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11021948  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noel Baker (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 244 held on 11 February, 1948


Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noel Baker (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 244 held on 11 February, 1948

 

This debate is taking place at the request of the delegation of India for a deferment of our work. It raises, I think, some important issues for the Security Council. I wish to make, if I may, a few preliminary remarks before I come to my main statement.

 

The first of my preliminary remarks is about the principle of the deferment of the work of the Security Council in a situation or dispute which threatens war. I feel sure that, in spite of the powerful observations which I am about to make, the Indian delegation will in fact go home. The members of that delegation will go home with the friendship, the understanding and the good wishes of the Security Council, and with our hopes for their early and profitable return. I am now speaking of the principle of deferment and not with any relation to our present case. It is very serious matter that, while a war is going on, while men are being killed, the Security Council should suspend its work which is designed to bring the fighting to an end.

 

I find it difficult to believe that in the early days of the League of Nations, while the Covenant was still being taken seriously, the Council of the League would ever have agreed to such a course. We were hoping that this Security Council, by the very fact that it is permanent, would be more effective for this purpose than the Council of the League. Of course, we recognize that there must sometimes be intervals when delegations must consult the Governments which make the decisions at home. We are more than grateful for the assurance which was given us by our Indian colleague yesterday afternoon. He is making no attempt to break off this affair and to withdraw the matter from the Security Council, but he is coming back as soon as he usefully can. We all agree that the item stands on the agenda. It is a matter of course. We are all agreed that, if developments should make it necessary, we shall proceed. That is a matter of course, and India will be represented, as our colleague told us, very well. We are all agreed that we must resume the question soon. The question is: how soon? I should be the last man to desire to express a firm view if the visit which is to be made to New Delhi will advance the cause of peace. But, as I am at present advised, it seems to me that the shortest period as yet proposed in the Council-the Chinese representative's fifteen days-is extremely long and the longest to which we ought now to agree, because this is a serious matter.

 

The representative of India told us yesterday that a battle was taking place in which 14,000 men had been Punched against the positions of the Indian Army That fact shows that large forces are now engaged. It is a big concentration. In any campaign, that would be a considerable engagement. Therefore, I hope-and I am sure that our Indian colleagues will do their best to justify the hope that they will return to us not necessarily at the end of the period which, in its wisdom, the Security Council may decide, but at the earliest moment when they see their path clear before them to useful work.

 

I want to add that I hope that what is being done today will not be taken as a precedent for future cases. think that is a matter of the highest importance. While there may be every justification for what the Indian delegation has asked, and to which we shall agree, there might, in another case, be no justification at all. That is why I hope it will be firmly established that this is not a precedent which can be held to bind the Security Council on any future occasion that may arise.

 

Secondly, I want to make a very brief amplification of what I said yesterday about the draft resolution presented by the President and the Rapporteur [document S/6671, out of which this request for adjournment has arisen. No one has asked that the Security Council shall vote on that draft resolution; no one is going to ask it. The Security Council, as I think, has given it a broad endorsement. But I venture to think that supposing we had voted on it, supposing we had made a formal decision, of course it would still have been open to the Security Council to make amendments to it, to make additions or deletions either by agreement of the parties or to meet the view of one of the parties which we thought was, well founded

 

Of course, it is not a binding document. If it had been voted, it would not be a binding document ruling out everything else. It could be changed or added to in any way. And, of course, not every member of the Security Council is in agreement with every detail that appears in the resolution. In my experience, that is always true in every document agreed to by any democratic body. I do not know what the experience of other members of the Security Council may have been in their respective parliaments at home, but I doubt if I have ever voted for a bill in the House of Commons of which, in all its details, I approved. But broadly, we think this is a good and reasonable basis of discussion. For my part, I would have thought the same of the memorandum presented by the representative of Colombia at the 241st meeting, of which the representative of India spoke some favourable words the other day.

 

Thirdly, in taking the view of the draft resolution submitted by the President and this Rapporteur or of the memorandum submitted by the representative of Colombia, I am sure that every member of the Security Council has acted according to his conscience and with absolute impartiality between the parties. The members of the Security Council have no reason in the world to do anything else. With equal understanding and equal friendship for two great peoples, they have sought to do equal justice to them both. And as they have begun, I am convinced they will go on to the very end. of all our work.

