Text of the Speech made by Sir Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

Text of the Speech made by Sir Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

Members of the Security Council may recollect that in the course of the brief debate on this subject which took place on 29 December [458th meeting] I made a statement concerning the attitude of the United Kingdom Government and indicated its general support for the proposals made to the parties by General McNaughton. I do not propose to repeat again today the considerations which I put forward then, and which have been fully endorsed by my Government, which has now introduced me to add certain observations in the light of the statements which have been made to the Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan.

All of us here must agree that this issue is one of importance to us all, and one which demands that we should proceed unflinchingly to do what we conceive to be right. All of us must wish to maintain and extend the power and prestige of the United Nations and the Security Council. We must do all that we can to make effective the code of good conduct that is contained in our Charter. Men and Women throughout the world yet place their hopes in us and we must not fail in our duty to those people.

The Kashmir dispute has been before the Security Council now for over two years. Much work has been done, work in the Council itself and by the Commission, and although a solution is not yet at hand, that work has been by no means fruitless. Here is an area of agreement, not so large as we should wish or might have expected, and we must think twice before we discard any solid element of agreement on which a settlement might be built.

I do not mean that we must be rigid or inflexible. We are here to deal justly and impartially with matters which come before us, and we must, of course, take due account of all developments which may be relevant. But if this Council. is to function effectively now, and in the days to come, we must insist that its authority be respected and its recommendations be not made simply to be discarded or ignored.

I say this at once because I have felt there is a tendency to reopen the earlier history of this matter in a way which cannot contribute to the peaceful settlement which it is our duty to devise. General McNaughton in his statement on 29 December expressed the view that any legalistic or historical approach to the matter would entail the examination of a complex mass of detail. I have no wish to enter into such past history.

The representative of Pakistan submitted that the history of the Kashmir dispute did not begin with the influx of tribesmen in October 1947. Any attempt to fix the initial responsibility for the present state of affairs would involve investigation of the claim made by Pakistan that the fighting began when the Maharaja made unprovoked attacks on his Muslim subjects. I do not express any view on that claim, but I refer to this point as an instance of the dangers that lie in harking back to the detailed history of this matter. It seems to me that we may risk losing sight of our real purpose through becoming involved in the discussion of numbers of points which are not directly relevant to a practical solution of the problem. I know that it has been argued that proposals must be examined against the background of past events. In many negotiations that is the case, but we remember that, in this case, if we can achieve what we desire, that is, to enable the people of Kashmir freely to express their wishes, by which the fate of the State will be decided, all this past history will then have become irrelevant, and I hope the slate could then be sponged clean.

What we are discussing is really a question of mechanics, of preparing for that free expression of the will of the people. Both India and Pakistan have given their agreement to a procedure which will enable the people of Kashmir to make known their views. I am indeed glad to note that in their statements to the Council the representatives of India and Pakistan seemed to be in full agreement with the objectives set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of General McNaughton's proposals [S/1453].

Let us refresh our memory of paragraph 1. Sub-paragraph (a) refers to the intention that the future of the State shall be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite. But, more than this, the clause provides that the plebiscite should take place as early as possible. I repeat as early as possible. Sub paragraph (b) underlines the desire of both Governments to settle the dispute in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants. Surely we have in these two clauses, to which both the Indian and Pakistan Governments subscribe, a most important principle. Both Governments acknowledge that the will of the people is to be decisive, and they agree that the people should be given an opportunity freely to express their desires as quickly as is found practicable.

Far be it from me to brush aside legal considerations when they are relevant, but can it be argued that the hopes and aspirations of the people of the State are in any way dependent upon the question of who exercises sovereignty over Kashmir at this time? Then, again, there are the questions of the disbanding and stationing of troops. Can it be the wish of either side to lay itself open to charges that it is preventing the expression of the will of the people in a free and unfettered manner? Can either side afford to prolong the present deadlock by insisting that this or that force should be disbanded at this or that time ? One merely has to pose these questions to know the answers.

