Text of the Speech made by Sir Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 458 held on 29 December 1949
The discussion of this matter in the Security Council today, particularly in the absence of the replies from the two parties to the proposals which the President has made to them, is necessarily in a preliminary stage. However, in the hope that it may be useful to the Security Council, I am already in the position to indicate broadly the reaction of my Government to those proposals which the President has put to the parties and which are now before the Security Council.
As the members of the Council will be aware, the United Kingdom stands in a very special relationship to India and to Pakistan. We value very greatly the friendship which we enjoy with both countries, and we are anxious to do all in our power to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan to reach agreement in regard to Kashmir. It has been a matter for particular regret on our part that the dispute has for so long hindered the development of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between the two Governments. The immense problems which face both of them call for the exertion of every ounce of their joint strength.
We all know how great a part these mighty nations can play in leading the people of Asia and of the world to a realisation of those great hopes of a fuller and better life which all of us cherish. These facts seem to me to place a special responsibility upon the Security Council in its consideration of the question of Kashmir. The work which the Security Council has done on this question during the last two years possesses a significance out of all proportion to the simple issue of Kashmir alone. It is the duty of the Security Council to strive to safeguard the peace and well-being of the peoples of the world, and we must take the account of all relative considerations, and do our utmost to display the breadth of vision which alone can enable us to fulfil our duty to the peoples of the world.
India and Pakistan brought their dispute to the United Nations in this spirit, and it is in this spirit that we must apply ourselves to the task of arriving at a settlement which will be accepted by the peoples of India and of Pakistan, and of the whole world, as just and right.
It is perhaps appropriate that the leader of a delegation of another Commonwealth country should have been entrusted by the Security Council with the task of endeavouring, by private negotiation, to arrive at the basis of settlement upon which the parties might agree. Our President has, I know, laboured night and day since the last meeting of the Security Council and has spared neither himself nor his staff. We all owe a very great debt of gratitude to him and his delegation. Such knowledge as I have had of the progress of his consultations with the parties has led me to admire his fair-mindedness and his anxiety to take due account of all points of view and of the special difficulties which beset the parties to the dispute.
I know sufficient of his work to be able to say that his whole attitude has been completely objective, and I feel confident that the representatives of India and Pakistan will agree with me that this is unquestionably the case.
The third interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/1430, S/1430/ Add. ), S/ 14301 Add. 2, S/1430/Add. 3) drew particular attention to three matters which have hindered the Commission in its work. Two of these matters, namely, the disposal of the Azad forces and the withdrawal of troops from Jammu and Kashmir, can, in the view of my delegation, be linked together when we reflect upon ways and means of overcoming the impasse which has been reached. It seems to us that, viewed against the proper background, these matters are not of such a major character that a solution is impossible. Both Governments are, after all, pledged to determine the final accession of Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people expressed through a free and impartial plebiscite. The principles which are to govern the arrangements for the plebiscite have, moreover, been agreed by both parties and are set out in the United Nations Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. Clearly, however, conditions for the plebiscite cannot be established so long as there is any reasonable ground for fear on the part of any of the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir. It is, therefore, fundamental that the armed forces in the State, no matter what their description may be, should be so reduced in number and so disposed as to afford a guarantee to the people that they will be left free to exercise their votes without any form of anxiety or pressure. I do not think that either India or Pakistan would attempt to dispute this view, and we, for our part, would certainly support any arrangements which they might agree upon for the effective reduction of the armed forces which are now established within the borders of the State.
In regard to the question of the Northern Area, my Government is impressed by the statement in paragraph 273 of the Commission's report that "the entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities." It is, of course, the duty of the Security Council to eliminate such a contingency. It will be remembered that all members of the Commission except one felt that the Government of India ought, in the circumstance, to be willing to waive a claim which has, in any event, to be considered afresh in connection with the preparation of conditions for the holding of a plebiscite.
According to my information, the proposals which the President submitted to the two parties were prepared only after the closest consultation with them. They were designed to pay the utmost possible regard to the legitimate interests of the two parties to this dispute.
I do not think anyone would wish to question the general considerations which are set out in paragraph 1 of the proposals.
In paragraph 2 I note that it is laid down that the programme of progressive demilitarisation shall be agreed between the parties. Having regard to the objectives which have been accepted publicly by both Governments, it seems to me impossible to quarrel with this paragraph. No doubt special considerations and interests might need to be taken into account in preparing the program, but given good will on the part of all concerned, I believe that it would be possible to achieve a result which would be equitable and acceptable.
The remaining paragraphs of the proposal seem to my delegation to be equally appropriate, having regard to the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and the history of this matter.
I would, therefore, as to the parties that these proposals seem to me to correspond broadly to the views of well-disposed and impartial observers of the Kashmir scene.. I know that both the Indian and Pakistan delegations have been reflecting upon them with all seriousness, and that this matter calls for the display of great statesmanship on the part of the leaders of both countries. Let us, however, be under no illusion about the purport of these proposals. What is under consideration is not a final solution of the Kashmir problem, but rather the next step in a process leading towards the plebiscite which, as both side, are agreed, shall take place to decide the ultimate fate of Kashmir. The two Governments have had submitted to them well-intentioned and objective suggestions designed to achieve the end which both of them desire. It will, of course, be understood that there is no desire to exclude consideration of any modifications or amendments that would help to achieve the object in view.
In conclusion, I would extend to the President and to the delegations of India and Pakistan our good wishes in the anxious negotiations which are now proceeding. I have every confidence that it will be found possible to reach an understanding along the lines suggested by the President, which will enable progress to be made in this matter fairly and satisfactorily to all concerned.