04021948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Lopez (Colombia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 245 held on 4 February, 1948
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Lopez (Colombia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 245 held on 4 February, 1948
This debate, I believe, is practically exhausted. There is indeed very little that anyone can usefully add to the presentation that has been made by the representatives of India and Pakistan of their respective cases and to the very well informed discussion that has taken place in the Security Council. But should like very much to have some clarification on those points, which I am sure will leave the Security Council with the impression that in our labours since yesterday we have made very good progress in obtaining a clearer understanding of the present position.
I shall first mention this point: Yesterday, the Indian delegation requested a deferment of our discussion. The Indian delegation stated that it had been invited by its Government to return to India in order to have a more thorough discussion of the situation as it found it in the Security Council today. and then to determine its attitude. The Indian representative among other explanations, made this statement: "The question of whether any one of the present members of the delegation should be left behind, or somebody else should represent India at such meetings or on such occasions, is-I hope the Security Council will agree-an internal matter to be settled by our Government. We shall do the best we can in order to see that the Security Council's work in connection with the Jammu and Kashmir question, should any such emergency arise, is not inconvenienced thereby. "A little before that statement the Indian representative said: "As long as this item is on the agenda, India is under an obligation to see that any inquiries made in regard to any emergency situations are answered by someone who has full authority to speak in the name of India. If it so happens that the Security Council holds a meeting for the purpose of discussing any such emergent situation, India certainly will make arrangements to be properly represented at such a meeting."
My first doubt is just that: Are we going to stop discussing the Jammu and Kashmir question until the Indian delegation finds it advisable to return to the Security Council ? And in the meantime, are we going to restrict or limit our discussions to what the Indian representative would call an "emergent situation" ? Or, once we stop discussing the Jammu and Kashmir question, is the Security Council going with the discussion of other matters that have been brought to its attention by the delegations of both India and Pakistan, not as matters of the same character of urgency, but all the same as matters that have enough urgency in the mind of the Security Council not to be postponed indefinitely until such time as we have completed our discussions of the Jammu and Kashmir question, after the Indian delegation deems it advisable to come back ?
That, I believe, is a rather important point that has not been brought to the attention of the Security Council. I think it is very important because it places the Pakistan delegation. at a great disadvantage, unless I am very much mistaken in my understanding of the present position, which I take to be that the Indian delegation will return to India without giving us very definite assurance as to when and how they will return. And the Pakistan delegation, I take it, will remain with us in the meantime,
Then, another doubt arises in my mind. What is going to happen in Jammu and Kashmir in the meantime? Is the fighting to continue? Will the Indian Government be free to carry on its military operations? Does the Security Council expect, by any chance, that two, three or four weeks from now, it is going to renew its discussions at the political or at the military level at which it discontinued them ?
I have a third rather serious doubt. This morning. the representative of the United Kingdom wanted it to be very clear that we were not establishing a precedent by agreeing to the adjournment requested by the Indian delegation. He was rather emphatic about it. He wanted to be sure that we were not establishing a precedent. I should like to ask very respectfully: Does anyone really believe for a moment that we shall not be establishing a precedent? Once we agree that any delegation which comes before the Security Council with a case of this importance can, at any stage in the proceedings at which they see fit, say that it wants to go home, and can request an adjournment, can anybody hereafter labour under it? any misapprehension as to the fact that the Security Council has established a precedent from which it will never be able to get away? Not only that, the precedent is an extremely serious one. It is as serious as anything that has come to my knowledge while I have been a representative on the Security Council. It is something that, in my opinion, threatens the very stability of the authority of the Security Council.
We have been discussing several proposals, and we are now practically in agreement-if this is not the understanding, I should like to be corrected, because, I repeat, I believe the matter is of the utmost importance-with the idea of granting what is apparently a reasonable request that the Indian delegation should have a kind of option on the action of the Security Council. We have discussed with them the different proposals that have come before the Security Council; and just because we were labouring under the understanding that they both wanted us to help them to reach very promptly a friendly agreement. we have departed from our usual rules of procedure The different proposals or suggestions that have come before the Security Council have been discussed with the representatives of India and Pakistan through the medium of the President of the Security Council. Now, at this point, six weeks after the start of our deliberations, with nothing new having come up in the meantime, the representative of India says "I have been instructed to go home to discuss this question. I am going to inform my Government of what the trend of opinion is in the Security Council." The Indian delegation knows reasonably well now the opinion of the majority of the members of the Security Council as to what should be done. That opinion has been incorporated in the different draft resolutions and memoranda. It has been discussed with the President of the Security Council, acting on behalf of the Security Council, and the action of the President, in his negotiations with the representatives of the two parties, has, time and again, been endorsed by the Security Council.
Now, when all this has been done, the Indian delegation comes to the President of the Security Council and says: "I request that I be allowed to withdraw to India to discuss the situation with my Government." What will be the position if, after they are gone, they inform the Security Council that the Government of India does not agree to the proposals that have been discussed with them and which represent the point of view of at least a very large majority of the members of the Security Council? Is this or is this not a serious precedent in our work ?
