21041948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. EL-Khouri (Syria) in the Security Council Meeting No. 286 held on 21 April, 1948

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. EL-Khouri (Syria) in the Security Council Meeting No. 286 held on 21 April, 1948

 

We all agreed from the beginning of this discussion that an effort should be made to get the agreement of both parties on one kind of resolution, with the belief that it would be advantageous for the Security Council and for the implementation of its programme if the programme coincided with the wishes and had the consent of both parties. Unfortunately, until now, this agreement has not been achieved. Each side persists in its position. From the speeches which we heard yesterday [285th meeting), we understood that neither of the parties is in agreement with this joint draft resolution.

 

This matter has certain aspects. There is the political aspect, and there is the judicial and legal aspect of the question. I have noticed that this joint draft resolution, which has been proposed by six and supported by seven members of the Security Council, deals in a very good manner with the political aspect, the finding of a solution which would cope with the political phases of the question in the best possible way.

 

But at the same time, there is also the legal aspect which has not even been discussed, nor considered at all, in the Security Council. The legal aspect to which I refer is the matter of accession, which is now considered by the Indian delegation as an accomplished fact. The Security Council did not refer to this matter in any way, but I believe that, while dealing with such a situation and considering a final resolution on it, this aspect should not be neglected altogether. This is obviously the case if we bear in mind what the accession is and to what extent it can be considered, in such a way that it would be helpful for both parties and for the Commission which is to be established to assist in the implementation of the resolution.

 

I understood from the statements presented by both parties that the accession of one of the States to either India or Pakistan will, in the first place, be made by the ruler, by the Maharajah of that State, when he is in full agreement with his subjects. If there is no agreement between the Maharajah and his subjects, then the plebiscite is the only way to decide the question of accession, whether it be to one side or the other.

 

I do not know how many of the 585 States in the subcontinent of India have acceded to Dominion or the other in this way, but there were only two cases brought before us : Kashmir and Junagadh. Both of them are in similar, antagonistic positions. In Jammu and Kashmir there is a great majority of Muslims, about eighty per cent. In Junagadh it is the contrary. The population is Hindu, and the Maharajah is Muslim, while in Kashmir the population is Muslim and the Maharajah is Hindu. It seems that in both States the accession was declared by the Maharajah, according to his own wish, sentiment and intentions. The Muslim Maharajah of Junagadh submitted his decision of accession to Pakistan, being himself Muslim and the majority of his subjects Hindus. In Kashmir it was just the contrary. The Maharajah is Hindu, and the majority of the people are Muslims, so the Maharajah of Kashmir expressed his desire to make the accession to India. In both cases the wishes of the Maharajah were opposed to the desire and wishes of his subjects. According to the agreement reached between the two parties when the Dominions of India and Pakistan were created, in cases where there is conflict between a Maharajah and his subjects, only a plebiscite would determine to which Dominion accession would be made.

 

We have seen what happened in the case of Junagadh. When the Maharajah announced the accession to Pakistan, the Indian Government did not accept it, and they occupied it. Junagadh with military forces deposed the Maharajah and established a government. Afterwards, they had a new plebiscite, and the result of the plebiscite were in favour of India, so that the desire of the Maharajah for accession to Pakistan was nullified

 

In the State of Kashmir it was altogether different. The Maharajah announced his desire for accession to India against the wishes of a good number of the people. I do not now, whether that number was in the majority or in the minority but there was revolution and bloodshed in Kashmir for some time. The Muslim people there, as we understood it were demanding that the Maharajah declare accession to Pakistan, which he did not wish to do. He declared accession to India and called for help from India. India at once sent forces to occupy the country and became the de facto authority there, complying with the wish of the Maharajah, while the population is still fighting and receiving help from raiders and intruders from other neighbouring countries and from the Muslim tribes who came to help their people

 

There is another government, the Azad government. Kashmir, which was established to defend their case. In this matter, as far as I understand it, it would not be legally and judicially correct if we considered the accession as already having taken place, and that it cannot be modified except by a plebiscite 1 consider that, up to the present time, there is no accession of Kashmir to either Dominion, because that accession which was proposed was not in conformity with the arrangements and arrangement made between the two parties, and it is not an arrangement with the people of Kashmir themselves whereby they have been given a chance for self-determination, an opportunity to decide their own fate. The wishes of one person should not dominate, as in the case of Junagadh. It is correct to say that the Maharajah of Junagadh, in declaring his accession to Pakistan, was not acting within the rules of our Charter, and that the people of Junagadh were not given the opportunity for self-determination, the chance to determine the fate of their future government. It was the same case in Kashmir.

 

Let us leave this point and pass on to the second point, which is that there are now two candidates for election in this plebiscite India and Pakistan.

 

I consider it to be fair and just that, in drafting a resolution, the Security Council should give to both parties equal advantage and privileges in controlling the plebiscite which is to be held. I believe that it is obligatory that both parties should have the same advantages, just as, in all elections held throughout the world, when there are two candidates, they are given the same opportunities to exercise their right of control and of seeing what is going on. One party should not be given the advantage over the other.

 

The draft resolution before the Security Council envisages, as a first point, the establishment of peace. Toward that end, it calls upon the people of Kashmir and the tribe men who are there to stop fighting. I am sure that such an appeal will not be effective.