 

I now come to one or two of the important matters which were raised in the Security Council yesterday afternoon. The representative of India, with the courteous firmness which he always shows, told us that he wanted us to do more about clauses 4 (a) and (b) of the President's resolution. He said that he wanted drastic action taken by Pakistan to stop the fighting. We all want drastic action taken by Pakistan to stop the fighting. He said that India wanted those two clauses I have mentioned in the President's draft resolution to be much more developed. We all want those two clauses to be much developed. For my part, I could write a long essay on the subject.

 

He said that he wanted specific obligations to be laid on Pakistan about the tribesmen, about the volunteers from the Punjab and about the other matters which he mentioned. We all want obligations, as specific, as comprehensive, as the Indian delegation could desire.

 

India wants a demand made on Pakistan that its obligations be accepted and carried out. We are all quiet. ready to make that demand, but India wants that demand made now, at once, as the sole action of the Security Council, irrespective of everything else we may have to do, and if I understood him rightly yesterday the Indian representative said: "This is our task and other matters which have been raised, if not wholly irrelevant, are at least matters which can wait for a considerable time. We must," he said, "concentrate now on stopping the fighting."

 

That is the point-stopping the fighting. Would it stop the fighting if the Security Council did what he desires ? Everything lies there. Suppose we put this demand on Pakistan, and put it now. Would the inhabitants of Poonch and Mirpur and Riasi lay down their arms? Would the volunteers from the West Punjab go home? Would the tribesmen obey the summons of Security Council and go back to their barren uplands, or would our action have exactly the opposite effect? Would the tribesmen in their tens of thousands -- the tribesmen, who, many of them, have hitherto been persuaded to stay at home-come flooding down to conquer Kashmir, as they believe they can ?

 

I have constantly argued that that is the danger, perhaps a moral danger, to all concerned. The Indian representative brought some evidence to the Council chamber the other day. When that evidence was taken as a whole it supported, and very powerfully supported, what I have just said. It showed how grave the risks might be, how swift and disastrous the results might be, if the Council made a mistake. and acted unwisely or intemperately at this dangerous time.

 

How can the Council help the Indian delegation to bring the fighting to an immediate stop? We have said very often : by getting a general settlement of the whole Kashmir affair... I think it was the representative of the United States who put it first in our debates He said at the 20th meeting: "It is my opinion that, if and when the Security Council

 

deals with this problem, it must consider it as a whole, because unless it does, there cannot be a cessation of hostilities. How is it possible to induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without warfare and without driving them out ? That is the only way it can be done, unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim government that is in fact, and that has the appearance of being, non-partisan."

 

The representative of China put it, as I thought, in wise and cogent words at the 243rd meeting when he said:

 

"If you agree to a plebiscite, it must be a free and impartial plebiscite. Furthermore, the announcement and the establishment of a scheme of a free and impartial plebiscite would be the most potent means to pacify the Muslims and the tribesmen. I cannot think of any other way of carrying across to the people in revolt the message that it is unnecessary for them to resort to violence; and that, for their own good, they should stop violence as early as possible, because they will have a fair chance to decide their own future."

 

I endorse those sentiments and I venture to think that even the Indian delegation have given them some support by putting forward, ten days ago [236th meeting], a complete scheme of settlement which covered the restoration of order, the question of military occupation, the organisation of government and the carrying out of the plebiscite.

 

I think the Indian representative retreated a little from that position yesterday afternoon and, indeed, some doubt has been cast on what the Indian delegation really wants. It has been asked: "Are they desiring to make this demand on Pakistan, regardless of the consequences to be achieved, on the basis of fiat Justitia, ruat coelom?" Are they saying, "If this may mean war, let there be war" ? I do not believe it.

 

It has been suggested that they want action which will shorten and make less costly the action of the Indian Army ; that the Indian Army could then finish off the rebels and drive out the tribesmen and volunteers from Pakistan. Perhaps if the Security Council did what the Indian representative desired, it might have that result, though I doubt it.

