doing that. The Security Council is not playing the part of a broker or trying to bring about a compromise or a deal between the two parties. If the Council asks either India or Pakistan to make a concession, it is not a concession to Pakistan or India, but rather a concession in the interest of the plebiscite. This is the consideration that has dominated all our thinking. My delegation has advocated from the beginning that a free and impartial plebiscite alone will give a final and peaceful solution of a dispute that has unfortunately stood in the way of friendly co-operation between two great peoples in the continent of Asia.
As regards the draft resolution submitted today by the representatives of Cuba, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, I wish to say that I had prepared my statement. before I saw the draft resolution. Representatives will notice that I have covered in my statement a number of points contained in the draft resolution and in General McNaughton's proposals I shall make further comments on the draft resolution if I consider it necessary or useful.