Up to the present time it has been the rather unfortunate experience of this Organisation and every one of its organs to have its recommendations or decisions on most important points substantially disregarded, disregarded after the organs of the United Nations have made every possible effort, by compromise, to guard against that eventuality. That is what, in the mind of the Colombian delegation, accounts for the decreasing interest of the public in the work of the United. Nations.
Unfortunately, it is true that far from being eminently successful, as everyone expected the United Nations to be after they had been so repeatedly assured of the backing of the great Powers, we have been eminently unsuccessful. But, after all, everyone is generally in a hopeful frame of mind and we all continue to work in the expectation that condition will improve, that our work will become increasingly useful, and that we shall be able to recoup the interest and prestige in our work which has been lost. However, I feel very deeply concerned-I hope I am wrong when I think of the implications of what I consider to be the option that will be granted the Indian delegation in this matter. Article 24 of the Charter says: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility. for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." This has been my understanding right along, and it was this that we tried to reaffirm in our proposal.
It seems to me quite obvious that it follows that the decisions of the Security Council cannot be made conditional, as we are, to all intents and purposes, making these proposals when we agree that the Indian delegation should go back home and return within two, three, four or five weeks to inform us whether or not they are acceptable to the Indian Government.
1 do not believe that I have to impose on the patience of the members of the Security Council in order to establish the reason for my doubts, my preoccupations and my concern. We started this discussion with the understanding that both India and Pakistan had come here, not only willingly, but with a sincere desire to have the Security Council help them to reach, as I said before, a friendly agreement. When the question of the Commission was discussed, perhaps the members will recall, there was a very brief argument as to the membership of the Commission and as to how the Commission should be appointed.
The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, if I remember correctly, did not share our view that the best way to appoint the Commission was the one we adopted, that is, that each of the two parties should appoint a member and they should appoint a third member. If my memory does not fail me, the representative of the USSR pointed out that it was advisable that the Security Council be represented in that Commission and that the Security Council should take a larger, stranger hand in the appointment of that Commission. Then, very superficially guided by my first feelings, and sharing the optimism of the Security Council, I said: "No, this is the best way. They have come to us; they are willing to agree. This is the way they suggest; this is the best. This is the one they will accept." However, from the moment that the Commission was decided upon, I have had a feeling, and I venture to say that I am sure that every member of the Security Council shares that feeling; Mr. Austin very properly pointed it out yesterday-that the two parties have been receding all the time from their original positions. That is why they have not come to an understanding because it is too obvious that, with the help of the Security Council and with our willingness to cooperate with them, if they had persisted in their original attitude, we should I have reached by this time some sort of an agreement; but we have not.
I do not find that, at the moment when the Indian delegation requests this adjournment, any new thing has come up that we have not been discussing here. There is no new subject; there is no new situation; there is no new proposal. On the country, the record shows that, from the moment that the Security Council did not agree to take the one action that the Indian delegation wanted-action to stop the fighting without taking action on the plebiscite-they have been gradually coming to the point at which they have arrived. On two or three occasions at the end of a week we have agreed that the President of the Security Council should continue conversation with two parties, and, at the beginning of the following week, in each instance, we have been informed that no progress had been made; the last time, not only that no progress had been made, but that the Indian delegation wanted to return to India.
I do not know if I should be justified in embarking upon an examination of the memorandum submitted by the Colombian delegation at the 241st meeting. I believe that the debate, as I said before, is exhausted; but I believe it would be useful if the President will allow me the privilege of considering that this memorandum has been formally submitted to the Security Council as a draft resolution.
There are several reasons that have induced me to take this action which all the members of the Security Council know I was not anxious to take. As a matter of fact, not feeling sure, as I do not yet feel sure, that I understood the implications of the case, I submitted that memorandum as a contribution to the conversations of the President of the Security Council with the two parties. I do not feel that I can claim that this is my memorandum, because substantially it is not. To use a familiar expression, it is a kind of a rehash of things that have already been presented and discussed here, viewed from a different position and a different angle. I shall deal presently with that angle. However, I do wish to say this: If I were asked for evidence of the impartiality of the Security Council, of the goodwill of the Security Council and of its unprejudiced attitude in this matter, I should point out that the latest memorandum submitted by the President of the Security Council and the Rapporteur [document S/667] has been substantially accepted by Pakistan, and that the memorandum that I have submitted has been substantially accepted by India.
The President and the Rapporteur and I have had no substantial difference of opinion. We have all been contributing in the same spirit, exchanging views and advancing our tentative proposals simply as contributions to the understanding that we were expecting between India and Pakistan. That has not come about, much to my regret and, I believe, to the regret of every member of the Security Council. Now I believe that it is pertinent to give one or two explanations which I thought unnecessary last week.
