10021948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 243 held on 10 February, 1948.
Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 243 held on 10 February, 1948.
The Security Council is still working in the field of solution by negotiation. It has not arrived at the type of service. which is described by Article 37 of the Charter.
Of course, we still hope that it will not be necessary for us to find that there has been a failure on the part of the parties to agree upon terms of settlement. We still have faith
that one of two possible conclusions may be arrived at by them.
The first conclusion would be the better; that is, actually to present to the Security Council terms of settlement upon which they have agreed. But that is not the only solution they could arrive at. They could, if they were unable to agree upon terms of settlement, arrive at an attitude toward recommendations made by our President and Rapporteur for a settlement, provided the Security Council passed a resolution covering that plan of settlement. In other words, the alter native would be acquiescence in a recommendation of the Security Council, notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not been willing themselves to assent to all of the terms of the proposal The result of our efforts that are now being made might be, then, either agreement or acquiescence.
The Security Council is reluctant to take action that will indicate that it believes that there is no hope in negotiation. Such would be the case, I believe, if we should pass a resolution different from those now pending. The instant business before the Security Council is represented by two short resolutions [documents S/661 and S/662] which were proposed by the representative of Belgium during the time that he was President of the Security Council. They have not been disposed of. Until they are finally disposed of, they hold the control of the voting in the Security Council, subject to those procedural votes that have priority or preference.
We have not come to a decision on those resolutions because we have continuously debated the situation from the time they were introduced [237th meeting] until the present, and we have invariably concluded our meetings with the suggestion that the parties get together and try again. Therefore, we are now in the situation in which we formerly were.
What I have to say about the memorandum presented by the representative of Colombia at the 241st meeting and the appeal contained in document 1 [document S/667] submitted by the President today, should not be understood to indicate that the United States favours the adoption of a resolution containing these principles. My remarks constitute an attempt to bring about further consideration by the parties of those principles.
If I were to judge the situation by the record, I should think that it was very promising and certainly not so hopeless as would seem to be indicated. Taking the memorandum submitted by the representative Colombia, and the verbatim record of the remarks of the representative of India, at the 242nd meeting, and referring specifically to parts of it, I would really consider that the means of agreement are contained there. Mention is actually made of principles to govern the parties in leading to specific propositions or proposals of settlement.
On the subject of urgency, about which the representative of Syria inquired, I noticed that the representative of India very eloquently characterised all that we have presented thus far leading towards harmonious settlement of this matter as "trends of opinion"; and observed, if I understood him a right, that urgency is not recognized in those "trends" which, in his view, seemed to disregard the urgency of the situation and to put the emphasis upon a long-range settlement. That is not my understanding of the situation. In fact, the very first sentence in the findings stated in the memorandum submitted by the representative of Colombia reads:
"A...the cessation of fighting and other acts of hostility is of a particularly urgent character in the Jammu and Kashmir State." If that is not recognized as an expression of urgency, I do not know how it could be put into language that would express it. The point of difference is one upon which I believe agreement can be reached. The question is asked today by the representative of India: "How shall the acts of hostility be made to end?" I think that if representatives examine this memorandum and the verbatim record of agreement in principle which is contained in the record of the 242nd meeting, they will find a great promise there of agreement in principle upon the method of stopping the fighting.
It was not until a late hour in the debate here that we made the startling discovery that many of the positions taken up by India and Pakistan in the record in the exchange of telegrams had been receded from. On the occasion to which I have just referred, Sheikh Abdullah made a statement that indicated that what he desired-and this was ratified by the representative of India immediately afterwards-as a trend in the Security Council towards the termination of hostilities, was that the Security Council should take up a position which would amount to that of an ally in a war, and should pull off Pakistan and allow India to finish the job by force against the tribesmen. That is the very last position which the Security Council ought to take.
If the representative of India refers to that in saying that his delegation has no hope of getting the Security Council to stop the fighting, then the Indian delegation has certainly made an appraisal of trends that is correct, because the trend of opinion in the Security Council is against war. In fact, it is the special function of the Security Council in a situation where there is a threat to the peace or, as in the present case, actual aggression, to make every effort in the first place to bring the matter to a peaceful conclusion by peaceful methods and not by means of force. No party coming here to a case like this can expect trends in the Security Council discussion towards the application of force, or towards a solution which would ally the United Nations with one side so that it could be successful in a military attack or defence.
