24021950 Text of the Speech made by the Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950
24021950 Text of the Speech made by the Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950
I wish at the outset to associate my delegation unreservedly with the statements which have been made this afternoon by the representatives of Norway, the United Kingdom and
The dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir is but one of many problems which have strained relations and these new nations were created by the partition of former British India. The Council will recall that, when India placed the Kashmir case before this body in January 1948 [S/628], Pakistan on its part. submitted three other problems [S1646 and 646 Corr. 1] namely, the developments in the State of Junagadh, the recent massacres of migrating peoples in the Punjab, and the difficulties which had arisen with respect to certain partition agreements between India and Pakistan. The Council then decided, and my Government believes it was a wise decision, that all of these problems were interrelated and that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute would open the way to a satisfactory disposition of the other issues.
What has happened since ? Unfortunately, the differences between India and Pakistan have multiplied and spread. Today, the two countries are engaged in economic warfare which has resulted in almost complete cessation of trade between them. Such other issues as the Punjab rivers question and the 'evacuse' property problem remain unresolved. In short, relations between India and Pakistan have markedly deteriorated.
This is no light thing. The fate of more 400 million people is involved. people who, only two and one half years ago, took into their own hands the governance of their new countries, with high hopes for economic and social betterment. These hopes are being thwarted by the continued tension between India and Pakistan, which retards the concentration of their talents and energies on constructive efforts.
This picture has a brighter side. The leaders of India and Pakistan know that the differences between their countries are thwarting the legitimate aspirations of their people. They have repeatedly declared that these differences must be removed, and removed peacefully. This Council can, therefore, be confident that both Governments will direct their best talents and their unremitting efforts towards the settlement of their own disputes. The Security Council stands ready now, as in the past, to assist them. If the parties, with the help of this Council, can find a solution to the Kashmir problem, my Government has faith that the goodwill of India and Pakistan will speedly find the means of removing their remaining differences.
The Security Council has dealt with several matters of great importance to the international community, and the body of experience which it has gained has perhaps to some extent been generalised. When confronted with a dispute involving armed conflict, the first task for the Security Council has been to obtain a cessation of hostilities. The disputants must stop fighting. This means a cease-fire, and a cease-fire line. If necessary, this Council must, as it did in the Palestine case, act expressly under Chapter VII of the Charter in insisting upon an end to hostilities.
A cease-fire, however, is merely a temporary restraining measure. It is the first essential action in removing excess heat from controversies which have passed the boiling point. The Council's experience has shown that the heat is quick to develop again when other steps looking towards a lasting settlement are not quickly taken.
The next step, after the fighting is stopped, is to draw the opposing forces away from each other and to reduce them, by degrees if necessary. As this process continues, the strain on the cease-fire line eases; its importance diminishes; a more permanent arrangement takes place, such as the armistice agreements in Palestine and the truce provisions of the Renville Agreement (S/649, Appendix XI] in the Indonesian case.
The wisdom gained from these and other experiences was recognized by the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, held some thirteen months ago.
Two important lessons can be drawn from previous Security Council experience. First, the elimination of Military pressure between the parties to a dispute is partly a stop-gap measure, which must be quickly followed by a lasting political settlement. Secondly, while effectuation of a cease-fire and a demilitarised programme is a process in which this Council can, if necessary, assume the initiative, the enduring political solution is essentially the responsibility of the parties to a dispute. Their agreement and their cooperation are indispensable ingredients.
In the case now before us, India and Pakistan have agreed to the application of this general pattern. As a result of the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the corporation of India and Pakistan, both Governments have agreed upon certain bases of settlement which are set forth in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The principles underlying these resolutions are that hostilities should cease; that the State should be demilitarised in order to establish more normal conditions of life for its inhabitants ; and that the final disposition of Kashmir should be in accord with the will of its people, to be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite. The first principle was affected by the cease-fire, worked out by the parties themselves, on India's initiative, on 1 January 1949, and by the agreement in July 1949 on a definitive cease-fire line.
Unhappily, the parties, despite the efforts of the United Nations Commission for India and
on the implementation of the demilitarisation phase of the Commission's resolutions. The impediments to agreement have derived, at least in part, from conflicting claims with respect to legal and technical aspects of the dispute. For example, India's position has been based in some part on its legal claim that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was acceded to India. On the other hand, Pakistan, in addition to opposing this claim, has pointed to certain geographic factors, economic ties and communal affiliation as offsetting the claim on India.
From the outset of this case it has been evident that agreement between the two nations for an enduring settlement of the dispute must be reached on broad political grounds. The two nations at an early stage accepted the principle that the question of accession of the State should be determined by the will of the people freely and impartially ascertained under the auspices of the Security Council. For these reasons, therefore, while the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan have from the beginning listened with the greatest respect to the contentions of the two parties on the legal and technical issues, they have consistently taken the position that a determination by them of these issues was neither essential nor conducive to a just settlement of the question. Thus, in seeking to advance this settlement within the existing area of agreement, we should avoid unprofitable discussion of these disputed issues and focus our attention on the pressing problems of the present and the future.
