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17041948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 289. held on 17 April, 1948


Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 289. held on 17 April, 1948

 

Exactly one month has passed since the Security Council last considered the dispute concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We have devoted an entire month to the study of the problem.

 

At the end of the last meeting of the Security Council. On this question, the 269th meeting of 18 March 1948, I stated that I would rely on the experience of the two previous presidents of the Security Council, the representatives of Belgium and Canada. I also stated that I would welcome suggestions, oral or written, from other delegations with regard to the solution of this problem. Since the adjournment of the meeting of the Security Council of 18 March, I received detailed suggestions from the delegation of the United Kingdom and the delegation of the United States of America. Because of the fact that I anticipated that the solution of the problem would be delayed until this month of April, I also invited the delegation of Colombia to join in

the discussion. Thus, a total of six delegations participated in the revised draft resolution.

 

The President of the Security Council called attention. to the fact that when he assumed office, he had before him a revised draft resolution, dated 30 March. That revised draft resolution was, in fact, the third since the one I submitted on 18 March [document S/699]. Since the submission of the revised draft resolution on of 30 March, many additional revisions have been submitted.

 

The present revised draft resolution is the considered judgement of six delegations, arrived at after weeks of hard work. As the representative of Canada said, the conferences on this question were animated by only one purpose, that of helping the parties to come to an agreement, and failing that agreement between the parties, to find the fairest and most effective means of achieving a peaceful settlement.

 

The problem has two aspects; first, the restoration of peace and order, and secondly, a plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall become a part of the Dominion of India or a part of the Dominion of Pakistan.

 

The problem is indeed complicated, having its roots in the long political, cultural and religious history of the sub continent, together with the very complicated geographical aspect. If we had only considered the complications contained in the problem, we might well have despaired of ever finding a solution. Fortunately, the Government of India, together with the two delegations present, furnished the Security Council with a key to the solution.

 

Long before the problem was brought to the attention of the Security Council, the Prime Minister of India said that he would leave the question of the eventual accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the decision of the people of that State. Since the question came before the Security Council, the delegation of India and the delegation of Pakistan have both insisted that that is their wish. That gave us the key. Therefore, the plebiscite is the arch of this draft resolution. The question should and must be solved by a fair and imperial plebiscite. The greater part of the draft resolution is aimed at making that plebiscite as fair and as impartial as possible.

 

I should like to explain to the Security Council the various safeguards for the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite which this draft resolution provides.

 

The plebiscite cannot be singled out alone. It is related to the entire military and political situation in the State, and therefore, we have included provisions which cover the general situation. However, I should like first of all to deal with the plebiscite itself.

 

The following provisions are contained in the draft resolution:

 

First, we provide that an administrator of international repute, nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, shall be appointed to be the head of the plebiscite

administration.

 

Secondly, this internationally nominated administrator shall have the right to choose his own assistants and subordinates. In other words, this international personage will

have the authority to control the choice of personnel in that administration.

 

Thirdly, this plebiscite administrator shall frame the regulations governing the plebiscite, Fourthly, the plebiscite administrator shall have full power concerning the conduct of the plebiscite, including the direction and supervision of the State forces and police. Fifthly, special magistrates, nominated by the plebiscite administrator, shall be appointed to try cases relating to and arising out of the plebiscite Sixthly, the Government of India and, through the Government of India, the Government of the State shall undertake to prevent "any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir." This relates to the public authorities in the State. Seventhly, this draft resolution provides, in paragraph 12, assurance to the voters. Paragraph 12 reads as follows: "The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit."

 

Eighthly, outsiders, people who are not normally resident in the State and who are not there for a lawful purpose, shall be asked to withdraw. In other words, the voting will not be swamped by people who have no right to vote there.

 

Ninthly, all the present political prisoners shall be freed and given back their citizenship rights.

 

Tenthly, this revised draft resolution provides that the Commission of the Security Council shall station observers in all parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to watch the proceeding in the plebiscite.

 

Finally, this revised draft resolution provides in paragraph 15 that

 

"The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial."

 

During recent decades, a number of plebiscites have been held in various parts of the world and international bodies have seen to it that the plebiscites were free and impartial. I do not know of any previous plebiscite where the safeguards for freedom and impartiality have been so numerous and strict.

 

I am honestly convinced that the provisions of the revised draft resolution are all that one could expect. These provisions were mainly contained in the draft resolution which I submitted to the Security Council on 18 March. My draft resolution met with a negative reception; even a hostile one. For a time, I was greatly puzzled. I have learned since that the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir is a special problem quite different from plebiscites that have been held elsewhere..

 

I learned that the plebiscite which the Security Council wishes to hold in Kashmir may will be influenced by many. psychological and sociological factors. Therefore, in order to meet these peculiar psychological and sociological factors, we have introduced in this revised draft resolution other features relating to the disposition of the army and the composition of the interim administration.

 

It is with these aspects that I now wish to deal. The military provisions of this revised draft resolution have really two objectives in view. The first is the restoration of peace and order that, in itself, is important, and it is also an essential condition of the plebiscite. Without the restoration of peace and order, no plebiscite can be held. The Indian army is in Kashmir. It went there because of the intrusion of the tribesmen. Therefore, on the military side, we start in paragraph I by asking the Government of Pakistan to use its best endeavours :

 

"To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State."