What we are dealing with here is a situation which both parties have declared to be one that threatens the peace of the world, and one which, therefore, the Security Council has jurisdiction to consider. Our view, as indicated thus far by trends of opinion, must be clear. I think that there is no confusion at all about the fact that the trend of our opinion, which is not yet in the form of a resolution, is towards a pacific settlement of this matter-an arrangement with terms of such character that they command the respect and the confidence of the parties to the dispute. As I have said, there seems to be no other way of bringing peace to that part of the world than this specific method of agreement between the parties, which involves such management and such control of the plebiscite-to which both parties have assented-as to ensure that everyone interested will know that it is free, fair and just.
There is nothing within our vision that will induce the tribesmen to retire except such an arrangement as that. Nobody has proposed any method save this one suggested by Sheikh Abdullah: "You take care of Pakistan. Make Pakistan stop furnishing supplies, ammunition and weapons, and stop her allowing the establishment of bases in her country; stop the crossing of her country, and we will do the rest." That is a proposition which is perfectly astonishing.
I hope that when the Indian delegation returns to its country it will make very plain the fact that the United Nations is not engaged in promoting war or taking sides in war, and that the Security Council's business is just the opposite-namely, trying to find a peaceful solution to this problem. That is one assurance that can be given, and it is a trend properly appraised, I believe, by the representative of India.
On the other hand, I think that if the Indian delegation leaves this debate and returns home to receive new instructions, it ought to point out as well that the trend of opinion is toward a fair consideration by the Security Council of all the circumstances. There is no reason why the parties to this negotiation should expect favour, one as against the other, in a settlement. There is every reason to expect that the Security Council, if it should have to take this matter in hand and act under Article 37 of the Charter, will make a recommendation calling upon both parties to play a corresponding part in effecting the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of conditions in which the plebiscite can be carried out.
It is true that the drafts which have been submitted do not necessarily represent assent by every member of the Security Council to every single item. In speaking before, I have indicated my approval of many of the items which appear in both the memorandum of the Colombian delegation and the draft submitted today by the President of the Security Council But the approval expressed is not final, and we have not closed our minds to a consideration of new proposals and additional amendments. Upon some of these matters the United States has not taken any position. But on the whole do they not clearly aim at a settlement of this matter in which the rights and interests of all parties are taken into consideration? If they do not, let us take care of that situation. For example, if it is complained that sub-paragraph 4 (a) of document I document S/667] which was submitted to us today, is a mere abstract proposition, let us amend it and consider
suggested changes. I think that the Security Council trend, as shown by our debate, is to make these principles as useful and as applicable as possible to the situation so as to reach an agreement. If these principles are more acceptable when made less general than they appear in document I, then the way to remedy that is to make them more specific. For example, added to sub paragraph 4 (a) following alternative B, document 1, could be the words of any form of a military character", so that air bases, territory crossing, and the furnishing of weapons and other supplies could all be written into such a principle. There will be no trouble if a genuine purpose is shown to arrive at an agreement on the terms of settlement.
Therefore, I hope that when the delegation of India returns to its country, and particularly when the members speak to one of my very dear friends there, it will assure him that one of the trends of the Security Council is toward an equitable, fair and just settlement of this matter which takes an account the rights and claims of both parties which is not by any means restricted to the specific item of the drafts now before us.
The Security Council is seized of an issue of urgent importance. Nothing new has lessened the urgency of this case since we began the consideration of it.
The answer to the first allegation in the memorandum submitted by the Colombian delegation in the 241st meeting namely, that the cessation of fighting and other acts of hostility is of a particularly urgent character in the Jammu and Kashmir State-the representative of India said in the 242nd meeting "After the word 'Finds:', Paragraph A speaks of the cessation of fighting and other acts of hostility as being of a particularly urgent character in the Jammu and Kashmir State. We are entirely in agreement with this, and I hope that the Security Council as a whole is in agreement with it." We think the trend indicates that the Security Council does hold that opinion.