How, then can either side feel justified in pursuing points such as these which can do no good and which, unintentionally. I know, does it merely serve to frustrate the early expression of the will of the people? Delay is dangerous. In this case, it is no healer. Unless positive action is taken without delay, the present malady, which besets not only the unfortunate State of Jammu and Kashmir but also the whole sub-continent, may become incurable. Can it be anyone's wish to allow legal points of doubtful relevance to stand in the way of progress? Here, again, one merely has to pose the question to know what the answer will be. If safeguards or guarantees are required, it is up to the United Nations to provide those safeguards or guarantees, and I see no reason why we should not be able to do anything which is likely to be needed.

I would like to remind the Council of some words uttered by the Prime Minister of India, a great statesman whose wisdom we all admire. He said, in November 1947: "We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it". In the same statement, the Prime Minister used these words also: "As soon as Kashmir is free from the invader, our troops will have no further necessity to remain there, and the fate of Kashmir will be left in the hands of the people". These are the words of a noble and wise statesman. Let us not allow ourselves to become so blindly by lesser matters that we lose sight of these principles altogether.

Considerable progress has been made towards the fulfilment of the undertakings given by the Prime Minister of India. With the agreement of both parties, a man of world-wide renown has been nominated by our Organisation to administer the plebiscite. Moreover, both parties have agreed to the performance by our nominee of certain functions, including the final disposal of armed forces remaining in the State, as a preliminary to the plebiscite. These seem to me to be very substantial steps towards the eventual settlement of this matter, and I can see no valid reason why we should not be able to complete our task along the lines on which we have so far proceeded. It seems to me that the time has come for the Council to give a lead in the matter, and for the members to indicate frankly what, in their view, might break the present deadlock and contribute to the achievement of a solution. which would be just and equitable and which they would expect both parties to accept.

I cannot attempt to conceal the disappointment of my Government that the proposals put forward by General Mc Naughton to the two parties were not accepted. My Government feels that these proposals indicate broadly a basis upon which this matter could be disposed of quickly and fairly. I must confess that we are very sorry to learn that the replies of the two Governments showed that the high hopes which we had entertained in regard to the outcome of General Mc Naughton's discussions could not be realised.

It is now the duty of the Council to devise other means of carrying forward their plans. I think there can be no doubt in anyone's mind about the attitude of the United Kingdom after the remarks I have made this afternoon. My delegation has had the advantage in these last few days of consultation with a number of other delegations, and we have been able to put our name to a joint draft resolution which is being submitted this afternoon for consideration [S/1461] I should wish it to be quite clear that, in acting as one of the sponsors of this draft resolution, my delegation does so in the belief and on the understanding that the procedure indicated therein is directed towards the earliest possible implementation of the agreement existing between the parties in regard to the ascertainment of the will of the people. In my view, both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have accepted an obligation to extend their full and unreserved co-operation in the preparation of arrangements which will enable the people to express their views through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is, therefore, incumbent upon both Governments to make every effort towards putting into effect the arrangements set out in the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949.

To turn to the question of demilitarisation, members of the Council will observe that the draft resolution submitted to them does not follow General Mc Naughton in his suggestion that agreement should be reached in New York in regard to the matters listed in paragraph 1 of General McNaughton's proposals. If the Council decides to appoint a representative of the kind suggested in the draft resolution, I should consider it appropriate to leave it to him to decide upon the procedure he intends to adopt. I should hope that he might find it possible to begin negotiations here in New York.

I would conclude by commending the draft resolution to the Council and to the parties. No doubt one or other of these, or even both, will find in it things that they would have changed that must always be the case in any attempt to bridge differences of opinion, but I trust both parties will recognize in this draft resolution a sincere attempt on the part of members of the Security Council to formulate proposals that will be fair and effective. We are, I hope, on the way to a solution of a difficulty that has been embittering for too long the relations between the two countries concerned. It is not, unfortunately, the only question at issue between them, but if it could be satisfactorily settled much else might follow. The ultimate method for settlement is agreed ; we are only hampered and obstructed by differences of opinion as to how we can come to achieve that settlement, and I most devoutly hope that the deliberations of this Council, at this time, may make a useful contribution to the removal of these differences.