 

That is the initial point of this whole programme of restoration of peace and order. After a beginning has been made in the withdrawal of these intruders, when the Commission of the Security Council is satisfied that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of fighting have become effective, then, at that point, the Security Council will ask India to withdraw a part of its army and reduce the remainder to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of law and order.

 

In this connection, we ask, first, the reduction of the Indian force in the State, and secondly, we ask the Indian Government to station the remainder of those troops-that part which cannot be withdrawn-in accordance with certain principles :

 

"(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State,

 

"(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas, "(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area.

 

I have been privately informed by our friends from India that they dislike these military provisions; that they think these provisions go too far and curtail their rights. I think it can be argued that in appearance these provisions do curtail their rights, but I would not concede that in reality, in substance, these provisions, in any way, deny or curtail their rights. It is my conviction that the Commission of the Security Council would wish to have peace and order maintained in all parts at all times. The Commission which the Security Council would send out would not wish to have anarchy develop in any part of the State. Therefore, I presume that the Commission will not propose, to the Government of India or the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, such arrangements as would not maintain peace and order.

 

That is my understanding of the purpose of these paragraphs. I state it for the record. If other sponsors of this revised draft resolution intend to give those paragraphs a different interpretation, I hope they will state their interpretation now. I shall reiterate that it is my interpretation that the Commission would not wish to hamper the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the performance of the task of maintaining peace and order.

 

We hope that these proposed revisions will make that problem easier and will make it necessary for India to maintain its present armed strength of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We hope that when the provisions of this revised draft resolution are carried out, the Indian troops can be reduced progressively and be so stationed as this revised draft resolution requires, without endangering peace and order in the State,

 

Another complaint against this revised draft resolution is that it does not recognize specifically the right of the Dominion of India and its duty of defending Jammu and Kashmir. That question of defence has been in our thoughts a great deal during the course of all these deliberations.

 

I maintain that if the provisions of the draft resolution were each executed in turn, the problem of defence would be a minor one, if it did not disappear altogether. We assume that if the provisions of the earlier paragraphs are carried out, it would not leave any problem of defence in that State. But if our calculations should be wrong and if, suddenly, there should be a large invasion, then what ? This draft resolution does not provide for that contingency. This draft resolution is framed on the hypothesis that the contingency will not arise. But suppose that contingency does arise. Then what ? Then, all the Member States, and naturally the Dominion of India, will fall back on the provisions of the Charter. One of the Articles of the Charter specifically assures to all Members the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. Therefore, today, I wish to state, for the purposes of the record, that nothing in this draft resolution impairs that inherent right of self-defence. If the other sponsors of this draft resolution have a different interpretation of its meaning I hope they will state it openly before the Security Council and have that put on record too.

 

It is my understanding that the many provisions of this draft resolution do not impair that inherent right of all Member States to individual or collective self-defence.

 

Finally, we have to take care of the general political framework under which, in our opinion, this plebiscite might be carried out as we hope it will be. I am now speaking of paragraph 6, which is a very important one in this draft resolution. It reads:

 

"The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invites the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out."

 

I wish to call the attention of the Security Council to this paragraph. Major political groups will have the right to designate responsible representatives. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State will invite these responsible representatives.

 

The major political groups of which we speak are existent groups in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. They are not foreign elements. They are groups of long-standing; well-known to the people. We are not imposing any outside element on the Government of the State, and it is, as the last phrase points out, "while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out". This provision is for the purpose of ensuring that there will be no undue administrative interference with the plebiscite.

 

I know there are objections to coalition cabinets. People say that coalition cabinets are inefficient cabinets. Frankly, we are trying to offer to the State of Kashmir a scheme for efficient government. It may result that the efficiency of the administration will suffer. Frankly, we are offering a scheme whereby administrative interference with the plebiscite may be checked, and, because of the representative nature of the cabinet, there will be public confidence that the Government of Kashmir is not interfering with the plebiscite, and that is the primary objective. I do not concede that the paragraph infringes on the rights of the Government of India.

 

As to the draft resolution itself, I think I have said enough. I know its provisions are not entirely satisfactory to both parties. I am convinced it is impossible to find a resolution that will be acceptable in its entirety to both parties. However, if the members of the Security Council wish to have a peaceful solution of this dispute, I humbly and respectfully submit that this draft resolution appears to me to be the only possible one. If the two parties to the dispute wish to have a peaceful solution to this problem, I also humbly and respectfully submit that this draft resolution is the only possible one. Do we, or do we not, wish to have a peaceful solution to this problem? As the world is at present, I know there are men in public life, who, 1 should say, speculate on the temporary advantages of war or diplomacy. I think I am not too presumptuous when I say that the statesmen of both India and Pakistan are above such speculations. I know that they wish to organise new States, to organise new life, and to start relations between two neighbours not founded on the shifting sands of war or diplomacy. Enduring foundations for the solution of such a problem can only be found in the consent of the people of the State. If that is the only foundation on which we can build, I submit that this resolution guarantees the fullest and freest expression of the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.