 

But even if it did make it a little less long, a little less bloody, it would still be a long and bloody business. What would be infinitely worse is this and this is what both delegations and the Security Council (must bear continually in mind that it would make the hope of real friendship between India and Pakistan, lasting friendship for the years to come. less than it is today. I do not believe, I cannot believe, I will not believe, that this is what India really wants. They must want the full stoppage of the fighting at the earliest possible time; they must want the people of Poonch and Mirpur, the volunteers, the tribesmen, to stop their action because they believe they safely can do so.

 

Why can we not make the settlement now which the members of the Security Council desire ? Why does the Indian representative suggest that a plebiscite, which he admits is not irrelevant, is nevertheless a matter which could wait for a considerable time? Why does he call them, as he did, "long range problems" ? I think it would be a disaster both to India and to Pakistan if we so regard them. What is long term about them ? Why should it take long to make a settlement ?

 

The Indian delegation have no doubt given consideration to the matter during the past month. The Security Council has given consideration to it over a considerable time and they produced their scheme within a matter of days-two days if I remember rightly.

 

We start from a very strong position. Both sides want a fair plebiscite. It is contrary to common sense to think that a Government would come to this table and talk about a plebiscite that was not to be fair. Our problem in the Security Council is that to make all parties, including Pakistan and the Kashmiris now fighting against the Indian Army-whom the Indian representative admitted to be parties the other day, regard the plebiscite as fair.

 

I do not think that ought to take months and months. Why should it? I was very much struck by some words used by the Indian representative yesterday afternoon. He said, towards the end of his speech :

 

"On the occasion when the President handed this draft resolution to me, all I tried to persuade him of was that we had spent about a month in talking about generalities. Let us come to brass tacks; let us consider concrete proposals; let us sit down from day to day, hour after hour for the next four or five days and formulate concrete action to be taken. That would be time well spent. However, if we now are going to discuss merely general principles of this sort, get them through the Security Council, and later on begin to sit in order to consider concrete steps in themselves matters which will involve points of controversy" he felt that the Indian delegation had better do what it now proposes.

 

Those observation make me feel, firstly that I was right yesterday afternoon in suggesting that if we do not have an interval in our discussions, it should be used by our President and our Rapporteur in trying to evolve a much more definite, concrete scheme and, secondly, I am bound to say that I-and I think most members of the Security Council-had hoped that discussions of the kind described would have happened in the last interval between 6 February and 10 February, a period of nearly four days when we broke off for that very purpose.

 

But even now, in my view, it is not too late to do this. Why should not the delegations of India and Pakistan, the President and the Rapporteur sit down this afternoon and begin to hammer for four or five days on end at the real causes of disagreement? I think they can usefully do it on the basis of the draft resolution presented by the President and the Rapporteur. I do not think that would in any way prejudice the position of the delegation of India. If it were desired, I think the memorandum of the representative of Colombia also could be put in as a basis of debate.

 

Whatever the basis, of course, the hands of the Indian delegation would be free but I think it would be a tragedy if the representatives of India were to go back to their country without having, in their own words, "thrashed out the difficulties, the real differences that remain," and without understanding fully, on one side and the other, all that is in mind.

 

There is nothing irrevocable about an aircraft ticket. There may be something irrevocable in the departure of the Indian delegation. Who knows what may happen while they are away? I say, with all respect, that delays and hesitations have caused more unwanted wars than all the other factors in the world, wars that Governments had not planned, wars on which the Governments and the peoples look back with harshness. regret.

 

I believe this is a short-term, an urgent and, as politics. go in 1948, an easy problem. I am sure that if the delegations. could get back to the spirit of Independence Day five months ago, they could settle these issues without delay. As I said two weeks ago, they have settled by joint action problems far more difficult and far more terrible than this. In this, form should be nothing; spirit should be all.

 

On Independence Day the cabinet of the Government of India made a declaration in which they said: "We proclaim that we as a nation and a people stand for world peace and cooperation among nations. We stand for democracy. The method of democracy is to find peaceful solutions for all problems. By violence and hatred, no problem is solved." Let both delegations take those noble phrases as their programme; then our work will soon be ended and lasting peace and friendship will be assured.