Paragraph B of the Colombian memorandum says: "That in conformity with the policy of the Indian Government that in the case of any statement where the issue of accession has been the subject of a dispute, the question should be settled by a reference to the people, India and Pakistan have agreed that the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan or to India must be determined through a plebiscite to be held under international auspices.." In regard to paragraph B, the Indian representative said at the 242nd meeting "Paragraph B speaks of the question of accession being referred to the people. Barring verbal amendments. which, if necessary, I shall propose at the proper time, it seems to me that the substance of this paragraph is worthy of serious examination. It speaks of a plebiscite to be held under international auspices."
Then we come to paragraph C, which states: "That the plebiscite as a method of determining the future status of the Jammu and Kashmir State is the most desirable and democratic, provided the will of the people is given free, fair and unfettered expression." There is an issue here, but it is not at all hopeless,
I shall read what was said by the representative of India: "Paragraph C seems to go rather beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. It refers to the plebiscite as being a method of determining the future government of the Jammu and Kashmir State, but I do not think any suggestion has been made that the future government of the State should be determined by means of a plebiscite. Our own proposal is that a national assembly, elected on the basis of adult suffrage, should frame the constitution of the State".
I think that is a very hopeful situation. I think the members of the Security Council should consider most carefully whether they ought to insist on any such proposal.
I want to say that I fear my own position here has been misunderstood. When I spoke about an interim government, I only envisaged that much control of the machinery of government as is necessary for the limited time and purpose of holding a fair plebiscite; that is all. My own position does not relate to the future government. I can think of many ways in which that situation might be handled without the least derogation of the present interim Government's life or powers, except for that special purpose; and that is a purpose which I believe both parties desire and which all the world would be glad to see pursued.
As regards paragraph D, the representative of India said, among other things, the following, and I am not reading it all: "We should, therefore, be willing to consider paragraph D if it were so modified as to indicate that the early establishment of a government reflecting the will of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State is essential to the attainment of the aims and purpose of this scheme."
Paragraph D states-and I do not know why it could not be changed according to that doctrine and principle: "That an interim Administration which will command the full confidence and respect of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State is essential to the attainment of the aims and purposes of this resolution".
I repeat that so far as the Security Council's jurisdiction over this matter is concerned, I have never envisaged any control over the internal government of Jammu and Kashmir longer than is necessary to accomplish that much-desired purpose of a fair and free plebiscite.
I have taken a good deal of time on this matter because I hope that if this delegation returns to India, it will go, not with discouragement and with a feeling that it has been prejudiced by these trends that have been indicated, but that there is actually every hope in the world for achieving an agreement that would be approved by the Security Council; it is really up to the parties, provided we do not have to get into Article 37 of the Charter. I hope we shall not have to do that.
Should the Security Council, being seized of this very serious and urgent question, adjourn its consideration of the item ? Whether or not we should adjourn consideration of the item is a serious question. We might be required to take up an emergency situation that will come to us tomorrow. If we had adjourned, what would be our situation? If the whole delegation returned to India without any notice that we had the intention to hold ourselves able to act in an emergency, could we act; would we act ? I think we should make such an arrangement of this matter as will accommodate the Indian delegation but which will also preserve this great objective that we have of preventing further aggression, of preventing further threats and of stopping the hostilities, all of which as we see it, requires agreement. Without agreement, there is nothing we can do under Chapter VI of the Charter which will accomplish that objective.
We wish to accommodate the Indian delegation, but I think we should say, without equivocation, that in their much regretted absence the Security Council holds itself in a position to act upon any emergency that might arise during the time they are necessarily absent.
My own view is that the Security Council would make a better record if we would recognize the necessity and convenience of the delegation of India to return home for the purpose that is stated in the letter from the Government of India, but if we would not adjourn this matter, and would bold it in statu quo and keep it there for two weeks, which is long enough, or perhaps three weeks.
I think that asking the Security Council to hold this matter in abeyance, subject to emergency, until 15 March or 20 March, is too long, and perhaps has more significance to the outside world than the delegation of India would like to give it. I am sure that India wishes to have everyone who knows about this transaction understand that what they are about to do is in the direction of a pacific settlement of a situation that threatens the peace of the world.
I conclude by expressing the urgent wish that we can arrive at this accommodation by an agreement to the effect that this item will remain on the agenda without consideration by the Security Council for fifteen days, unless there is a situation that requires the Security Council to act.