Text of the Speech made by Mr. Chauvel (France). in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950.
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Chauvel (France). in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950.
My delegation had followed with the keenest sympathy the efforts at conciliation General McNaughton made having his presidency of the Council in accordance with the Council's action of 17 December 1949 [457th meeting]. The French delegation had encouraged him to continue his efforts even after the expiry of his term of office as President and as a representative to the Council, and has therefore studied the report of his activities with particular attention.
I cannot conceal my delegation's disappointment at the fact that, once again, the conscientious efforts of a man whose impartiality and moral authority cannot be challenged, came up against the all too familiar obstacles.
The Jammu-Kashmir case was placed before the Security Council by a communication from the representative of India [S/628] on 1 January 1948, that is, almost twenty-six months ago today. Since then, United Nations action in the matter has consisted of four principal acts the Council's resolutions of 20 January 1948 [S/654] and 21 April 1948 [S/726] creating the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and setting forth its membership and powers, and the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The Commission itself laid down three stages in the settlement of the dispute: cessation of hostilities, organisation of the trace by demilitarisation of all the territories concerned, and organisation of this plebiscite.
What is the situation today, twenty-six months after the question was brought before the Council and almost fourteen months after the Commission's second resolution ? The parties have agreed to the resolution of 13 August 1945 January 1949. On 1 January 1949, they affected the cessation of hostilities, and on 27 July 1949 they agreed to the establishment of the cease-fire line 1S/1430/ Add. 1, Annex 26]. They have accepted the principle of a plebiscite and consented to the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator. That is all. In other words, only the first of the three stages laid down in the resolution of 5 January 1949, the cessation of hostilities, has been completed. On the other hand, there has been no progress towards the conclusion of a truce agreement which, in practice, can be based only on demilitarisation, nor, despite the appointment of Admiral Nimitz, towards organisation of the plebiscite. In fact, some time past, demilitarisation has been the main obstacle to all efforts: not the principle of demilitarisation, but the way to carry it out.
If we consider the different interests involved, we see that the main issue is the political allegiance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. That issue concerns, first and foremost, the populations of those two States, and I may add, in passing, that whatever the solution of the problem, the question of refugees cannot be left out of account, as regards both their participation in the plebiscite and their ultimate settlement. It also concerns, obviously and for various reasons the two States which claim a right to those territories, that is, India and Pakistan.
I must stress, however, that whatever importance India and Pakistan may attach to the defence of their respective claims, they have a still greater interest to consider; the cessation of the conflict which divides them and sets them against each other. In view of the present state of Asia and the world, it is unthinkable that two great countries which have recently acquired full sovereignty and have to face all the problems of organisation and all the political, economic and financial adjustments following on that new status, should exhaust their strength in a struggle which has destroyed their past solidarity and compromises the solidarity which geography imposes upon them for the future. Is it possible that these two States, belonging as they do to the same great group of sovereign States, and being besides, both Members of the United Nations, should be unaware not only of their own
higher interest, but also of that of the community of nations ? That community, the world community which we represent in this Council, can have no other wish than to put an end to a burdensome and dangerous situation and to eliminate from the map of the world and from such an important point on that map a troubled area from which tempests might blow. As against considerations of such weight, I see no principle that could properly be invoked.
The Government of India claims that it stands on a kind of legality. It consents to a plebiscite, but repudiates as illegal the authorities now in control of the northern and eastern zones. In its opinion the plebiscite must be held in a unified State under the sole authority of Sheikh Abdullah. Apart from the fact that no principle of legality can stand against the will of people, it would appear that Kashmir is now divided not only by two occupations, but also by the fact that it has two Governments, each the product of uprisings against the authority of the Maharaja. While, on the Indian side, Sheikh Abdullah has seized power in the name of the principles of democracy after many years of struggle and the test of imprisonment, another rebel, Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, invoking the same principles, confronts him, backed by thirty-two battalions levied from the inhabitants of the areas under his control.
In the face of such a situation, our position is clear. It is prescribed to us by the United Nations Charter. It is for the populations themselves, and for them alone, to decide their fate. They must do so in conditions of security against all forms of pressure. It would have been desirable for the two neighbouring States to agree on those conditions. In the absence of such agreement, there is no other way but to place the matter again in the hands of the Organisation, which assumes responsibility for it. I do not see what objection there can be to this. Whatever their feelings on the substance of the issue, I do not doubt that the parties are both profoundly anxious that the wishes of the populations should be respected. It is clear enough that the United Nations does not want any particular solution, but a solution. Its objectivity and impartiality offer the best possible guarantee to the populations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, consequently, to the Governments of India and Pakistan.
That is the course to which the French delegation has faithfully adhered in this matter. In its opinion, that course must be followed in order to complete the two remaining stages of organisation of the truce by the demilitarisation of the territories as a whole and organisation of the plebiscite.
The way in which the United Nations should take charge of the situation when the question of organising the plebiscite actually arises will be a matter for other debates. The issue before us today is only the organisation of the truce by means of demilitarisation, and that was the purpose of General McNaughton's efforts and of the proposals he put before the parties. Those proposals appear eminently reasonable to my delegation. For the phase of operations with which they are concerned, they take into account the three conditions listed here by the French representative on 24 January 1948 [235th meeting] as follows:
"1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir".
"2. The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race-Hindu or Moslem-to their places of origin in that State"
"3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote."
That, I repeat, is why the French delegation has been deeply disappointed by the reservations made with regard to those proposals; those reservations have so far prevented their implementation.
My delegation can do nothing today but recommend them for renewed and earnest consideration by the Council and the parties. It entreats the latter to spare no effort of conciliation which might at long last ensure, in this important matter, the triumph of the principles which the Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to defend and which they themselves, in the case in point, have expressly