In approaching the problem of demilitarisation it is important to keep these considerations in mind as a guide to our thinking. Demilitarisation does not prejudge the rights or claims of the parties. It need not, therefore, rest upon those rights or claims. It is, however, an essential prerequisite for a solution of the dispute. Fortunately, the task of the Security Council in its efforts to help the parties in this problem has been made easier by the fact that both sides have agreed to the demilitarisation of Kashmir and the problem is not whether there should be demilitarisation, but how it shall be carried out. Thus, the Security Council, in the draft resolution which has been placed upon the table, and which my delegation joins Cuba, Norway and the United Kingdom in sponsoring, directs itself towards this immediate and essential objective. In the circumstances of this case it seems necessary for the Security Council to call upon the parties, as this draft resolution does, to agree on a workable plan of demilitarisation and to carry out that plan as a necessary preliminary to the final stage of determining the wishes of the people of the State. The Security Council would also fulfil a duty by providing the means for helping the parties reach agreement. This would be done by appointing a representative to carry forward the work started by the Security Council and the Commission, and to supervise such arrangements for demilitarisation as will be agreed upon.
The demilitarisation proposals placed before the two parties by General McNaughton unfortunately did not prove acceptable to the Government of India. The basic principles governing these proposals are, in our judgement, fair and sound. The draft resolution proposed by the United Kingdom, Norway, Cuba and the United States would call upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to prepare and to execute a plan of demilitarisation on the basis of these principles.
A basic principle of General McNaughton's proposals is that the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line. The armed forces should be reduced in this manner to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order. They should be reduced to a level sufficiently low, and should be so disposed, as not to inhibit the free expression of public opinion in a plebiscite. This principle has not been objected to by either party.
Another basic concept is that the problem of demilitarisation should be dealt with as a whole. It will be recalled that the resolutions of the Commission contemplated that the local forces west of the cease-fire line, as well as local forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, should be disposed of during the next plebiscite period, rather than at the time of the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan regular troops during the earlier truce period. This distinction in timing developed later into one of the major obstacles encountered by the Commission in reaching an agreement on demilitarisation India had, in the course of the Commission's mediation, indicated its view that the disposal of the local forces on the other side of the cease-fire line should be linked with the withdrawal of Indian regular forces.
The concept of accomplishing demilitarisation within a single period, rather than the two successive periods envisaged by the Commission's resolutions, is consistent with what should be the controlling consideration in the demilitarisation of Kashmir, that is, the need to minimise at all stages the possibility of a resumption of fighting across the cease-fire line. The process should therefore be so timed that at the conclusion of the demilitarisation period there should be no armed force in the State with any aggressive potential.
The proposals also rest on the principle of embracing all areas of the State, including those to the north of the cease-fire line, in a coordinated programme of demilitarisation. This is likewise, in the opinion of my Government, an appropriate principle, consonant with the essential objective of any demilitarisation. The Commission's conclusions in respect of the demilitarisation of the northern area are clear and, in our view, sound and practical. The Commission concluded that "the entry of Indian forces into the area north of the case-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities'' (S/1430, paragraph 273].
The Commission's report continued [S/1430, paragraph 275]: "The situation in the northern area today is such that the posting of garrisons by the Indian Army at any point beyond those which are now held by it would result in an extension of military activities the Government of India although it need not necessarily imply an increase in the military potential which both Governments have agreed is not to take place on either side." Phim 1 continues to quote from the next paragraph of the report of the Commission; "The Karachi Military Conference of July has settled the question of the cease-fire line. The line is now demarcated and agreed to by India and Pakistan. Until such time the conditions as envisaged in the resolution of 5 January have been created and normal life begins to return to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the line which is today a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities should be scrupulously observed by the Government of India and Pakistan, and the opposing forces should remain behind it.
In our view it is eminently fair and sound, and in fulfilment of our duty as members of this Council dedicated to peaceful settlements, to recommend to the parties that they accept a principle which strengthens the concept and value of the cease-fire line and avoids the risk of an extension of military activity.
No inference should be drawn from the fact that the Commission did not, in its resort, address itself specifically to the question of the temporary administration of the area during the period of demilitarisation. It is altogether reason able to assume that since the Commission concluded that it would not be in the interest of the plebiscite to sanction an extension of military activity beyond the established cease fire line, the Commission believed it unnecessary to refer to a change in the administration of the area, since such a change would clearly depend upon, or involve the risk of, an extension of military activity.
I should like now to turn to that part of the draft resolution which envisages the appointment of a United Nations representative to assist in the preparation, and to supervise the implementation, of such programmes of demilitarisation as may emerge from future negotiations. This feature of the draft resolution also has the full support of my Government. It is considered a judgement of the Commission that a single person can now (most effectively conduct the negotiations and consultations with and between the parties.
General McNaughton endorsed and acted upon this recommendation of the Commission. In the discharge of the duties which the Security Council would entrust to such a representative, the closest and the most continuous relations with the two Governments will be necessary. The mutual understanding and confidence which should form the background of these relations can best be built up and maintained. by a single individual. In saying this, of course, I do not with to disparage the relationship which existed between the Commission and the two Governments. I merely wish to stress that continuity and the resulting accumulation of understanding so necessary to subtle negotiation, are likely to be achieved more readily by one person than by a body of diverse personalities with the ever-present risk to continuity through changes in personnel. In negotiations of the present nature, shades of meaning play their part and these are less likely to be lost when stored in the memory of one individual than when dispersed, and perhaps differently evaluated, in the minds of several.
I am privileged to join several of my distinguished colleagues on the Council in sponsoring the draft resolution which has been presented to the Council this afternoon. We have attempted as loyal members of the Security Council and as friends of both India and Pakistan, to bring to bear upon the Kashmir problem the lessons that this Council has learned in other disputes and the knowledge that we have gained of the special factors involved in the present dispute. We believe that this draft resolution derives from the principles already accepted by the parties We are confident that it will contribute to the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan by enabling them to move expeditiously toward the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and a final settlement of the dispute in accord with the will of the people of the State as to their permanent affiliation with India or Pakistan.