The draft resolution [document S/671] reads
"Whereas India and Pakistan have brought to the attention of the Security Council the situations in the Jammu and Kashmir State and other Indian States which are likely to endanger international peace and security; "-that is a fact, and there is no argument about it-"and
"Whereas the Members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agreed that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf...", That is from the Charter, but in view of the considerations which I have enumerated before, I did not think it was superfluous to insert that provision of the Charter here. The document goes on to say:
"The Security Council,
"Having considered the claims and allegations of India and Pakistan and their requests to the Council to adopt appropriate measures for the pacific settlement of their disputes and the restoration of friendly relations between the two countries, "Finds:..."
There has been some question here as to which of the provisions of the Charter applies to the present case. In the view of the Colombian delegation the best thing to do as the case stands today is to discuss the problem under Article 38, which is the last of the six Articles of Chapter VI regarding the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 38 reads:
"Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute."
I emphasize the words, "without prejudice to any other Articles of the chapter. But one point which is very important in this situation is the fact that we are authorised under the Charter to take action under Article 38 because we have been requested by the parties to make our recommendations. That is one position which we should not lose. The Security Council has to stand on the fact that this dispute was brought to its attention by India and Pakistan, and that they requested it to take appropriate measures to settle the dispute by peaceful means and to restore friendly relations between them. I may say, in passing, that is the principal reason why I differ with the memorandum presented by the President [document /667]. I hesitate very much to differ with men who are more familiar with this question than I am, the more so in a dispute of such world-wide importance as this. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we cannot move from the facts and the Charter to any declaration of principles by the President of the Security Council. That would be weakening our fundamental position as set forth in these three paragraphs of my resolution and in the Charter. I apologize for speaking my mind so frankly, but I believe that we should be guilty of a great political mistake if we were to move out of that situation. to a declaration of principles more or less subject to the approval of the Indian Government. That is my sixth or seventh doubt in this question.
Another difference is that I have been in favour of increasing the membership of the Commission to five, one member to be selected by India, one by Pakistan, and the other three appointed by the Security Council. The reason for that, as briefly stated in my resolution, is, "That the Commission established by the resolution of 20 January 1948 [document S/654] will have to perform with the utmost dispatch various and complicated duties which call for a more numerous membership," but there is a great deal that I feel I can add in favour of increasing the numerical strength of the Commission. First and foremost, in a situation like this, the Security Council should be in a position-as this draft resolution provides-to call for and to receive from its chosen representatives, for its information and guidance, direct reports of conditions in the Jammu and Kashmir State and other parts of India and Pakistan.
So far, we have been working on contradictory reports that we have been getting from the representatives of Pakistan and India, who generally contradict each other. After that, the members of the Security Council come to conclusions without their own means of verification. This in no way implies that I doubt the sincerity or the truthfulness of the reports submitted by the representatives of India and Pakistan, although those reports are contradictory.
I submit that we should have a representative Commission on which we can depend, and on which we should be at liberty to call it information and guidance, the more so if it is the intention of the Security Council to carry out the idea of having a plebiscite under the authority and supervision of the Security Council. It is inconceivable to me that we should undertake that responsibility without being directly and sufficiently represented on that Commission.
There are many more good reasons that I might adduce, but I shall only advance one more in this regard. Assuming that the two parties name their representatives to the Commission and that they do not agree upon the third member of the Commission, where shall we be ? Increasing the membership of the Commission is-among many other things-the assurance we are going to have that there will be a Commission. The Security Council will have to decide upon the proper time to get the Commission into action-when to send it to India and to decide upon its functions.
However, having established this Commission already. by the resolution of 20 January 1948 [document S/654] I believe that, in the light of what has transpired in the Security Council and in the light of what the Commission has to do, as well as the fact that it is one of our primary purposes to have the plebiscite carried out with some sort of intervention from the Security Council, the Commission should be increased to five or seven members, as the Security Council may decide.
Otherwise, I would say that I do not find very substantial opposition to or difference with this memorandum in the remarks of the Indian representative. We should be able to come to a satisfactory arrangement within a reasonable length of time, in view of the co-operative spirit with which we have tried to help India and Pakistan in this emergency.
I may be entirely wrong, but I have a feeling-as I have stated many times that these doubts call for a considerable clarification; that unless we know exactly what the position of the Security Council is going to be, we should not take action under the stress of the circumstances Speaking more concretely, I refer to the Indian delegation having booked passage to India.
It has already been said many times before that a railroad ticket or an airplane ticket can be cancelled or transferred. Without in any way trying to be disagreeable-I hope that there is no question in the mind of the Indian delegation that I want to be-I should also like to suggest a second contribution to the pacific settlement of this dispute. In reciprocity for the consideration that we have shown the Indian delegation, we would expect that the Indian delegation might see their way clear to waiting one, two, three, or four days, or at least until we settle this point of our discussion. It is extremely important, in any case, that the Indian delegation should not leave without having a clear statement of the position of the Security Council vis a-vis these questions I have submitted, as well as others that have been submitted by other members of the Security Council; and that if they choose to do so, it will be with the understanding that we are going to continue with our work.