 

Sub-paragraph 1 (b) of the draft resolution calls upon the Government of Pakistan to use its best endeavours to persuade the people of Kashmir and the tribesmen who came there from outside the State that this resolution guarantees for them full freedom to express their views in a just and free plebiscite.

 

The representative of Pakistan indicated on 19 April [285th meeting] that he is not convinced that this resolution will guarantee the fulfilment of the aims indicated in it. How can we ask the Government of Pakistan to persuade others of something about which that Government is not itself convinced? The representative of Pakistan stated clearly that he is not convinced that this resolution will guarantee a free plebiscite and equal rights to all the people. If he is not convinced, certainly we cannot expect him to convince others. Therefore, the first point as to the establishment of peace fails from the beginning. If the Government of Pakistan will not undertake to

 

carry out the provisions of sub-paragraph 1 (b), who will do it? It will have to be done by force. The Indian forces which are in Kashmir will continue to fight with the tribesmen and with the opposing party, in order to try to establish peace. In that case, our resolution would not be effective in leading towards a peaceful solution of the matter.

 

As to the next point, the plebiscite, under the terms of the joint resolution Pakistan would have no opportunity to participate in controlling or inspecting or supervising it. The Government of India has been given a certain amount of supervisory authority; Pakistan has been given nothing. I think that for reasons of fairness and practicability, the Security Council must give equal opportunities to both parties in any resolution. Only in that way could the resolution be worthy of being described as a recommendation not of either of the parties, but of the Security Council. If we fail to meet the desires of the parties, then we have to draft our resolution in fair terms, giving equal advantages to both.

 

If the authors of the joint resolution would agree to certain amendments in it, I should perhaps find it acceptable. However, I understand from reliable sources that the seven members who have supported the resolution are not ready to vote for any amendments. Furthermore, the paper circulated today by the Indian delegation indicates that it does not accept this joint draft resolution and will not agree to any amendments unless the Pakistan delegation is willing to accept the first draft resolution submitted by the President of the Security Council, the representative of China [document S/699].

 

For these reasons, I do not see much hope in supporting this draft resolution, or in trying to put it into effect. The fighting will continue in the present circumstances, and no results will be attained. Therefore, as long as the draft resolution does not have the support of both parties, I prefer to abstain from voting. The President: As no other member of the Security Council wishes to speak. I take it that it is the wish of the Council to proceed as has been suggested, namely, to discuss and vote upon this draft resolution paragraph by paragraph. We shall do so accordingly.

 

Before I ask the Assistant Secretary-General to read the draft resolution paragraph by paragraph, I wish to make clear once more that it has never been the understanding of the authors of this draft resolution, nor their wish, intention, or right, to restrict the views of any member of the Security Council in any way, or to prevent their submission of whatever amendments they may see fit to any of its paragraphs.

 

Mr. Sobolev (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs): The preamble of the revised draft resolution at present under discussion reads as follows: "The Security Council,

 

Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,

 

"Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting.

 

"Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,

 

"Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,"

 

The President: The complaint has been voiced that the authors of this proposal failed, in the preamble, to give their opinion as to the steps that should be taken by Pakistan to secure the removal of the invaders.

 

I would like to explain that the matter of the complaint is very clearly and fully covered in the substantive part of the draft resolution, in the paragraph relating to the things that Pakistan should do on the recommendation of the Security Council. In this connection we did not think that the Security Council had been invited, or could be invited, to give an opinion on the legal merits of the case as to the rights of the parties to this dispute. The Security Council was requested by them to take appropriate measures for the peaceful settlement of the dispute and to restore friendly relations between them. That is what we have been seeking to achieve with these. recommendations.

 

I might add that, at the very beginning of these deliberations, the position seemed to be more hopeful than it is at present. As a matter of fact, both parties agreed to the appointment of a Commission that would act on behalf of the Security Council [230 meeting], but the members of which would be appointed by the parties to the dispute. At the beginning we did not think it would be necessary in any way to have direct representation of the Security Council on the Commission.

 

The Security Council has had an opportunity to hear the extreme points of view so ably stated by the representatives of India and Pakistan and also to appreciate the task with which it was confronted in trying to bring about some sort of conciliation between those two extreme points of view in order to make what would be considered a just, fair and acceptable recommendation.

 

It is a matter of great disappointment to the Security Council to find that, on the contrary, both parties seem to think very definitely that the Council has not learned enough to either side in trying to meet their wishes, but we still hope that the Council has not learned enough to either side in trying to meet their wishes, but we still hope that the spirit of the friendly approach that brought the parties before the Security Council will be continued, and that the overriding interests of the sub-continent will very decisively influence the parties to consider these recommendations as favourably as possible before doing anything that will in any way I will not say endanger international peace and security because I don't even like to think of that-but which might in any way widen the breach between the two Dominions. The Security Council believes that it is clearly in their interest to make every possible effort to reach an understanding, and confidently expects that after this discussion has come to an end, the Governments of India and Pakistan will see their way to remedying whatever shortcomings this draft resolution may have, with a view to finding a way to work in agreement towards this proposed goal of a free and impartial plebiscite by means of which the people of Jammu and Kashmir would be given an opportunity to decide the question of accession either to India or to Pakistan.